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SUMMARY 
 
 
THE NEAR REPEAT RISK CALCULATION OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES IN 
HILLCREST, KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA: A CRIMINOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
This research applies the Near Repeat Calculator (NRC) to identify near repeat 
residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area for the first time. A 
total of 490 residential burglaries, over a 12-month period, reported to Hillcrest police 
station were mapped (geocoded) and the near repeat calculations were visualised 
using the Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The month-to-month near repeat 
calculations are analysed and suggest that the NRC is a valuable tool that can predict 
the space-time locations of near repeat residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing 
area. 
 
 
KEY TERMS: 
 
 
Near Repeat Calculator (NRC); Near Repeat Burglary; Repeat Victimisation; 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS); Crime Pattern Theory; Flag and Boost 
Theory; Crime mapping; Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED); 
Broken Windows Theory; Burglary Patterns. 
xix  
 
TRANSLATION ISIZULU 
 
 
ISILINGANISO SAMATHUBA OKUTHI KUNOKWENZEKA ZIPHINDE ZENZEKE 
FUTHI IZIGAMEKO ZOKUGQEKEZWA KWAMAKHAYA E-HILLCREST, 
KWAZULU-NATALI, ENINGIZIMU AFRIKA: UKUHLAZIYWA KWEZIGAMEKO 
ZOBUGEBENGU 
 
Iqoqa: 
 
 
Lolu cwaningo lusebenzisa i-Near Repeat Calculator (NRC) ukuhlonza amaphethini 
okuphindaphindeka kwezigameko zokugqekezwa kwamakhaya endaweni 
eyenganyelwe yisiteshi samaphoyisa sase-Hillcrest (KZN). Izigameko 
zokugqekezwa kwamakhaya ezingama-490 ezabikwa esiteshini samaphoyisa sase- 
Hillcrest esikhathini esiyizinyanga eziyi-12 zaboniswa emfanekisweni webalazwe 
lendawo (geocoded) futhi izilinganiso zamathuba okuthi ziphinde zenzeke izigameko 
zokugqekezwa kwamakhaya zaboniswa ngokuthi kusetshenziswe umfanekiso 
owenziwe nge-Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Kwahlaziywa amathuba 
enyanga nenyanga okuphindaphindeka kwezigameko, futhi imiphumela 
eyatholakala kulokhu iyabonisa ukuthi i-NRC iyithuluzi eliwusizo impela 
elingabikezela izindawo nesikhathi lapho kungaphinda futhi kwenzeke khona 
izigameko zokugqekezwa kwamakhaya endaweni eyenganyelwe yisiteshi 
samaphoyisa sase-Hillcrest. 
 
Amatemu asemqoka: 
 
 
I-Near Repeat Calculator (NRC); Amathuba Okuthi Kuphinde Kwenzeke Isigameko 
Sokugqekeza; Ukuphindaphindeka Kokuba Yisisulu; ama-Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS); Ithiyori Yamaphethini Obugebengu; i-Flag and Boost Theory; 
Umfanekiso webalazwe obonisa izizinda zobugebengu endaweni ethile; Ukuvinjelwa 
Kobugebengu Ngokusebenzisa Idizayini Yesimo Sendawo (CPTED); Ithiyori 
Yamafasitela Aphukile; Amaphethini Ezigameko Zokugqekeza. 
1 
 
 
TRANSLATION NESIXHOSA 
 
 
UBALO OLUVEZA IZIGANEKO ZOQHEKEZO EZIPHINDWAYO KWINDAWO 
ETHILE KWIMIZI YASEHILLCREST, KWAZULU-NATAL, EMZANTSI AFRIKA: 
UHLALUTYO LWENZULULWAZI YOLWAPHULO MTHETHO. 
 
 
 
 
Isishwankathelo: 
 
 
Olu phando lusebenzisa uhlobo lokubala olwaziwa ngokuba yiNear Repeat Calculator 
(NRC) ngenjongo yokubona isimbo sokuqhekezwa kwezindlu zabantu kummandla 
ophantsi kwamapolisa aseHillcrest (eKZN). Kuqwalaselwe ama-490 eziganeko 
zoqhekezo lwemizi ezaxelwa emapoliseni aseHillcrest kwisithuba seenyanga ezili-12, 
kwaye uhlobo lokubala oluqikelela ukuphindwa kweziganeko zoqhekezo luboniswe 
ngokusebenzisa inkqubo ekuthiwa yiGeographic Information Systems (GIS). Ubalo 
oluqikelela ukuphindwa kweziganeko luphononongiwe kwinyanga nenyanga, kwaye 
iziphumo zibonisa ukuba iNRC sisixhobo esinexabiso, esinokukwazi ukuqikelela 
indawo nexesha apho kunokuphinda kuqhekezwe khona kummandla ophantsi 
kwamapolisa aseHillcrest. 
 
 
 
Amagama aphambili: 
 
 
Isixhobo sokubala esiyiNear Repeat Calculator (NRC); Uqhekezo Oluphindwa 
Kwindawo Ekufutshane; Ukuxhatshwazwa Okuphindwayo; Iinkqubo Zolwazi 
Lwezelizwe (iGeographic Information Systems (GIS); Ingcingane Yepatheni 
Yolwaphulo Mthetho (iCrime Pattern Theory); Ingcingane Yomtsalane Kubaphuli 
Mthetho (iFlag and Boost Theory); Ukuzotywa Kommandla Wolwaphulo Mthetho 
(iCrime mapping); Uthintelo Lolwaphulo Mthetho Ngokuyila Okusingqongileyo (iCrime 
Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED); Ingcingane Yeefestire 
Ezaphukileyo; Iipatheni Zoqhekezo. 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
ARV 
 
Antiretroviral 
 
ATM 
 
Automatic Teller Machine 
 
BCU 
 
Basic Command Unit 
 
BWT 
 
Broken Window Theory 
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Crime Administration System 
 
CCTV 
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CDA 
 
Case Docket Analysis 
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Crime Information Analysis Centre 
 
CID 
 
Crime Investigation Division 
 
CLM 
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CPA 
 
Crime Threat Analysis 
 
CPA 
 
Crime Pattern Analysis 
 
CPF 
 
Community Policing Forum 
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CPTED 
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CRIMSA 
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CSA 
 
Crime Statistical Analysis 
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Crime Threat Analysis 
 
DACST 
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DSS 
 
Decision Support System 
 
DST 
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Environmental Systems Research Institute 
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FOSS 
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Geographic Information System 
 
GMP 
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GPS 
 
Global Positioning System 
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International Business Machines 
 
IED 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION TO THE NEAR REPEAT 
CALCULATOR 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The term ‘near repeat’ was first used in 2000, by Dr Frank Morgan, a researcher who 
found that further residential burglaries occurred, in close proximity to one another, 
within one month of the first burglaries (Groff & Taniguichi, 2016: np). International 
research (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen, Yuan & Li, 2013; 
Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson, Bernasco, Bowers, Elffers, Ratcliffe, Rengert & 
Townsley, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto, Piza & Caplan, 2014; Piza & 
Carter, 2018; Morgan, 2000; Townsley, Homel & Chaseling, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; 
Wu, Xu, Ye & Zhu, 2015), has found that a residential burglary is a good indicator of 
future residential burglaries, either to the same or to nearby houses for a period of 
time. 
 
Near repeat residential burglary patterns have been identified in Western countries 
such as Australia (Johnson et al, 2007; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003:615), the 
Netherlands (Johnson et al, 2007), New Zealand (Johnson et al, 2007), the United 
Kingdom (UK) (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; 
Johnson & Bowers, 2004) the United States of America (USA) (Johnson et al, 2007; 
Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018) and, in more recent years, in non-Western 
countries, like Brazil (Chainey & da Silva, 2016) and China (Chen et al, 2013; Wang 
& Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015). Johnson et al (2007) conducted research on the space- 
time pattern of burglary risk in five different countries (Australia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, UK, and the USA), using ten different data-sets provided by the police forces 
responsible for the areas (Johnson et al, 2007:14, 43). These researchers found that 
even though patterns varied in all the areas, houses situated within 200 meters of a 
burgled home were at an increased risk of burglary for two weeks following the initial 
burglary (Johnson et al, 2007:2). 
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Professor Jerry Ratcliffe of Temple University in the USA developed the Near Repeat 
Calculator (NRC) (Ratcliffe, [sa]: np) which is supported by the National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ), and Office of Justice Programs from the US Department of Justice 
(Ratcliffe, 2009:4). The NRC was developed to calculate the temporal and spatial risk 
to other properties, after a series of burglaries in a specific area (Ratcliffe, [sa]: np). 
Furthermore, the NRC was developed to address crime analysis issues and to 
estimate near repeat processes for crime data using the recorded dates and 
coordinates of the burglaries (Ratcliffe, [Sa]: np). The NRC is copyrighted but freely 
available but cannot be re-sold. It was intended for use by law enforcement agencies, 
criminal justice researchers and educators. Prior research by Johnson (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004), Bowers (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Bowers, 2004), Townsley (Johnson et al, 2007; Townsley 
et al, 2003), Henk Elffers (Johnson et al, 2007), Bernasco (Johnson et al, 2007) and 
Rengert (Johnson et al, 2007) was instrumental to the  development of the NRC 
(Ratcliffe, 2009:4) for near repeat residential burglary patterns. 
 
Moreto et al (2014) conducted research in Newark, New Jersey, USA using the NRC, 
Risk Terrain Modelling (RTM) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The 
Newark Police Department’s residential burglary data for 2010, together with the NRC, 
was used to identify the risk of future burglaries (Moreto et al, 2014:1119). The NRC 
identified that previously burgled residences were at a 318% (p=0.001) risk for 14 days 
of repeat residential burglary victimisation, and a 23% risk for houses located 900 feet 
(about 275m) from previously burgled houses (Moreto et al, 2014:1118-1119). In 
recent years, near repeat burglary patterns have been identified in China (Chen et al, 
2013; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015). Using the NRC, Chen et al (2013:9), found 
that near repeat burglary risk was extended up to three weeks, and within 100m of 
each burgled location. Through the application of the NRC, researchers Wu et al 
(2015:181, 183,187), identified near repeat burglary patterns, which highlighted that 
26% of burglaries occurred within 14 days of the initial incident of burglary. Recent 
research (Chainey & da Silva, 2016) used the NRC in Belo Horizonte, a large Brazilian 
city, and recorded crime data on residential burglary from 2012 to 2014. The NRC 
found a statistically significant higher risk of a repeat, and near repeat patterns of 
burglary, to nearby residences, but these findings are lower than research findings in 
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Western countries (Chainey & da Silva, 2016:7). 
 
Since the 1990s, crime mapping has been carried out using the GIS (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2016:232) which is a set of computer-based tools that allow one to visualise, 
query or analyse geographic, and tabular data for a specific area (Santos, 2017:8). 
The GIS is used in this research to visualise the Hillcrest policing area, residential 
burglaries, and the NRC results. This research aims to test the NRC's ability to identify 
near repeat residential burglary patterns in a South African context, based on 
residential burglary cases reported at the Hillcrest KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Police 
Station. 
 
1.2 CRIME ANALYSIS TOOLS USED 
 
 
At station level, the SAPS make use of the Crime Threat Analysis (CTA) and the Crime 
Pattern Analysis (CPA) (National Crime Registrar, 2017:12). The CTA is an example 
of a Decision Support System (DSS) used by crime analysts at SAPS on station level 
(Krause, 2007:35). The CTA was implemented in 1998 and integrates crime-related 
findings such as crime statistical analysis, crime pattern analysis, linkage analysis, 
crime docket analysis, profiling, and fieldwork activities (Krause, 2007:3-4, 19, 35). 
The focus of the CTA is to generate core management information required for crime 
prevention, and to illuminate criminal activities by group offenders, repeat offenders 
and serial offenders (Krause, 2007:3-4). According to the NRC (2017:16-17), the CTA 
and the CPA are used in operational planning, resource allocation, shift tasking, and 
to identify hotspots to prevent crime. According to a detective at Hillcrest Police 
(Respondent 4, 2015: np) who participated in the qualitative interviews for this 
research, the CTA and the CPA are used at the Hillcrest Police Station to gauge where 
future residential burglaries may occur. Accordingly, the CPA can indicate the 
frequency when crimes may occur in time (temporal) and space (spatial) (Krause, 
2007:3). According to Krause (2007:34-35), the CTA process consists of the following 
seven steps: 
 
1.  Step 1: Crime statistical analysis (CSA). 
 
2.  Step 2: Geographic crime analysis (GCA). 
 
3.  Step 3: Crime pattern analysis (CPA). 
 
4.  Step 4: Linkage crime analysis (LCA). 
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5.  Step 5: Case docket analysis (CDA). 
 
6.  Step 6: Fieldwork. 
 
7.  Step 7: Profiling. 
 
 
Step one to three of the CTA process demonstrates the nature and extent of crime 
over a specific period. It further identifies hotspots and crime pattern information in 
geographic areas (Krause, 2007:34-35). This information is vital to police 
management, for planning crime prevention strategies and resource allocation, 
according to the predicted day(s) of the week, time, and geographic areas where crime 
is likely to occur (Krause, 2007:35). Steps one to seven are for crime detection 
purposes and provide the crime analyst with operational information pertaining to 
organised crime, repeat offenders and serial offenders (Krause, 2007:35). The CTA 
plays a role in the SAPS Strategic Plan for 2014-2019. According to the SAPS 
Strategic Plan: 2014-2019, amongst critical interventions, crime intelligence gathering 
on a local level is to be improved to supply enough area coverage for the CTA and to 
promote the development of quality cases (SAPS, 2015a:17-18). The GIS is currently 
used by all SAPS divisions, components, and sections for the management of 
functional policing and for crime reporting, analysis, and prevention (SAPS, 2015b:45). 
 
The aim of this study is to apply the NRC to identify near repeat residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. At the time of writing, there was no known 
research on near repeat burglary patterns, or on the use of the NRC in South Africa 
or Africa as a whole. If near repeat burglary patterns are found to exist in the Hillcrest 
policing area, and if the NRC can spatially and temporarily predict residential burglary 
patterns, this research could be of value to the Hillcrest police and, via further 
research, to the SAPS as a whole. 
 
If NRC results are used, in conjunction with the GIS, to form predictive risk maps, the 
police will be better able to allocate resources, such as crime prevention patrols in 
areas with an increased risk for house burglaries. Previous research findings (Bowers 
& Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; 
Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 2000; Piza 
& Carter, 2018; Townsley et al, 2003:615; Wang & Liu, 2017;  & Wu et al, 2015) on 
near repeat burglary patterns and the application of the NRC in various countries, 
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(Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Moreto et al, 2014; Wu et al, 2015) may 
be applicable to urban formal settlements in the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
TABLE 1: Predictive Tool Comparison 
 
Crime Analysis tools 
Tool Predictive Function Purpose 
Crime Threat Analysis 
(CTA) 
Can predict hotspots of 
crime, like residential 
burglaries. 
Hotspots are areas that have 
a high density or volume of 
crime. 
The focus of the CTA is to 
generate core management 
information required  for 
crime prevention, and to 
illuminate criminal activities 
by group offenders, repeat 
offenders and serial 
offenders. 
 
Both the CTA and CPA are 
used by the SAPS in 
operational planning, 
resource allocation, shift 
tasking, and to identify 
hotspots to prevent crime, 
such as residential 
burglaries. 
Crime Pattern Analysis 
(CPA) 
Can   predict   frequency   of 
crime  occurrence  in  space 
and time. 
Near Repeat Calculator 
(NRC) 
Developed    specifically    to 
identify near repeat patterns 
of residential burglary risk. 
 
The near repeat 
phenomenon suggests every 
incident has the potential to 
transfer risk to the nearby 
vicinity. 
 
The  NRC can  predict 
clusters occurring in space 
and time. 
The NRC can be used as a 
standalone tool or it can be 
used   in   conjunction   with 
other predictive tools, like the 
CPA and CTA to enhance 
management      information 
and decision making for 
resource allocation in the 
prevention of residential 
burglaries. 
 
In this research the NRC was 
used as a standalone tool, 
where the near repeat 
calculations of risk were 
illustrated and analysed by 
using the GIS. 
Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) 
A mapping tool which can 
identify  crime patterns, 
trends and clusters. 
The  GIS  can  visualise  or 
map data generated by the 
CTA, CPA and the NRC. 
 
The GIS was used in this 
exploratory research to 
visualise the  Hillcrest 
policing area, to map 
residential burglary points, to 
create month-month 
predictive  maps  based  on 
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the near repeat calculations 
of residential burglary risk 
and to analyse the data. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RATIONALE 
 
 
International research (Groff & Taniguchi, 2016: np) has found near repeat patterns 
for crimes such as residential burglaries, vehicle thefts, shootings, illegal carrying of 
firearms and street robberies. However, the extent of the spatial and temporal near 
repeat patterns of distinct types of crime vary and require crime-specific crime 
prevention strategies (Groff & Taniguchi, 2016: np). According to Groff and Taniguchi 
(2016: np), the near repeat pattern has become a pivotal point for predictive 
forecasting of crime occurrence. When near repeat patterns are merged with other 
data, such as land-use, they can enhance the predictive accuracy of crime forecasts 
(Groff & Taniguchi, 2016: np). According to the SAPS Annual Crime Statistics from 
April 2017 to March 2018, 765 residential burglary cases were reported to the Hillcrest 
police station (SAPS, 2018: np). A clearer picture of the nature and extent of residential 
burglaries can be provided through closed-case analysis. This study focuses on 490 
closed-case dockets for residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest Police Station 
between April 2012 and March 2013. Most of these residential burglaries occurred in 
the formal urban settlements of the Hillcrest policing area. Mabena (2017: np) opines 
that due to a lack of resources, the police (SAPS) are unable to carry out their duties 
efficiently. The high residential burglary rate in the Hillcrest policing area can be 
attributed to a lack of police presence and police resources (Guy, Waterworth & Gopi, 
2016: np). According to news articles (Naicker, 2015:3; Nair, 2013a: np; Nair, 2013b: 
np), the Hillcrest policing area has experienced severe crimes waves over the past 
few years. The findings of this research could be valuable to the SAPS, as the 
application of the NRC could prevent future incidents of residential burglary and assist 
with on-going investigations and resource allocation for crime prevention initiatives. 
The NRC can, for instance, indicate which spatial areas are at an increased risk for 
residential burglaries so that crime prevention patrols can be focused. Thus, location 
prediction for house burglary would assist the police in allocating patrols and reducing 
response times, if they knew the areas, neighbourhoods, streets and/or even houses 
at increased risk of burglary (Groff & Le Vigne, 2002:31). Like the NRC, the Q- 
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Geographic Information System (Q-GIS) is freely available software. Both the NRC 
and Q-GIS are valuable and cost-effective tools for the prevention and investigation of 
residential burglary and could be used by the Hillcrest police at station level. The GIS 
was used in this research to geocode (map) residential burglary points, to illustrate 
NRC results, to highlight various land uses in the area (e.g. formal urban settlements, 
farmland, vacant land, and informal settlements) and environmental factors (such as 
main roads, railway lines, road nodes and end nodes or cul-de-sacs). 
 
 
This research applies the NRC to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in 
the Hillcrest policing area, and the GIS to visualise near repeat calculations of 
residential burglary risk in the form of month-to-month, predictive risk maps. The NRC 
can be used to identify near repeat patterns of risk and the GIS for visualisation of data 
and analysis. This research is by no means a replacement for any processes currently 
employed by Hillcrest police. Instead, it proposed additional tools to potentially 
increase the predictive accuracy of future residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing 
area and improve the effective allocation of valuable resources. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
The research aims to apply the NRC to identify near repeat burglary patterns in the 
Hillcrest policing area. The GIS allows visualisation of the Hillcrest policing area, 
residential burglary point geo-coding (x and y coordinates), and near repeat 
calculations which can be analysed to create month-to-month predictive risk maps. 
The NRC, associated with the identification of near repeat residential burglary 
patterns, coupled with the visualisation and analytical capabilities of the GIS, can 
support Hillcrest SAPS in decision-making for resource allocation and with crime 
preventions strategies focused on specific areas at specific times. 
 
The objective of this research is to test the predictive accuracy of the NRC using 
residential burglaries reported to the Hillcrest police over 12-months. Month-to-month 
predictive risk maps, based on NRC results, are then created using the GIS; and for 
each month the near repeat residential burglary results are measured against actual 
burglaries reported to ascertain the predictive accuracy of the NRC. If the NRC, and 
GIS predictive risk map process, are found to be accurate, they could be valuable tools 
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for use at station level. 
 
 
Qualitative interviews were conducted with five detectives from the Hillcrest police 
station. The detectives volunteered to be interviewed providing anonymity was 
assured. These interviews were carried out one-on-one, allowing the researcher to 
gain insight into knowledge, experiences, views, and attitudes on residential burglaries 
in the Hillcrest policing area. Subject Matter Experts (SME) were contacted 
electronically to draw on their experience and opinions relating to this research in 
terms of its methodology and the application of the NRC in a South African context. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
This research is exploratory in nature which refers to specific research carried out for 
the first time, to gain better insight into and understanding of the research topic or 
phenomenon  (Babbie,  2016:92;  Bachman  &  Schutt,  2016:9,  Maxfield  &  Babbie, 
2016:313). This study thus, applies the NRC, for the first time in South Africa, to 
identify near repeat burglary patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area, while 
creating month-to-month near repeat predictive risk maps using the GIS. The GIS is 
further used to conduct a spatial analysis between residential burglaries and the 
environment in which they occurred. 
 
The researcher aims to answer the following research questions: 
 
• Can the NRC identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest 
policing area? 
• Can the NRC predict near repeat risk of residential burglaries in the Hillcrest 
policing area? 
• Can the NRC be of value to the Hillcrest police for resource allocation, crime 
prevention strategies and investigations in the Hillcrest policing area? 
• Can the GIS be of value for visualisation and analytics at Hillcrest police 
station? 
 
 
 
1.6 DEFINITIONS 
 
 
The following definitions are central to this research. 
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1.6.1 Environmental Criminology 
 
 
Environmental criminology focuses on various aspects of the environment in which 
crime occurs, by identifying patterns of criminal behaviour and opportunities for crime 
to take place (Santos, 2017:39-40). According to Herbig (2016: ii-iii), environmental 
criminology is concerned with crime patterns, criminal behaviour, and analyses of the 
space and time when a crime has occurred while acknowledging environmental factors 
such as land use, traffic patterns, street layout and the routine activities of both victims 
and offenders. Environmental criminology is rooted in three criminological theories to 
wit the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), Routine Activities Theory (RAT) and the Crime 
Pattern Theory (CPT), and focuses on geographical and spatial factors related to 
crime (Turner, 2013:3). According to Andresen, Brantingham and Kinney (2010:6), 
environmental criminology consists of four theories, i.e. the Geometry Theory of crime, 
the RCT, the RAT and CPT, and is concerned with the environment in which the crime 
occurs, and not with the offender. Environmental criminology encompasses a group 
of related theories that share an interest in crime and the immediate environment in 
which crime occurs (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2011:1). In this research, environmental 
criminology is defined as a criminological perspective which draws on the RCT, RAT 
and CPT, and focuses on the immediate environment in which a crime has occurred. 
 
1.6.2  Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
 
 
The GIS is a software tool that has gained in popularity with researchers since the 
 
1990s because of its sophisticated crime-mapping functions (Bachman & Schutt, 
 
2016:232). The GIS allows one to change, visualise, query, or analyse geographic and 
tabular data (Santos, 2017:8). It makes allowances for a crime analyst to map crime 
in several ways, ranging from a single point on a map, to a three-dimensional 
visualisation of spatial or temporal data, and can additionally store, retrieve, and 
display spatial data on maps (Gorr & Kurland, 2012:3; Santos, 2017:8). This valuable 
tool enables crime analysts, investigators and the police to access and analyse data 
on crime maps for the purpose of law enforcement and crime prevention strategies 
(Gorr & Kurland, 2012:2). In this research, the GIS is defined as a geographic software 
tool used by crime analysts to map crimes and to analyse and visualise data for crime 
prevention strategies. 
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1.6.3  Crime Mapping 
 
 
Crime mapping often entails the use of the GIS to visualise data such as the location 
of the crime, distance, patterns, and links that may exist. Crime mapping enables 
visual and statistical analysis of crime and the environment in which it occurs. It also 
facilitates the linking of crime data to different data sources and presents analysed 
data in the form of visual maps (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:232, 312). Crime mapping 
is used by law enforcement agencies as a visualisation tool to map and analyse 
crime/crime scenes (Balogun, Okeke & Chukwukere, 2014:465; Eloff, 2013:10). This 
tool can assist law enforcement management in decision-making, resource allocation, 
strategies and tactical analysis including crime forecasting (Balogun et al, 2014:465). 
 
According to Breetzke (2016a), the GIS has become a valuable tool for spatial analysis 
and the visualisation of crime data in South Africa. The GIS can report and map police 
activity, share information, identify hotspots, monitor, and evaluate the impact of crime 
prevention initiatives, and assist decision-makers with resource allocation 
(Mukumbira, 2012:20). Unsurprisingly the GIS has been a significant innovation for 
police organisations worldwide (Gorr & Kurland, 2012:2). Crime mapping involves 
using the GIS to conduct spatial analysis of crime, referred to as crime analysis 
(Santos, 2017:8). For this study, crime mapping is defined as a visualisation tool that 
integrates the GIS to map and analyse crime, to aid police management with decision- 
making, resource allocation, crime prevention strategy and prediction of crime location 
or area. 
 
1.6.4  Crime Analysis 
 
 
According to Eloff (2013:10), crime analysis is the process of analysing relevant 
information about crime patterns. Crime analysis includes tactical, strategic, 
academic, operational, intelligence, and investigation aspects. For crime analysis to 
be useful, it requires data-mining, crime-mapping, statistics, research methods, 
desktop publishing, charts, presentations, critical thinking, and a solid understanding 
of criminal behaviour (Eloff, 2006:4). Crime analysis involves the study of crime and 
disorder - such as a neglected neighbourhood plagued with litter and graffiti which 
transmits a careless community attitude - and socio-demographic, spatial and 
temporal factors (Winfree & Abadinsky, 2017:10). This analysis can assist the police 
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in apprehending offenders; reducing crime and disorder, implementing crime 
prevention strategies, and evaluating implemented strategies (Santos, 2017:4). Crime 
analysis makes use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Data obtained 
through qualitative methods is aimed at enhancing understanding of crime, while 
quantitative data involves the analysis of categories or numerical data, in the form of 
statistics, frequencies, percentages, means or rates (Santos, 2017:4-5). For the 
function of this research, crime analysis is defined as a process consisting of 
qualitative and quantitative data, focused on crime patterns, including tactical, 
strategic, academic, operational, intelligence and investigative factors relating to 
crime. 
 
1.6.5  Q - Geographic Information System (Q-GIS) 
 
 
The Q-GIS is a free open source software (FOSS). It is a user-friendly GIS programme 
registered under a public licence. It is an official project of the Open Source Geospatial 
Foundation. The Q-GIS operates on the Linux, Unix, Mac OSX, Windows, and Android 
systems. It supports various vector and raster database formats and functions (Q-GIS, 
[Sa]: np). Vector data is represented by points, lines and polygons, while raster data 
(also known as grid cells) consist of aerial photos or satellite imagery (GIS Geography, 
2016: np). Q-GIS, in this research, refers to free GIS software used to map the Hillcrest 
policing area, geocode residential burglary points, visualise the NRC results, and carry 
out spatial analysis. 
 
1.6.6  Mixed method research 
 
 
Mixed method research consists of both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
involves combining the two to provide a better understanding of a specific research 
area (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:315; Bryman, 2016:692; Creswell, 2014:4, 215; 
Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 2013: 207). 
 
Qualitative research methods consist of participant observation, interviews or focus 
groups, with the research findings presented in the form of words or writing (Bachman 
& Schutt, 2018:316). 
 
 
Quantitative research methods consist of surveys and experiments to measure the 
area of research and produce findings in the form of numbers or categories (Bachman 
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& Schutt, 2018:316-317). After qualitative and quantitative data collection is complete, 
the data is analysed and only then are the findings combined to form mixed method 
research (DeCuir-Gunby & Schutz, 2017:86). In this research, mixed method research 
refers to the combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods 
focused on the topic under investigation. 
 
1.6.7  Near Repeat Burglary 
 
 
Morgan (2000) defined the term ‘near repeat’ to describe burglaries that occurred in 
close proximity to one another and within one month of the initial burglary (Groff & 
Taniguichi, 2016: np). According to the near repeat theory, every victimisation, like 
burglary, has the potential to form patterns of victimisation in the surrounding area for 
a period of time (Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). Bernasco (2008:414) 
proffers that once a house has been burgled, not only is the same property at an 
elevated risk of repeat victimisation but so are the nearby homes. This near repeat 
burglary risk fades, at a similar rate as repeat burglary risk. The National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ) (2014: np) describes near repeat burglary as the higher risk of burglary 
victimisation to nearby homes, for a period of 7-14 days, after a house is burgled in 
the same area. A near repeat burglary occurs when two or more nearby houses are 
burgled within a space of time and within a set spatial neighbourhood or area (Short, 
D’Orsogna, Brantingham & Tita, 2009: np). For this research, near repeat burglary is 
defined as burglaries that occur in close proximity to one another within a period after 
initial burglary victimisation in the same area. 
 
1.6.8  Near Repeat Calculator (NRC) 
 
 
The Near Repeat Calculator (NRC) can calculate the near repeat risk transferred to 
nearby properties, using the coordinates and date(s) of the crime(s) previously 
committed (Ratcliffe, 2009: np). The NRC is based on an algorithm of the Knox Test 
(Knox, 1964) and the statistical significance is measured using the Monte Carlo 
Simulation (Wu et al, 2015:181). The NRC is a free software package available for 
download. The user enters the coordinates and dates for any type of crime, and results 
are calculated showing the risk of near repeat crime, the geographic area (spatial) and 
duration (temporal) of increased risk (Tech Beat, 2008: np). For the purpose of this 
research, the NRC is defined as a scientific tool that uses the coordinates and dates 
13  
of previous residential burglaries, to calculate the near repeat risk (spatial and 
temporal) of burglary to nearby properties. 
 
1.6.9  Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
 
 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) are developed for various research studies (Canter 
 
& Youngs, 2008:12). Interdisciplinary research is required during the development of 
a DSS, including but not limited to, computer science, decision theory, statistics, 
psychology, organisational science, information knowledge and engineering (Mysiak, 
Giupponi & Rosato, 2005:203-204). DSS differ from expert systems in that they do not 
give investigators a definite answer that can lead to the arrest of an offender(s) (Canter 
& Youngs, 2008:12). Instead, DSS aim to systematically supply current information to 
the police in order to facilitate their knowledge and understanding of crime and crime 
patterns in their areas of policing (Canter & Youngs, 2008:12). DSS can promote 
investigators’ skills, knowledge, and experience, and thus aid in their investigations 
(Canter & Youngs, 2008:12). Thus, DSS comprises systems to assist the decision- 
making process but do not always provide answers. DSS are a specific type of 
computerised information platforms that support organisational and business decision- 
making processes (Thakur, 2015: np). The CTA and GIS are examples of a DSS used 
by the SAPS (Krause, 2007:3-4; Overall, Singh & Gcina (2008:37). According to 
Overall et al (2008:37), the GIS, which identifies crime patterns, trends, and clusters, 
is a valuable DSS for crime prevention. 
 
1.6.10 Residential burglary 
 
 
Residential burglary is the illegal entry into a residential structure often using physical 
force or a tool; ordinarily committed in the belief that no one is home (Lehohla, 2014:x). 
According to the Institute of Security Studies (Institute of Security Studies, [Sa]:np), 
residential burglary, or housebreaking, is committed by a person or persons who 
illegally and intentionally break into a residential building, or structure using physical 
force or a tool, with the aim of committing a crime on the premises (Institute of Security 
Studies [Sa]: np). In this research, residential burglary refers to unlawful and 
intentional breaking into a home, residential structure or building in the belief that it is 
unoccupied, with the aim of stealing from the premises. 
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1.6.11 Robbery at residential premises 
 
 
Robbery at residential premises is the unlawful and intentional removal and theft of 
tangible property from a residential premise while someone is at home (Lehohla, 
2014:x). House robbery is a term used by the SAPS to describe a robbery where the 
offenders confront, overpower, detain, and rob the occupants of the targeted residence 
(Zinn, 2010:27). For purposes of this research, robbery at residential premises means 
the unlawful and intentional removal and theft of tangible property from the residential 
premises while occupied by confronting, threatening, or overpowering the residents. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGICAL OUTLAY 
 
 
The methodological outlay outlines each section of the process undertaken by the 
researcher. The broad goals of the research and the aims and objectives are 
summarised. The choice, rationale and benefit of exploratory research design are 
summarised. The unit of analysis and criteria for validity and reliability fulfilment are 
described. The ethical processes and procedures which guide the research and its 
interpretation are outlined. 
 
1.7.1  Broad goals of the research 
 
 
This research aims to test the NRC’s ability to identify near repeat residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area. The value of creating predictive risk maps, 
applying the GIS from the NRC results, is the prevention of near repeat residential 
burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
1.7.2  Aims and objectives 
 
 
This research aims to apply the NRC in order to identify near repeat burglary patterns 
in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area. The GIS is used to map and visualises the Hillcrest 
policing area and to geocode residential burglaries. The NRC and GIS capabilities are 
combined to create month-to-month predictive risk maps. It is averred that the NRC 
and GIS are valuable instruments for policing. They can be used to aid resource 
allocation and crime prevention strategies at specific location and times to prevent 
near repeat residential burglaries. The NRC, in conjunction with the GIS, can be 
employed at station level by the Hillcrest police as part of their crime monitoring and 
prevention functions. The objective of this research is to test the predictive accuracy 
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of the NRC and GIS using 12-months of residential burglary cases reported to the 
Hillcrest (KZN) police. The GIS creates month-to-month near repeat predictive risk 
maps, based on NRC results. The month-to-month predictive risk maps are compared 
over a 12-month period to prove the accuracy, or inaccuracy of the NRC, to identify 
and predict near repeat resident burglary patterns. Both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods are used to meet the aim and objective of this research, as 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The research questions which the researcher aims to answer are: 
 
• Can the NRC identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest 
policing area? 
• Can the NRC predict near repeat risk of residential burglaries in the Hillcrest 
policing area? 
• Is  the  NRC  valuable  to  the  Hillcrest  police  for  resource  allocation,  crime 
prevention strategies and investigation in their policing area? 
• Is the GIS a valuable visualisation and analytical tool for the Hillcrest police 
station? 
 
1.7.3  Research design 
 
 
An exploratory research method is used here because the researcher is exploring an 
unknown and hence new problem (Babbie, 2016:92; Bachman & Schutt, 2016:9, 
Maxfield & Babbie, 2016:313), to wit the use of the NRC to identify near repeat 
residential burglary in Hillcrest (KZN). Further, there is a paucity of research relating 
to this topic in South Africa. Exploratory research allows the researcher to better 
comprehend the area of study, investigate if further research is sensible and to 
develop research methods for potential use in future studies (Babbie, 2016:92). 
 
The researcher, however, acknowledges that exploratory is limited in its ability to 
provide a definite answer or conclusion to a specific problem (Babbie, 2016:92). 
Subsequently, this study focuses on the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area only, and the 
research findings may not necessarily apply to other areas. Most of the closed-case 
residential burglaries used for this research occurred in formal urban settlements. 
Through further and more representative research the NRC could be tested for its 
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ability to identify near repeat burglary patterns over bigger areas, and in a uniquely 
 
South Africa context. 
 
1.7.4  Unit of analysis 
 
 
This studies unit of analysis is residential burglaries reported to the Hillcrest police 
between April 2012 and March 2013. In-line with the research aim - using the NRC 
and GIS to identify and visualise near repeat burglary patterns in Hillcrest (KZN) - 
docket analysis provided a detailed overview of the dynamics, factors and modus 
operandi (MO) of the crime, and assisted with narrowing the direction of investigation 
and enhancing the researcher comprehension of crime data to promote scientific 
research (Van Graan & Van der Watt, 2014:144). According to Van Graan and Van 
der Watt (2014:144), case-docket analysis can potentially assist criminal investigators, 
crime analysts and crime researchers, to narrow or direct investigations by highlighting 
dynamics and contributing factors; assist in decision-making; enable specific crime 
incident analysis and identify MO and case-linking. One should not understate the 
advantages of docket analysis provided it is carried out systematically (Van Graan & 
Van der Watt, 2014:144). This research is based on an analysis of 490 closed-case 
police dockets for residential burglaries reported to the Hillcrest Police Station between 
April 2012 and March 2013. Hillcrest SAPS polices a large area of 452km2; 90% of 
which is rural and has few tarred roads (Hillcrest Community Policing Forum, 2015: 
np). A total of 449 (91.6%) of 490 of the analysed burglaries occurred in formal urban 
settlements and 38 (7.8%) on farmlands. 
 
1.7.5  Data collection methods 
 
 
In this research both the quantitative and qualitative method relies on an explanatory, 
sequential mixed methods approach, to gain a detailed and complete understanding 
of the NRC and predictive risk maps for residential burglaries, using the GIS.  Mixed 
methods research approaches have been successfully employed to connect detailed 
qualitative research and broad quantitative data (Bishop & Kuula-Lummi, 2017:10). 
Merging the two forms of data provides a more detailed understanding of the NRC's 
ability to create predictive risk maps using the GIS, as opposed to a single (i.e. a 
qualitative or quantitative) research method. Hence, residential burglaries were 
geocoded, the NRC was applied to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns, 
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and results were mapped using the GIS. 
 
 
The NRC and Q-GIS are both open-source, freely available software applications. 
eThekwini Municipal GIS data is available from the Information Management Unit for 
Corporate GIS in Durban (KZN). 
 
Secondary data refers to data previously collected which can be used for a novel 
analysis (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:18; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 2013:81; Schutt, 
2017:44; Withrow, 2014:273). The researcher relied on a docket analysis which 
signifies secondary data, collected from closed cases of residential burglary previously 
reported to the Hillcrest police. 
 
Qualitative data collection, via structured interviews with five detectives from the 
Hillcrest police station, occurred in this research. The researcher relied on structured 
interviews to gather specific information for a particular purpose (Maxfield & Babbie, 
2016: 203). A structured questionnaire, including open-ended questions, was 
prepared in advance, and the researcher read the questions to the participants and 
recorded their feedback accurately. The researcher used open-ended questions to 
prompt answers from the participants (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:74,158; Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2016: 316). 
 
SMEs were interviewed via email communication wherein the researcher requested 
their opinions, feedback, and comments on this research. The SMEs include: 
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TABLE 2: Interviewed SMEs 
 
 
 
SME 
 
 
POSITION 
  
D
r 
S
c
h
m
it
z 
 
 
Principal Researcher at the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR), South Africa, conducted extensive research 
on geospatial analysis, crime analysis, logistics and forensic 
geography in South Africa 
  
P
ro
fe
ss
o
r 
B
re
e
tz
k
e
  
 
 
Department of Geography, Geoinformatics and Meteorology, 
at the University of Pretoria, South Africa 
  
D
r 
La
n
d
m
a
n
  
 
Previously a principal researcher at CSIR, Built Environment, 
South Africa, and currently a lecturer at the University of 
Pretoria 
  
P
ro
fe
ss
o
r 
K
ru
g
e
r 
 
 
 
 
A principal researcher at CSIR, South Africa 
  
P
ro
fe
ss
o
r 
Z
in
n
 
 
 
 
University of South Africa (UNISA), College of Law, School of 
Criminal Justice, Department of Police Practice 
 
 
 
 
1.7.6  Validity and reliability 
 
 
During this study, the researcher tested the validity of the NRC using residential 
burglary police data; mapping residential burglary points; mapping NRC results and 
using the GIS for a month-to-month analysis, to determine the NRC accuracy in 
predicting the subsequent months near repeat burglaries. Validity refers to the extent 
to which an indicator, which measures a concept, is accurate (Bachman & Schutt, 
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2016:39; Bryman, 2016:275; Gray, 2014:150; Schutt, 2017:245). Reliability refers to 
the repeat consistency and stability of a measured concept when used by different 
researchers during different research projects (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:85; Creswell, 
2014: np; Schutt, 2017:244). Reliability assessment must occur before measurement 
validity can be tested (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:85). In this research, validity is 
measured via predictive validity, statistical validity, construct validity and external 
validity, which are explained in-depth in Chapter 4. 
 
1.7.7  Ethics 
 
 
This research was approved by the University of South Africa (UNISA), College of Law 
Research and Ethics Committee (Ref: CLAW 2015 ST 11, see Annexure 3). A 
research request was sent to the SAPS (see Annexure 4) and subsequently approved 
by the SAPS’s Head of Strategic Management; the Divisional Commissioner of the 
Detective Service; and the Provincial Commissioner. The approval was granted in 
terms of the SAPS Research Policy (National Instruction 1/2006) (See Annexure 5) 
which stipulates that the research findings may only be published with permission from 
the SAPS. All conditions were adhered to by the researcher, namely the research was 
conducted at the exclusive cost of the researcher; arrangements to access the closed- 
case dockets were made in advance; the research did not disrupt the duties of any 
SAPS members; interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis and all information 
was treated confidentially. To ensure compliance with the UNISA, College of Law 
Research and Ethics Committee, a letter of permission from Professor Jerry Ratcliffe 
of the Temple University, giving permission to use the NRC was sought and obtained 
by the researcher, notwithstanding that the software is already freely available online 
(see Annexure 2). 
 
The researcher followed the Criminological and Victimological Society of Southern 
Africa’s (CRIMSA) code of conduct. The CRIMSA code of conduct mandates that the 
researcher will remain professional, ethical, competent; and be aware of his or her 
limitations and abilities (Criminological and Victimological Society of South Africa, 
2012: np). The researcher valued and respected all persons and ensured informed 
consent before carrying out any research or interview. The personal details of research 
participants  remained  confidential.  The  researcher,  however,  retains  the  right  to 
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disseminate research findings providing such distribution it will not harm any person 
or organisation, or breach any prior agreements. All research processes will be carried 
out on a high standard and findings will be reported accurately, truthfully, and within 
the agreed timeframe (CRIMSA, 2012: np). 
 
The Belmont Report’s (1979) ethical principles and guidelines were applied to this 
research. The three fundamental Belmont principles encompass respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:50; the Belmont Report, 1979: np). 
The researcher operated with respect for individual views; and remained cognisant of 
the need to provide protection for participants in the form of assistance, safety and 
security measures. In relation to beneficence, the researcher refrained from causing 
harm to the participants while maximising the potential benefits of the research. In 
respect of justice, the researcher treated all participants fairly (Bachman & Schutt, 
2018:50-51; the Belmont Report, 1979: np). 
 
No street names, numbers or personal details of residents, or victims of residential 
burglary are mentioned which ensures confidentiality and privacy and contributes to 
the low-risk categorisation of this research. Data was stored and password-protected 
electronically, and the researcher was the only person with access thereto. All 
respondents (detectives) participated voluntarily in structured one-on-one interviews 
and were informed of the purpose of the research beforehand. The participants were 
provided with a letter of introduction, containing the researcher’s name and contact 
details, and were required to sign an informed consent before interview 
commencement. 
 
 
E-mail interviews were conducted with SMEs. The researcher provided the SMEs with 
a brief outline of the research aim and objective, research questions and methodology. 
A structured questionnaire comprising questions related to the aforementioned areas 
was attached to e-mail correspondence to SMEs. The responding SMEs granted the 
researcher permission to include their feedback and opinions in the study. 
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1.7.8  Interpretation and explanation of findings 
 
 
The GIS was used to geocode twelve consecutive months of residential burglary data 
in combination with NRC results. The resultant maps visually illustrate the area where 
residential burglaries have occurred, including the risk buffers (bandwidths) which 
represent NRC results. The researcher will discuss the month-to-month in relation to 
one another and compared to earlier research findings and SME feedback and 
opinions. 
 
1.8 OUTLAY OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
This research is presented in six chapters to wit: 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL REVIEW OF NEAR 
REPEAT BURGLARY RESEARCH, GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FACTORS 
 
 
Earlier international research on various predictive tools used to identify near repeat 
burglary patterns - including the NRC -  are examined in detail. At the time of writing, 
there was no known NRC research carried out in South Africa. The development and 
advantages of the GIS internationally and in South Africa, are examined along with 
environmental risk factors relating to residential burglary risk. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: 
 
CRIMINOLOGICAL CRIME PREVENTION THEORIES 
 
 
 
The researcher investigates the CPT and Flag Boost Theory (FBT) to explain near 
repeat burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. The Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) and Broken Windows Theory (BWT) are examined in 
relation to prevention of initial residential burglary and near repeats in the Hillcrest 
policing area. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY: 
 
 
The methodology used in this research is examined in Chapter 4. Therein the 
researcher details why this research is categorised as exploratory and why he selected 
the explanatory sequential mixed methodology. The researcher further explains the 
unit of analysis, aim and objectives, sample size, and quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods that he used in this study. He then further explains the analysis 
and interpretation of research findings, and how validity and reliability were measured 
in this research. Ethical considerations, based on the Belmont Report (1979) and the 
CRIMSA code of conduct, and research approvals from the UNISA, College of Law 
Research and Ethics Committee and the SAPS are outlined. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 
AND FINDINGS: 
 
 
Applying the NRC, month-to-month near repeat calculations of risk for residential 
burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area is illustrated using the GIS. The researcher 
relied on the GIS to conduct spatial analyses of residential burglary locations and the 
environments in which they occurred. Feedback garnered through qualitative 
interviews with five detectives from Hillcrest police, and electronic interviews with 
SMEs are included in the analysis and interpretation of the research findings. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION: 
 
 
Research findings and conclusions are outlined and the feasibility of future studies 
resulting from this exploratory research are discussed. 
 
 
 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter started by recognising international research on near repeat residential 
burglary patterns, and Ratcliffe’s development of the NRC. Current analytical tools 
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used by the SAPS, such as the CTA, CPA and the GIS were outlined. The research 
questions posed by this exploratory research were highlighted, and the essential 
research concepts and terms were defined. 
 
The researcher's methodological outlay was discussed and its value outlined. The aim 
of the research is to apply the NRC to burglary data to identify near repeat residential 
burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. The GIS is used to illustrate the policing 
area, geocode residential burglary points and to visualise and analyse the month-to- 
month near repeat calculations of risk. The objective of the research is to test the 
accuracy of the NRC on month-to-month near repeat calculations of risk over a 12- 
month period. 
 
An exploratory research design was chosen because scant research exists on this 
topic in South Africa. The unit of analysis consists of docket analysis (secondary data 
collection) of 490 residential burglary cases reported to the Hillcrest (KZN) police 
station between April 2012 and March 2013. The researcher only had permission to 
access closed cases. A sequential mixed methods approach was found to be the 
appropriate data collection method for this exploratory research. Mixed methods 
research entails a blending of quantitative and qualitative data to provide a better 
understanding of the research topic. The quantitative aspect of this research focused 
on secondary data collected through docket analysis, geocoding of residential burglary 
points and near repeat calculations of risk. The qualitative aspect consisted of 
qualitative interviews with five detectives from the Hillcrest (KZN) police station and 
electronic interviews with SMEs as detailed earlier in this Chapter. 
 
In this chapter the researcher summarised how validity (predictive, statistical, 
construct and external) and reliability will be measured. The research was conducted 
following ethics outlined by UNISA, College of Law Research and Ethics Committee 
(Ref: CLAW 2015 ST 11, see Annexure 3), and permission and guidelines from the 
SAPS’s Head of Strategic Management; the Division Commissioner of the Detective 
Service; and the Provincial Commissioner. The researcher followed the CRIMSA code 
of conduct and the fundamental ethical principles and guidelines from the Belmont 
Report, 1979. In conclusion, the interpretation and explanation of the research findings 
were summarised, and the research chapters were outlined. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
A HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL REVIEW OF NEAR REPEAT 
BURGLARY RESEARCH, GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The first section of this chapter refers to international research on near repeat 
residential burglary patterns carried out in Australia (Johnson et al, 2007; Morgan, 
2000; Townsley et al, 2003); Brazil (Chainey & da Silva, 2016); China (Chen et al, 
 
2013; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015); New Zealand (Johnson et al, 2007), the 
Netherlands (Johnson et al, 2007); the UK (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Fielding & 
Jones, 2012; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Johnson et al, 2007) and the USA (Johnson 
et al, 2007; Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018). The most research relating to 
repeat residential burglaries has been conducted in these jurisdictions. 
 
Near repeat patterns have also been found in street robberies (Haberman & Ratcliffe, 
 
2012; Glasner & Leitner, 2016); shootings, robbery and motor vehicle theft (Youstin, 
Nobles, Ward & Cook, 2011; Piza & Carter, 2018), arson (Grubb & Nobles, 2016) 
and  insurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq (Townsley, 
Johnson & Ratcliffe, 2008). However, the researcher focusses here on near repeat 
residential burglaries. Near repeat, residential burglary patterns have been identified 
throughout the world thus making prior international research the foundation of this 
exploratory research carried out in Hillcrest, South Africa (SA). 
 
The second part of this chapter begins with a historical overview of the development 
of the GIS (Aguirre, 2014; Coppock & Rhind, 1991; Dempsey, 2012; Tomlinson, 
1962; Tomlinson, 1963) and crime analysis (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005; Hägerstand, 
 
1970; National Institute of Justice, 2018:np; Tobler, 1970). Regional research on the 
 
GIS in Namibia (Mukumbira, 2012)  and Nigeria (Balogun et al, 2014), followed by 
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research carried out in South Africa (Breetzke, 2007; Cooper & Schmitz, 2003; Eloff, 
 
2006; Schmitz, Potgieter, du Plessis, Cooper & Schwabe, 2000; Schwabe & 
Schurink, 1999, Snyders, 2016) is considered in detail. Potential advantages to be 
gained by police agencies implementing the GIS for crime mapping, crime analysis, 
identification of crime patterns, crime prevention strategies and resource allocation 
are then highlighted. 
 
The third part of this chapter focuses on the link between residential burglary and 
environmental risk factors. The researcher outlines residential burglary research 
conducted by Winchester and Jackson (1982) in Kent (UK), including their indexing 
of burglary risk and vulnerability of location (environmental risk). Thereafter, research 
findings pertaining to environmental risk factors (e.g. house location) and residential 
burglary in South Africa (Mundell & Ayres, 2015; Olckers, 2007; van Zyl, 2002) is 
compared to Winchester and Jackson’s index of environmental risks for house 
location. Lastly, news articles related to residential burglaries in KZN are outlined. 
 
 
 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ON NEAR REPEAT BURGLARY 
PATTERNS 
 
The researcher discusses near repeat burglary pattern research under the following 
headings: Australia, the UK, multi-country research, the USA, Brazil, and China. 
 
2.2.1 Australia 
 
 
Morgan (2000) focused on repeat residential burglary victimisation in Perth, 
Australia. His contribution is of significance to this study because he was the first to 
identify near repeat burglary patterns, and to use the term ‘near repeat’, to describe 
residential burglaries that occurred in close proximity to one another, within one 
month of the initial burglary (Groff & Taniguichi, 2016: np). Morgan’s research 
focused on repeat burglary victimisation in the small suburb of Parkville, Perth, 
Western Australia.  He used five years of recorded police burglary and attempted 
burglary data, physical addresses and the value of items stolen during incidents 
(Morgan, 2000:83,94-95). A Life Table Method of survival analysis was used to 
examine statistical repeat burglary victimisation in Perth, as it was found to be 
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appropriate for repeat burglary research (Morgan, 2000:83,110). Measurement of the 
hazard rate indicated the risk of burglary victimisation for households within a period 
of time. Survival analysis, which in this case indicated the risk of burglary victimisation 
for households; produces estimates which are unbiased, easy to interpret, data- 
based, and which produce fewer standard errors of estimate and confidence 
intervals. While Morgan acknowledged the role that residential location may play on 
the risk of victimisation, he stressed that previous burglary victimisation is a likely 
predictor of being burgled again in future. The attractiveness and accessibility of the 
surrounding area or neighbourhood to potential burglars played a more significant 
role than the characteristics of the home (Morgan, 2000:87, 94). 
 
Parkville contained six districts comprising different housing types, incomes and 
crime rates (Morgan, 2000:94). Two of the districts consisted mostly of detached 
houses on large properties (like most of the properties in the formal urban settlements 
of the Hillcrest policing area), which had the highest burglary rates of the six districts 
(Morgan, 2000:94). The environmental factors in these two districts included major 
access to pathways leading to public transport, and several alleyways allowing rear 
access to properties. The other four districts consisted of flats and semi-detached 
houses with fewer pedestrian alleyways and paths used by (Morgan, 2000:94) 
vehicles. 
 
To create a sizeable statistical base to analyse repeat victimisation, Morgan merged 
six of the districts in two areas, namely “Oldville” and “Newville”. Oldville consisted 
of homes built in the 1930s and 1940s, while Newville consisted of homes built from 
the 1950s onwards. The difference between the two areas was large enough to 
highlight heterogeneity in the analysis of repeat burglaries (Morgan, 2000:95). 
Morgan’s study revealed that different burglary and repeat burglary patterns existed 
in Perth, opportunities for burglary, accessibility to homes, the value of the items 
burgled, and the routine activities of residents and non-residents in the area (Morgan, 
2000:110). Further analysis of the burglaries in Parksville found that other burglary 
patterns existed apart from repeat burglaries at the same address. For instance, one 
of the months (out of 60 months) had experienced so many burglaries, that the 
probability of this occurring by coincidence was highly unlikely (Morgan, 2000:112). 
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It was clear that a burglar, or a group of burglars, was targeting homes in Parksville 
during this period. It was also found that two repeat residential burglaries occurred 
along with several near repeat burglaries of homes located close to the first burgled 
home, which was also burgled again later in the month (Morgan, 2000:95). 
 
The analysis of the different burglary patterns highlighted the significance of crime 
prevention strategies explicitly focused on near repeats. Morgan discussed the near 
repeat burglary patterns through the same crime prevention strategies that focus on 
repeat victimisation (Morgan, 2000:110,112). Morgan’s (2000) research opened the 
door for further research by Townsley et al (2003) in Brisbane, Australia, and 
Johnson and Bowers (2004), and Bowers and Johnson (2005), in Merseyside, UK. 
 
Building on Morgan’s (2000) research, Townsley et al (2003) conducted the first 
research on the spatial and temporal dimensions of risk for residential burglary 
victimisation. Townsley et al (2003:615) tested the near repeat burglary theory on 34 
months of recorded police burglary data, across high crime areas of Brisbane, 
Australia. They used a contagion model of near repeat residential burglary 
victimisation, which predicted that victimisation transfers from one burgled household 
to another in the same fashion as a disease. These researchers found that the 
majority of the near repeat patterns existed in the suburbs with homogenous housing 
(Townsley et al 2003:615, 618). 
 
Townsley et al (2003:617) hypothesised that proximity to a burgled home increased 
the risk of burglary to houses in the area that share a high degree of housing 
homogeneity. A police division in South East Queensland, Australia, characterised 
by the highest burglary rate in the state was used to conduct their research. 
According to demographic data, this zone was found to be a low socio-economic 
area with elevated levels of unemployment, public housing, poverty, and crime. 
demographic data notwithstanding, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) did not 
produce or provide any statistics relating to housing homogeneity or heterogeneity 
(Townsley et al, 2003:619). 
 
All recorded burglaries in the police division between 1 January 1995 and 31 October 
 
1997 were used in the data-set and included address points, time, and dates of the 
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burglaries (Townsley et al, 2003:19-20, 619). 
 
 
Townsley et al (2003:620) geocoded the burglary data using the GIS to illustrate the 
burglary points and found that 85% of the burglaries occurred in five urban suburbs, 
for which reliable street data existed, as opposed to rural street data. The five 
suburbs in the police division were analysed for homogeneity and risk. The risk or 
vulnerability resulted from a combination of the burglary rate, demographic factors 
such as unemployment, public housing, low-income households; and the potential 
offender population resident in the suburb (Townsley et al, 2003:620-621). 
 
George Knox (1963) developed the Knox Test to detect the spread of leukemia and 
other diseases in a population in the UK (Knox, 1964:17, 121).  In his calculations, 
Knox used data which consisted of time (temporal), space (spatial) and the 
interaction between the two (Knox, 1963:121-122; Knox 1964:17). Townsley et al 
(2003:621) used the Knox Test to examine near repeat burglaries. Each burglary 
case (or infection) was paired with every other case so that the N value cases 
resulted in N (N-1) /2 distinct pairs. The spatial and temporal variations between each 
pair were recorded, and cases that occurred within a certain distance (d) (spatial) 
were considered spatially close, while cases with (t) days were considered temporally 
close. The number of cases that were spatially and temporally close (X) was 
compared to the number expected by chance. When the number of observed pairs 
was compared to what was expected, burglary (disease) was considered contagious. 
The Knox method which aimed to predict the spread of disease, was, in this case, 
used to predict burglary risk (Townsley et al, 2003:621-622). 
 
A comparison was made between observed pairs and what was expected by random 
chance along short distances and short periods of time, to indicate if burglary risk 
was contagious (Townsley et al, 2003:622). A Knox Test was conducted within a 
specific spatial and temporal dimension, using all pairs which occurred closer than 
1,000m and 365 days apart, in the analysis. The spatial dimensions were broken 
down  into  100m  intervals  with  temporal  periods  of  30  days  (Townsley  et  al, 
2003:624). Single burglary victims experienced only one burglary, and repeat 
burglary victims experienced more than one burglary in 34 months (Townsley et al, 
2003:624). The analysis produced a contingency table consisting of ten columns and 
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12 rows, with each address or point representing either a single or repeat burglary 
victim (Townsley et al, 2003:624). There were three types of potential pairings, which 
were single and single (SS), single and repeat (SR) and repeat and repeat (RR). 
However, the Knox Test was used to identify near repeats and thus did not outline 
which pair occurred first. A contingency table was compiled for each of the five police 
divisions illustrating the three different pairs, with a total of 15 different tables of 
results (Townsley et al, 2003:624). Since the analysis focused on near repeats, it 
excluded all pairs (RR) with spatial distances equal to zero because of the burglary 
addresses or points which had been geocoded to the same location (Townsley et al, 
2003:624). 
 
 
Based on socio-economic status, the suburbs were divided into two groups. The first 
group consisted of suburb A and C, and the second group of suburbs B, D, and E 
(Townsley et al, 2003:625). All five suburbs had a similar number of homes, 
unemployment rates, renters, public housing, and households earning less than $500 
a week (Townsley et al, 2003:625). The difference between the two groups was 
geographic location or area and housing density, ascribed to rural areas of land in 
two of the suburbs. Suburbs A and C experienced a high prevalence of burglary 
concentration and share of the total number of burglaries occurring within the police 
division. Suburbs B, D, and E shared similar rates of prevalence but where however 
lower than suburbs A and C (Townsley et al, 2003:625, 627). In their research, 
Townsley et al (2003:627) used areas consisting of homogenous housing resultant 
from vast scale development which made all the properties relatively new and 
identical. 
 
Suburbs A and C did not meet the criteria of homogenous housing, while suburbs C 
and E did with most of the houses being less than ten years old. Townsley et al 
(2003:627) based the criteria for target vulnerability or risk, on the size of the local 
offender population, socio-economic status, and burglary rates in the area. Suburb 
C experienced a higher burglary rate than suburb A, while suburb A encountered 
higher concentration than suburb C (Townsley et al, 2003:627). Townsley et al’s 
(2003:628) contagion model found that the near repeats in each suburb 
corresponded mostly to housing types in the area and identified near repeats in the 
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areas with homogenous housing. 
 
 
Townsley et al’s (2003:629) research considered housing type, socioeconomic 
factors, and the vulnerability of five different suburbs in the police division. It identified 
the link between different housing types and burglary victimisation patterns. The near 
repeat patterns explained the extent of repeat burglary victimisation for other areas 
was rapid or increased housing development had occurred. Townsley et al, 
(2003:630) concluded that the link between housing diversity and target vulnerability 
is an infection in the form of a first burglary. If the housing types are similar in the 
area, the risk spreads like a contagion to nearby houses, while diverse housing types 
restrict the spread of contagion or risk to nearby houses (Townsley et al, 2003:630). 
Townsley et al’s (2003) research built on Morgan’s (2000) identification of near 
repeat burglary patterns. 
 
2.2.2  The United Kingdom 
 
 
Johnson and Bowers produced two separate research papers (Johnson & Bowers, 
 
2004; Bowers & Johnson, 2005) on the topic under investigation here. Their 2004 
research used 12-months (April 1999 to April 2000) of residential burglary records 
amounting to 1692 cases. Their 2005 research consisted of residential burglary data 
for six years and six months (1 April 1995 to 30 September 2001) producing a total 
of 75,101 residential burglary records.  Both studies relied on similar methodology 
using the Knox Method, Mantel Method, and FORTRAN software programme. 
 
Johnson and Bowers (2004) conducted research on near repeat burglary patterns in 
Merseyside, UK shortly after Townsley et al’s (2003) research. Johnson and Bowers 
(2004:237) opined that the ability to predict the location (spatial) and time (temporal) 
where crime (in this instance residential burglary) will likely occur is essential for 
prioritising and allocating police resources to prevent crime. 
 
Johnson and Bowers (2004:244) used spatially and temporally referenced police 
recorded data of residential burglaries in the county of Merseyside, UK. The recorded 
burglary data consisted of a unique reference number for each record; the street 
address of each burglary; grid references (x and y coordinates); date and time of 
each burglary; the victim’s name, and the property type burgled (Johnson & Bowers, 
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2004:244). 
 
 
To test for near repeat burglary patterns, Johnson, and Bowers (2004: 245) used the 
Mantel (1967) and the Knox Methods (1964), both initially developed to test disease 
contagion. The Mantel Method (1967), developed by Nathan Mantel (1967) was used 
initially to test for spatial-temporal clustering of disease (Mantel, 1967:213-214). This 
near repeat burglary research used the Mantel z-statistic, to measure the clustering 
of burglaries in space and time and compared the distribution of burglaries expected 
by chance. This method compared all burglaries against all other burglaries while 
making a total number of comparisons n (n-1) when n burglaries are considered. The 
Knox Method relied on standardised residuals (Johnson and Bowers, 2004, 245- 
246). Johnson and Bowers (2004:24) developed a software programme called 
FORTRAN, which they used to analyse the burglary data. The results indicated that 
more space-time clustering of residential burglaries occurred than could be expected 
by chance. The Knox contingency table and Knox residuals were calculated using 
the same residential burglary data. Knox residuals found that crime prevention 
efforts, focused on the specific area of residential burglaries, could be used 
successfully for up to two months (Johnson & Bowers, 2004:248). 
 
Bowers and Johnson (2004:250) highlighted the difference between clusters of near 
repeats (residential burglaries) and hotspots of crime. Hotspots are areas that have 
a high density or volume of crime, while near repeats predicted clusters occurring in 
space and time. Bowers and Johnson (2004:249) concluded that police crime 
prevention strategies and resource allocation would be better suited to the spatial 
distribution of risk than hotspotting techniques. The residential burglaries in their 
research clustered in space and time, with a first residential burglary found to be a 
predictor for increased risk of residential burglaries to nearby houses (Johnson & 
Bowers, 2004:248). 
 
Bowers and Johnson (2005:69-70) continued their research on space-time clusters 
of near repeat residential burglary using recorded police data from Merseyside Police 
(UK) as discussed above. The residential burglary data was cleaned and re- 
formatted using FORTRAN (Johnson & Bowers, 2005:69-70).  Bowers and Johnson 
(2005:70) used the Mantel Method to measure space-time clustering of near repeat 
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burglaries 
 
 
An analysis to measure the space-time clustering of residential burglary was 
conducted for each of the 118 local authority wards in Merseyside for a period of one 
year (1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000) (Bowers & Johnson (2005:71). The following 
data was used: Mantel z-score to measure the spatial-temporal clustering of 
residential burglaries; the number of burglaries and repeat burglaries that occurred 
in each ward and, the total number of houses in each ward. The analysis included 
data on housing types (terraced, semi-detached, detached, flats) and percentage of 
households without a motor vehicle. An index of residential segregation measured 
how isolated the housing types were while an index of housing heterogeneity 
measured how different the housing types were from one another (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005:71). 
 
Bowers and Johnson (2005:72) conducted the Mantel z-score analysis and a one 
sample t-test for all 118 wards and found that all the wards had experienced a series 
of residential burglaries. These findings were significant because, if police resource 
and crime prevention strategies, focused on the space and time of a residential 
burglary they may have prevented further burglaries in that area (Bowers & Johnson 
2005:72). Bowers and Johnson (2005:72) further examined the relationship between 
census variables and housing types and the extent to which the residential burglaries 
clustered in space and time. They found that the general burglary pattern was related 
to clustering and repeat burglary victimisation. The clustering of residential burglaries 
was found to be the highest in areas with detached and semi-detached houses with 
a high rate of residents owning cars. However, affluent residential areas experienced 
less burglary but more series of burglaries clustering in space and time (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005:72). In contrast, repeat burglary victimisation was found to be the 
highest in areas with terraced houses or flats with a low rate of residents owning cars. 
Related to repeat burglary victimisation are factors attributed to the number of 
residential burglaries that have occurred, and the level of deprivation and/or socio- 
economic factors in the area (Bowers & Johnson, 2005:72). Bowers and Johnson’s 
research (2004, 2005) using police data and the Knox and Mantel Methods, 
established the existence of near repeat burglary patterns (time-space clustering) of 
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residential burglaries in all 118 wards in Merseyside. These findings could have 
assisted the police in crime prevention strategies and resource allocation to prevent 
the occurrence of further burglaries. 
 
Fielding, an intelligence analyst with Greater Manchester Police (GMP), and Jones, 
the hub manager of the Trafford Division GMP, carried out research on predictive 
risk mapping in Trafford, Greater Manchester, UK (Fielding & Jones, 2012:30). 
Fielding and Jones’s research aimed to disrupt the patterns of burglars who returned 
to the same area (optimal foragers) to carry out further burglaries. The research 
entailed geo-coding residential burglaries and creating spatial and temporal colour 
coded risk buffers using the GIS (Fielding & Jones, 2012:30).  Fielding and Jones 
conducted the research over a 12-month period (12 May 2010 to 10 May 2011). 
Police and extended resources were deployed to the areas identified at increased 
risk of residential burglaries to act as capable guardians. The RAT and the daily 
foraging patterns of burglars formed a basis for their research (Fielding & Jones, 
2012:31), which the researcher discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
 
A software programme called Prospective Mapping was used to identify high-risk 
areas based on spatial and temporal patterns of residential burglaries (Fielding & 
Jones, 2012:31). Fielding and Jones (2012:31) were aware of the limitations of 
creating predictive risk maps tailor-made for each shift, however, this approach was 
considered an improvement as, prior to this model, patrol officers were left to their 
own devices insofar as when and where to patrol, and being a reactive response 
when incidents occurred. Previously, officers were allowed to use their knowledge of 
the areas while carrying out their patrols, and while this may have had its advantages, 
it was not the best way to employ valuable police resources. The new model allowed 
supervisors to dictate resource deployment, in the form of patrols to the areas of 
increased risk, while monitoring required written feedback at the end of each shift. 
This approach was used in the Trafford Basic Command Unit (BCU) area of the GMP 
for 12 months (Fielding & Jones, 2012:31-32). 
 
The aim of Fielding and Jones’s research was disseminated, and the concept was 
explained to Neighbourhood Inspectors who carried out their duties based on the red 
and orange areas (buffers) indicated on weekly predictive risk maps. This process 
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included a project leader and a project analyst who explained the details, processes, 
purpose of and requirements to the Neighbourhood Inspectors. The Neighbourhood 
Inspectors received the weekly predictive risk maps on a Wednesday, indicating shift 
specific visualisation of temporal and spatial risk for areas. The weekly maps were 
also made available via the Electronic Briefing Site accessible to all police officers. 
The patrol officers were informed of the significance of their presence in high-risk 
areas as capable guardians to prevent residential burglaries and to demonstrate a 
positive, reassuring presence in the area (Fielding & Jones, 2012:32). 
 
The GIS (Map Info 9.5) was used as a visualisation tool to map the residential 
burglary points, and create 400m risk buffers around each burglary point, to show 
the changing risk periods of time (temporal) and space (spatial). The temporal 
aspects of this study were rooted in the aoristic temporal analysis. Aoristic temporal 
analysis is a method used to analyse the time of crimes where the time is unknown 
and used in Excel to visualise heat mapping graphs (Fielding & Jones, 2012:32-33). 
The aoristic analysis method calculates an estimation or probability of an event, or a 
series of events (in this case residential burglaries), over a specific period (temporal) 
in a specific area (spatial). It allows the measurement of geocoded crime locations 
spatially according to an estimate of probability (Ratcliffe, 2002:26-27). 
 
Creating weekly predictive risks maps using recent residential burglary points, 
requires sufficient resources (such as colour printing) to map and produce the aoristic 
analysis as simply, consistently and efficiently as possible. Prior to this method, no 
maps were used to predict residential burglaries or to highlight high-risk areas or 
locations. Previous resources such as patrols were reactive in nature and focused 
on previous residential burglary locations in order to prevent further residential 
burglaries (Fielding & Jones, 2012:34). 
 
Fielding and Jones’s (2012:34) research used 12-months of residential burglary data 
recorded from 12 May 2010 to 10 May 2011, which consisted of 17,828 burglaries 
which occurred in the GMP area, and 902 burglaries that occurred in Trafford BCU. 
This was compared to the previous 12-months (13 May 2009 to 11 May 2010) and 
they found a decrease of 26.6% in burglaries in the GMP area, and 9% decrease in 
burglaries in the Trafford BCU. The successful reduction in residential burglaries 
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placed the Trafford BCU second out of 12 BCUs for reduction of residential burglaries 
for that period, and fourth overall for count reduction of residential burglaries. 
Residential burglaries in the GMP area decreased from 19,769 to 17,828 and 
Trafford BCU decreased from 1,229 to 902 (Fielding & Jones, 2012:34-35). It must 
be noted that additional resources had not been made available to the Trafford BCU. 
However, three large BCUs that had experienced more than 2,000 residential 
burglaries prior to this study (13 May 2009 to 11 May 2010) had access to further 
resources to assist with residential burglary reduction. It was found that the Trafford 
BCU improved over the average of the GMP force, and similar BCU’s within the GMP, 
and throughout the UK, with regards to the reduction of residential burglaries in the 
previous 12-months of the study. The potential economic savings across Trafford 
were estimated to be over £1 million (Fielding & Jones, 2012:35). 
 
Fielding and Jones’ (2012) highlighted the importance of and successes that can 
result from using prospective mapping software and the aoristic analysis method, in 
conjunction with the GIS (Map Info 9.5). The GIS was used to geocode residential 
burglary points and to visualise the calculation of heightened risk buffers (spatial and 
temporal) in the Trafford BCU, and to efficiently use available resources to reduce 
residential burglaries (Fielding & Jones, 2012:38). The limitation of this method is 
that the GIS does not take into consideration possible environmental barriers such 
as rivers which are not accessible, and this method of creating predictive risk maps 
should not be used in isolation nor as a sole solution for preventing residential 
burglaries (Fielding & Jones, 2012:38-39). 
 
Fielding and Jones (2012:40) highlighted that their research enhanced and improved 
the police techniques of GMP by reducing residential burglaries (Fielding & Jones, 
2012:40). They emphasised that police organisations should be open to innovative 
approaches to tackling crime, while bridging criminological theories and practical 
application, to address crimes like residential burglary (Fielding & Jones, 2012:34- 
35). 
 
2.2.3  Multiple countries 
 
 
Johnson et al (2007:201, 207), conducted research on the spatial and temporal 
patterns of burglary risk in five different countries (Australia, Netherlands, New 
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Zealand, UK, and the USA), using ten different data-sets provided by the police 
forces responsible for the areas. For every data-set, there was an over- 
representation of burglaries occurring within 100m and within a two-week period for 
all the areas (Johnson et al, 2007:210). They found that even though patterns may 
have varied for all the areas, houses within 200m of a burgled home were at an 
increased  risk  of burglary for  two weeks  following  an  incident  (Johnson  et  al, 
2007:201). Johnson et al (2007:206) only supplied an overview of the results from 
the ten different data-sets. The data-set concern Canberra and Beenleigh (Australia), 
Hague and Zoetermeer (Netherlands), Auckland and Palmerston North (New 
Zealand), Wirral and Bournemouth (UK) and Pompano Beach and Philadelphia 
(USA) (Johnson et al, 2007:207). 
 
The Knox Method was used to measure the existence of time-space clustering or 
near repeat patterns of residential burglaries. Temporal bandwidth intervals of 14 
days and spatial intervals of 100m were used. A maximum of 183 days (temporal) 
and 2 kilometers (spatial) were considered, resulting in a contingency table of 13 by 
20 (260 cells). All burglary pairs that represented repeat burglary victimisation were 
excluded from the analysis to ensure focus exclusively on near repeat burglaries 
(Johnson et al, 2007:207). A Monte Carlo Simulation took a random sample of all the 
permutations. The Monte Carlo Simulation can be described as a mathematical 
technique that provides quantitative analysis for decision-making in the form of a 
range of possible outcomes and probabilities (Palisade, [Sa]: np). In the application 
of the Knox Test, all dates are re-arranged, with this process taking place several 
times. A new Knox Table was generated for each permutation showing how many 
burglary pairs occurred in each time-space interval of one another and compared 
with the Knox Table used for observed distribution. Another contingency table was 
generated  which  recorded  the  results  from these  comparisons  (Johnson  et  al, 
2007:208.) For all ten data-sets, the permutation simulation found significant near 
repeat clustering of burglaries for all short-time (temporal) and distance (spatial) 
intervals, with a variance between the different data-sets. For every data-set, there 
was an over-representation of burglaries that occurred within 100m (spatial) and two 
weeks (temporal) (Johnson et al, 2007:210). There was a definite pattern of distance 
decay following a burglary. The transfer of risk was most significant to houses closest 
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(spatially) to the burglary and victimisation would occur shortly after (temporally) the 
initial incidence. Each data-set showed an over-representation of burglaries 
occurring within 100m and a two-week period for all the areas. The research found 
that in Australia and the Netherlands, the risk of burglary transferred over further 
distances, while in the USA the risk was more localised. It was found that the risk 
persisted over more extended periods of time in Canberra, the Hague, and 
Philadelphia, compared to a two-week period in other cases (Johnson et al, 2007: 
212-213). Johnson et al’s hypothesised that the difference in the communication of 
risk could be attributed to different target densities in the areas. Johnson et al 
(2007:214) found that the communication of burglary risk was clear across all the 
areas in their research. In Australia, the UK, and New Zealand communication of risk 
extended over further distances for areas with lower target density. In contrast, in the 
USA, the communication of risk was over shorter distances with higher target density. 
There was no housing density relationship found in the Netherlands (Johnson et al, 
2007:214). 
 
 
In their research, Johnson et al (2007:215) consistently found the existence of near 
repeat patterns of burglary (space-time clustering) across all the different data sets 
and concluded that this could be attributed to the variance in the physical and social 
heterogeneity of all the data-sets and the foraging behaviour of burglars. 
 
2.2.4 The United States of America (USA) 
 
 
Moreto, Piza, and Caplan (2014) employed a two-part analytical approach to 
forecasting the locations of residential burglaries in the urban city of Newark, New 
Jersey, USA. Their research included identifying instigator incidents, which refer to 
the first burglary in a near repeat pairing, and near repeat incidents, which refer to 
incidents that are spatially and temporally close to the instigator incident. The first 
part consisted of measuring risk heterogeneity using the risk terrain modeling (RTM) 
approach (Moreto et al, 2014:1103). The RTM used the GIS, (ArcGIS 10) to map six 
risk factors, i.e. land use parcels, at risk housing complexes, pawn shops (second- 
hand shops), the residence of known burglars, public transport nodes (such as bus 
stops and rail stations) and drug dealing locations. The Newark Police Department 
supplied the GIS data for 2010 residential burglaries, at risk housing complexes, 
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2009 drug arrests, pawn shop locations and the residence details for known burglars 
 
(Moreto et al, 2014:1109, 1111). 
 
 
Moreto et al (2014:1112-1113) applied an Exploratory Poisson Regression Model 
and the Pearson Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test to measure the distribution of 
data. Public transport nodes were identified as non-statistically significant risk factors 
and were not included. The negative binomial distribution predicts the probability of 
occurrence of whole numbers greater than, or equal to zero (Ford, 2016: np). 
Negative binomial analyses suggested that at-risk housing complexes, the residence 
of known burglars, drug dealing locations, land use and the location of pawn shops 
are significantly associated with residential burglaries (Moreto et al, 2014:1114). Risk 
heterogeneity refers to the spatial influence of the characteristics of the environment 
and the interaction between individuals and their environment. Moreto et al 
(2014:1103) described this risk heterogeneity as a base-level of environmental risk 
for an area, resulting in some areas being at a higher risk of residential burglaries 
than others. The second part of the research entailed the application of the NRC to 
test whether near repeat residential burglary patterns existed in Newark in 2010. 
Moreto et al (2014:1103-1104) compared the baseline level of risk for instigator and 
near repeat residential burglaries, to analyse whether the variation of environmental 
risk could influence near repeat burglaries rather than instigator burglary events in 
isolation. 
 
Moreto et al’s (2014:1120-1121) research differed to prior research (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Townsley et al, 2003), which used disease 
contagion models to explain near repeat residential burglaries, by highlighting that 
the instigator and near repeat residential burglaries, may be symptoms (and not 
causes) of an area where environmental risk already existed. 
 
Moreto et al’s (2014:1120) research demonstrated how the RTM and the NRC could 
be used in conjunction to highlight specific environments or locations (environmental 
factors) that are riskier than others before an initial burglary takes place.  Moreto et 
al’s (2014:1122) research promoted the use of the RTM and the NRC to forecast 
residential burglaries and allow police agencies to distribute resources to areas of 
increased risk, to prevent further residential burglaries. 
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Piza and Carter (2018) applied the NRC to identify near repeat patterns of residential 
burglary and motor vehicle theft in Indianapolis, the USA. The GIS (ArcGIS) was 
used to geocode crime data and used represented variables to conduct spatial 
analysis (Piza & Carter, 2018:10). A total of 11,536 residential burglaries and 4,991 
motor vehicle thefts were used for the research (Piza & Carter, 2018:16). Piza and 
Carter (2018:3) incorporated near repeat research and the environmental context in 
which these patterns occurred. Their research aimed at identifying an isolated or 
single incident, initiator, and a near repeat event, in a series of residential burglary 
and motor vehicles thefts. 
 
Spatio-temporal clustering was identified via application of the NRC over a 12-month 
study, including the application of multinomial logistic regression models to highlight 
any environmental factors (or variables) related to the initiator near repeat patterns 
of crime (Piza & Carter, 2018:1-2). These regression models comprised of 19 
variables incorporated into four distinct categories: crime generators (6), geographic 
edges (4), social disorganisation (5) and the date when the incidents occurred (4) 
(Piza & Carter, 2018:2-3,19). Crime generator variables were ATMs and banks, bars, 
liquor stores, parks, pawn shops, and trailer parks. Geographic edge variables 
consisted of railroad tracks, trails, patrol zone boundaries, and rivers. Residential 
burglary and motor vehicle theft that occurred within two blocks (868 feet / 264.5m) 
were considered in close vicinity to the variable. Social disorganisation variables 
entailed areas with low socio-economic status, geographic mobility, housing, and 
population density; racial heterogeneity, and the young male population. Date 
occurrence grouping comprised of quarter 1 (January – March), quarter 2 (April to 
June), quarter 3 (July to September), quarter 4 (October to December), and weekend 
(Friday to Sunday) (Piza & Carter, 2018:10,12). 
 
The residential burglary data was entered into the NRC, and the Manhattan Distance 
Calculator applied 4-day, 7-day, and 14-day temporal date intervals. One city block 
in was about 434 feet (about 132m) in length. The difference in temporal intervals 
was used to test for prominent or significant clustering or near repeat patterns (Piza 
& Carter, 2018:9-12). For residential burglary, the NRC identified near repeat 
patterns up to three blocks, and within four days of an initial or initiator event. Within 
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a one block radius, near repeat residential burglaries were 78% higher than chance 
occurrence, one to two blocks near repeat residential burglaries were 33% more 
likely to occur, and two to three blocks near repeat residential burglaries were 26% 
more likely to occur. Near repeat, patterns were present within one block between 
five and 16 days. Repeat residential burglary patterns were also found to be seven 
times more likely to occur at the same location, within four days of the initiator 
incident, and the increased risk of repeat victimisation was evident up to a 20-day 
period. The 7-day temporal date interval was entered into the NRC, and the 
spatiotemporal clustering was found to extend up to two blocks (and not three blocks 
as was the case with the 4-day interval) for 0 to seven days. Near repeat, residential 
burglary patterns were at heightened risk of 39% between eight and 14-days and 
within one block. Near repeat, patterns were also identified for the theft of motor 
vehicle incidents (Piza & Carter, 2018:11). Based on these calculations by Piza and 
Carter (2018), it was evident that near repeat patterns of residential burglary (and 
motor vehicle theft) exist in Indianapolis, USA. After the near repeat analysis was 
concluded, another function on the NRC was used to identify the number of times an 
event was an initiator in a space-time cluster. Out of the 11,536 residential burglaries, 
the NRC found that 2,536 were initiator events and 1,712 were near repeat events. 
For motor vehicle theft, the NRC found 802 initiator events and 592 near repeat 
events out of 4, 991 events (Piza & Carter, 2018:10,16). 
 
Spatial analysis showed that residential burglaries occurred within two blocks of the 
following crime generators: 20.27% from ATMs and banks, 7.74% from bars, 5.44% 
from liquor stores, 21.87% from parks, 1.27% from pawn shops and 3.08% from 
trailer parks. Residential burglaries occurred within two blocks of the following 
geographic edges: 12.21% from railroad tracks or a railway, 6.70% from trails, 
22.85% from patrol zone boundaries and 2.85% from the river (Piza & Carter, 
 
2018:12). The multinomial logistic regression models for the residential burglary 
identified two geographic edges: railroad tracks which were associated with a 
decrease in the likelihood of a burglary being a near repeat event, and the location 
in relation to a river increased the chance of a near repeat event (Piza & Carter, 
2018:18). All five social disorganisation variables were contributing factors in near 
repeat patterns for residential burglary, while four of these variables - concentrated 
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disadvantage, geographic mobility, population density, and risk heterogeneity - 
contributed to near repeat patterns in motor vehicle theft (Piza & Carter, 2018:18- 
19). From the date and occurrence variables, near repeat events were unlikely to 
occur between January and March, while residential burglaries occurring over 
weekends were 12% more likely to be near repeat events. These findings highlighted 
a statement by Fielding and Jones (2012:38-39) that the NRC should be used as part 
of current predictive and analytical tools, and not as a replacement for existing 
predictive tools. 
 
The Flag Hypothesis, flags or attracts the attention of would-be burglars (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178) and 
the Boost Hypothesis boosts or heightens the risk of victimisation (Pease, 1998:8-9; 
Wu et al, 2015:178). According to research by Piza and Carter (2018:22), the Boost 
and Flag hypotheses best explain the occurrence of repeat and near repeat patterns 
for residential burglary, and motor vehicle theft, either at the same location or within 
one block. Piza and Carter’s (2018:23) research highlighted that social 
disorganisation measures were significant for indicating an increased risk of a near 
repeat or initiator event and can be used to channel police resources. To a lesser 
effect, crime generators and geographic edges (environmental criminology) achieved 
statistical significance revealing a mixture of positive and negative associations for 
the variables (Piza & Carter, 2018:23). 
 
Piza and Carter’s (2018) research identified near repeat patterns for residential 
burglaries and motor vehicle theft. Relying on another function of the NRC, they 
established the extent of initiator and near repeat patterns in the study area. Through 
the application of multinomial logistic regression models, several variables were 
identified that may be conducive to near repeat patterns. The FBT explained 
residential burglary and motor vehicle theft patterns in Indianapolis, with social 
disorganisation variables being more significant than environmental variables. 
 
2.2.5  Brazil 
 
 
Brazil consists of twenty-six states; each policed by a Military Police Agency (Policia 
Militar) which polices’ and responds to incidents of crime. The residential burglary 
data included the address, date, and time of each burglary. Between 2012 and 2014, 
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there were 19 453 recorded residential burglaries and 1 668 (8.6%) repeat burglary 
victims in Belo Horizonte. The Policia Militar used the GIS to geocode the exact 
points of residential burglaries reported and applied the NRC to identify and analyse 
near repeat burglary patterns in Brazil (Chainey & da Silva, 2016:4-7). 
 
Brazil has lower residential burglaries rates compared to Western countries, like 
Australia, the UK, and the USA, which could be attributed to different housing 
structures. (Chainey & da Silva, 2016:6). Like most countries, under-reporting of 
crime is a problem, but under-reporting alone does not explain burglary rates 
(Chainey & da Silva, 2016:4-5). In Brazilian cities, such as Belo Horizonte, most 
people live in high-rise apartment blocks. High-risk apartments may limit 
opportunities for burglars because it is difficult to tell if anyone is at home (occupied), 
or not unless the unit is situated on the ground floor (Chainey & da Silva, 2016:7-8). 
 
Through the application of the NRC, Chainey and da Silva (2016:7) found statistically 
significant (p≤0.05) near repeat residential burglary patterns in Bel Horizonte. 
Fourteen of twenty different spatial and temporal buffers were found statistically 
significant (p≤0.05). All six buffers within 0 to 21-days and 1m to 200m of initial 
residential burglaries were found to be statistically significant and showed the highest 
levels of risk compared to other risk buffers. Chainey and da Silva (2016:7) found 
that there were 242 (2.2%) near repeat burglaries within 100m and seven days, 657 
(5.8%) of near repeat burglaries within 200m and seven days, and 1 430 (12.7%) 
within 300m and seven days of earlier residential burglaries. Near repeat, burglary 
patterns were found to be lower in Bel Horizonte compared to Western countries 
where near repeat residential burglaries within 200m and seven days of an originator 
residential burglary were between 12% and 23% of all residential burglaries (Chainey 
& da Silva, 2016:7). 
 
 
Furthermore, most properties have situational crime prevention measures in place, 
such as perimeter fencing, burglar bars, security gates and security guards at the 
entrances of apartment blocks (Chainey & da Silva, 2016:7-8). Chainey and da Silva 
(2016:7-8) concluded that near repeat residential burglaries occurred within seven 
days of the original burglary in Belo Horizonte, and stated that residential burglary 
programmes, such as those carried out in Trafford, Manchester (UK) by Fielding and 
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Jones (2012) would be less effective in reducing repeat and near repeat residential 
burglaries in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, where burglary patterns are already low. 
 
2.2.6  China 
 
 
Chen et al (2013) conducted research on the space-time analysis of burglary in 
Beijing, China. According to Chen et al (2013:1), environmental criminology and 
spatiotemporal analyses established crime clusters across both space and time. The 
development of environmental criminology and the distribution of crime have been 
widely studied and have identified various crime patterns which have contributed to 
a problem-orientated policing policy, forecasting and the allocation of police 
resources (Chen et al, 2013:1). 
 
Due to the lack of police recorded data in China, extraordinarily little was known about 
the spatial patterns of crime. In 1986, the Chinese Police Force introduced a 110- 
telephone number to contact the police service. These calls were manually captured, 
and later, computerised recording systems were introduced, which resulted in more 
detailed and exact crime reports. In recent years, the introduction of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) in the Beijing police allowed the exact locations (x and y 
or longitudes and latitudes) of crimes to be recorded. The Chinese government and 
the Chinese police’s concern with crime grew and generated interest in the study of 
crime and crime prevention strategies (Chen et al, 2013:1-2). Advances in 
technology have enhanced crime analysis through powerful tools and methods such 
as the GIS and the NRC. The GIS allows the exact location of the crime, and the 
distribution of crime to be analysed and the NRC calculates near repeat victimisation 
patterns (Chen et al, 2013:4, 9). 
 
Chen et al (2013:2-4), found that Cornish and Clarke’s (1986; 2014) RCT, Cohen 
and Felson’s (1979) RAT, and Brantingham and Brantingham’s (1984; 1995) CPT, 
best-explained burglaries in their research area. According to Chen et al (2013:8), 
spatial and temporal analysis of burglaries are concentrated at hotspots, and future 
risk was boosted or enhanced by earlier burglaries in the area. Chen et al (2013:1) 
used five months of recorded burglary data in Beijing and applied spatiotemporal 
analysis methods to analyse the burglaries. They entered the data into the NRC and 
identified that near repeat burglary patterns of risk were transferred for up to three 
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weeks (temporal) and 100m (spatial) around each previous victim (Chen et al, 
 
2013:9). The near repeat burglary patterns identified were like the UK and other 
countries as indicated in the research conducted by Johnson et al (2007). Chen et 
al, (2013:10-11), concluded that near repeat burglary patterns (spatial-temporal 
patterns of crime) and crime theories were not unique and applicable only to Western 
countries but also to Oriental nations. 
 
Researchers Wang and Liu (2017) used recorded burglary data for a large city (city 
N) in China to analyse burglary hotspots and near repeat patterns. These 
researchers utilised geocoded (x and y coordinates) recorded police burglary data 
for 4 226 burglaries from 1 January 2013 to 30 December 2013 (Wang & Liu, 2017:4). 
Wang and Liu (2017:1) wanted to identify the existence of near repeat burglary 
patterns in N city, and to further analyse displacement between hotspots and the 
near repeat patterns. With crime displacement, the result of crime prevention 
activities at the local level; and the risk levels of crime represented by a graph, 
allowed for crime forecasting and the allocation of police resources. The differences 
between a hotspot and near repeat patterns include: when many crimes cluster in 
space and time, they are known as hotspots’, while the near repeat phenomenon 
suggests that every crime incident has the potential to transfer risk to the nearby 
vicinity (Wang & Liu, 2017:1,11). 
 
Like Chen et al, (2013:2-4), Wang and Liu (2017:2) used Cornish and Clarke’s (1986; 
 
2014) RCT, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) RAT, and Brantingham and Brantingham’s 
(1984; 1995) CPT to explain the occurrence of burglaries in their research area. 
These theories support the role that environmental characteristics play in the 
occurrence of crime, such as the location of houses, roads, railway-lines, shops, and 
the environment in which the routine activities of residents and offenders take place. 
 
In addition to the above, the FBT explain the occurrence of repeat and near repeat 
residential burglary patterns. The Boost Theory (event dependent) suggests that 
increased risk of future burglary victimisation is boosted by previous burglary 
victimisation (Pease, 1998:8-9). This theory suggests that burglars pass-on 
information about items and value to other burglars, which then motivates these 
burglars to carry out future burglaries at the same locations (Wang & Liu, 2017:2). 
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According to Pease (1998: 8-9), offenders prefer to repeat victimise the same 
location rather than seek out a new property to victimise. The Flag Theory (based on 
risk heterogeneity) suggests that certain properties are flagged, or brought to the 
attention of potential burglars, and future burglaries carried out at these properties 
are the result of target attractiveness and independent burglars sharing information 
(Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2). 
 
Wang and Liu (2017:4) applied the Knox Method to analyse the existence of near 
repeat burglary patterns in city N and found that near repeat burglary risk extended 
for 14 days (temporal) and 300m (spatial) from each victimised location (Wang & Liu, 
2017:7). The Temporal Expanded Near Repeat Matrix (TENRM) was used to analyse 
the risk levels before and after hotspots had formed, and they made use of two 
different time scales. For the experiment, the time scale for 100m and seven days 
revealed that hotspots contributed to the increased risk level of near repeats within 
300m and 21-days. On another time scale, hotspots were found to contribute 
significantly to near repeats within 1000m and 42-days. These results highlighted the 
contribution of hotspots to near repeat risk (Wang & Liu, 2017:11). The TENRM was 
used to combine both the hotspot and near repeat patterns. The risk of crime was 
found to be continually moving in both space and time. When high-risk generates in 
an area, it can result in the formation of a hotspot. Once a hotspot has formed, the 
risk may transfer to the nearby vicinity depending on the size of the hotspot. Hotspots 
may even return after a few days. Where there are two spatially, or temporally 
adjacent, hotspots, they can merge together to form one hotspot. The levels of risk 
were found to decrease with the increase of space-time distance after a hotspot had 
formed and was similar to near repeat risk. Crime risk was found to move both in 
space and time, with low-risk levels before the formation of a hotspot and increased 
risk after the hotspot was formed. Adjacent areas were found to experience elevated 
levels both before and after the formation of a hotspot. This could be attributed to 
offenders foraging for new crime opportunities in familiar areas. Concurrently high- 
risk areas may exist nearby with the formation of hotspots (Wang & Liu, 2017:6,11- 
12). The research conducted by Wang and Liu (2017:12) considered near repeat 
patterns of risk as the main components attributed to the formation of hotspots, and 
that hotspot and near repeat patterns appear to contribute to one another. 
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Researchers Wu et al (2015:178) conducted research in Wuhan, a large Chinese 
city, on repeat and near repeat burglary patterns, and the extent to which the same 
burglar is involved. The Wuhan Metropolitan city consisted of various street block 
sizes and building densities made up of old houses and new high-rise apartment 
blocks (Wu et al, 2015:182). 
 
Wu et al (2015:178,181) utilised recorded burglary data provided by the Wuhan 
 
Municipal Public Security Bureau which consisted of 10 548 geocoded burglaries for 
 
2013. All geographic coordinates were generated at the local police station when the 
crime (burglary in this instance) was recorded and manually pin-pointed on a GIS 
map. Any unique identifiers of suspected burglars involved were included. The 10 
548 residential burglaries were entered into the NRC to analyse repeat and near 
repeat burglary patterns (Wu et al, 2015:181,183). 
 
Wu et al (2015:178) stated that two theories can explain repeat and near repeat 
burglary patterns; the Flag and Boost theories. The Flag Theory suggests that the 
characteristics of a location attract the attention of burglars, while the Boost Theory 
suggests  that  future  burglaries  are  dependent  on  earlier  burglaries  (Wu  et  al, 
2015:178). Detected burglaries were analysed and revealed that 874 burglars were 
involved in 2 347 detected burglaries, meaning that one burglar was responsible for 
three to four burglaries. The majority (90%) of the burglaries were committed by a 
single or solitary burglar, and 9% by multiple burglars (Wu et al, 2015:181). 
 
The NRC was applied to calculate repeat and near repeat burglary patterns based 
on 10 548 reported burglaries (Wu et al, 2015:181). The Manhattan Distance 
Measure was used with a spatial bandwidth of 100m and a 7-day temporal bandwidth 
(Wu et al, 2015:182). The analysis revealed that 2 739 burglaries (26%) occurred 
within 120m and within 14-days of any burglarised location (Wu et al, 2015:183,187). 
The Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime (STAC) was applied to analyse the 
distribution of burglaries. The STAC is a quadrant method of spatial clustering 
analysis which produces results as a standardised deviational ellipse used to analyse 
the distribution of 2 739 initiator burglaries and 7 809 independent burglaries. The 
clusters of burglaries highlighted three different patterns in Wuhan. All the clusters 
were initiator clusters. In the Hanyang district of Wuhan, the majority of the clusters 
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were independent clusters, and the Hankou district of Wuhan showed a mixture of 
both initiator and independent clusters (Wu et al, 2015:14-185). 
 
Wu et al (2015:186-187) opined that near repeat burglary patterns hold a crime 
prevention value that can be used by the police for resource allocation and crime 
prevention activities, based on the repeat and near repeat patterns identified by the 
NRC. Their research, which concluded that burglaries cluster in space and time, is 
consistent with previous international research (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey 
& da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson, Bernasco et al, 
 
2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018; Morgan, 
 
2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015), which demonstrated 
that surrounding properties are at a heightened risk of burglary victimisation following 
a burglary incident. The risk of repeat victimisation at the same location in Wuhan 
was found to be 600% greater than the average for the city (Wu et al, 2015:186). Wu 
et al (2015:17) were aware of the limitation of the under-reporting of crime in Wuhan. 
The basic premise of the Flag and Boost theories helped to explain the mechanism 
of repeat and near repeat burglaries in Wuhan (Wu et al, 2015:187-188). 
 
In summation, this section highlighted international near repeat residential burglary 
research (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; 
Fielding & Jones,  2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2005;  Moreto et 
al, 2014, Morgan, 2000; Piza & Carter, 2018; Townsley et al, 2003;  Wang & Liu, 
2017; Wu et al, 2015) which entailed the use of police recorded residential burglary 
data (geocoded) for each study area. All of the discussed studies identified that near 
repeat residential burglary patterns hold a crime prevention value for police agencies. 
 
2.3 INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
GIS 
 
Early research by Hägerstand (1970) and Tobler (1970) laid the foundation for a 
better understanding of crime (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np). Hägerstand (1970) 
focused on the regional science of population migration and identified the essential 
link that time and space co-exist with one another. Hägerstand introduced the space- 
time concept which could be used to develop a socio-economic web model to explain 
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population migration (Hägerstand, 1970:10). According to Hägerstand (1970:8), the 
need for employment, and/or monetary remuneration alone does not explain 
population migration, but easy access to schools, universities, theatres, libraries, 
doctors, hospitals, playgrounds, and security services are also important. This 
highlighted the role that environmental, or geographic factors play in population 
migration. Tobler (1970), developed a demographic model - a computer movie 
simulation of the urban growth of the Detroit (USA) region. The demographic model 
specifically focused on the geographic distribution of population growth but did not 
differentiate between employment opportunities or access to transportation (Tobler, 
1970:234, 236). 
 
 
Research in the 1970s (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np) found that by exploring the 
geographic components of Hägerstand’s 1970 space-time concept, and Tobler’s 
1970 geographic distribution of population growth, resulted in a better explanation 
and understanding of crime. This resulted in new techniques like identifying patterns 
and concentration of crime, relationships between crime and the environment (socio- 
economic characteristics), techniques to assess police effectiveness and crime 
prevention strategies focused on specific geographic areas (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 
2005: np). The reduction in the cost of technology, like computer hardware and 
operating systems (software), has paved the way for introducing GIS technologies 
for policing and crime prevention (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np). These 
technological advances have enabled the computerisation of police data, which can 
be used for crime and intelligence analysis, thus enabling better identification of 
crime patterns for use in crime prevention strategies (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np). 
 
Coppock and Rhind (1991:21) and Dempsey (2012: np) identified four distinct 
phases in the historical development of the GIS. The first phase was between the 
1960s and the mid-1970s where the emerging disciplines were influenced by a few 
key individuals, like Tomlinson (1962, 1963) (Coppock & Rhind, 1991:21; Dempsey, 
2012: np). The second phase was from the mid-1970s to early 1982 where agencies 
began to use GIS technologies which led to further development of the GIS. The third 
phase was from 1982 until the late 1980s during which GIS was developed for 
commercial use. The fourth phase was from the late 1990s to the present day and 
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comprises of developments and advancements of GIS for individual use (Coppock & 
Rhind, 1991:21; Dempsey, 2012: np). Coppock and Rhind (1991:23) identified key 
individuals and organisations that influenced the development of the GIS. The work 
of Howard Fischer (Waldheim & Irving, 2011:np) of the Harvard Laboratory for 
Computer Graphics (LCG), Roger Tomlinson (Tomlinson, 1962; 1963) of the 
Canadian GIS (CGIS), Jack Dangermond (Waldheim & Irving, 2011:np)   from 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) in North America, and David P 
Bicksmore (Riddick, Kessler, & Giles, 2017:19) of the Experimental Cartography Unit 
(ECU) in the UK, contributed to the development of the GIS. 
 
Tomlinson (1962) conducted research on computer mapping and the storage, 
compilation, and assessment of natural and economic data, for the evaluation of 
agricultural land in Ottawa, Canada (Tomlinson, 1962:2). This early use of computer 
input consisted of maps and tables whereby maps represented soil types from 
surveys. Tomlinson envisioned that one would be able to input the maps and related 
data, into a computer system; allowing the user to later retrieve and compare the 
data from another map or statistical data-set. The computer system would only 
require a single copy, or input, of the map of an area while visualising the data it 
represented (Tomlinson, 1962:2-4). Tomlinson described a computer mapping 
system as a system of techniques and instruments which could be applied to aerial 
data from both maps and statistical data. A feasibility report of computer mapping 
systems for agricultural rehabilitation and development under the administration of 
the Canadian Department of Agriculture was carried out by the staff of Spartan Air 
Services Ltd, Ottawa, Canada with the support of International Business Machines 
(IBM) (Tomlinson, 1963:1-2). This could be considered the starting point of the GIS 
as it is known today, and Tomlinson is credited for developing the first functional GIS, 
which decades later is found in a number of sectors (Aguirre, 2014: np). 
 
The NIJ’s Crime Mapping Research Centre (CMRC) led the modernisation of crime 
mapping by implementing the GIS in the USA (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np). The 
CMRC was renamed in 2002, as the Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety (MAPS) 
Programme (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np; NIJ, 2018: np). The MAPS Programme 
funds research based on the GIS; statistical analysis, and investigation of spatial 
50  
data to support effective police deployment to streamline the use of public safety 
resources, to strengthen crime policies and to enhance the understanding of crime 
issues (NIJ, 2018: np). The success of the USA’s government initiative spread and 
laid the foundation for the development of crime mapping based on the GIS, to 
countries such as the UK, Australia, South Africa and across South America 
(Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np; Mukumbira, 2012:19). 
 
The GIS is used in policing and crime prevention for recording and mapping police 
activity, crime prevention initiatives, service calls and incidents of crime (Chainey & 
Ratcliffe, 2005: np; Mukumbira, 2012:20). The GIS is a visualisation tool (Balogun et 
al, 2014:462; Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np; Mukumbira, 2012:43; NIJ, 2018: np) 
used to support the briefing of police involved in crime prevention duties; by 
identifying and explaining recent crimes and predicting future crime locations 
(Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005:np). The GIS can also be used to identify crime hotspots 
(Balogun et al, 2014:464; Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np) and focus on crime 
prevention initiatives; to help better understand the distribution of crime and the 
causes of criminal activity, through pattern analysis and local data (Chainey & 
Ratcliffe, 2005:np). 
 
The GIS as a visualisation tool (Balogun et al, 2014:462; Chainey & Ratcliffe, 
 
2005:np; Mukumbira, 2012:43; NIJ, 2018:np), can create maps to illustrate crime 
statistics to the public in different areas, and assist in the implementation and 
monitoring of crime prevention initiatives (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005:np). 
Furthermore, Chainey and Ratcliffe (2005: np) emphasised that the application of 
GIS and crime mapping has become essential for policing and crime prevention in 
the 21st century. 
 
2.3.1  Research on the GIS in Africa 
 
 
Very few criminological studies have been conducted on the GIS within an African 
context. Before detailing on research on the GIS in South Africa, two studies will be 
discussed; firstly, research by Mukumbira (2012) in Namibia and; secondly Balogun 
et al’s (2014) research in Nigeria. Both these research endeavours emphasised the 
advantages that the GIS and crime mapping hold for police agencies. Balogun et al 
(2014), Breetzke (2016a), Chainey and Ratcliffe (2005), Eloff (2006), Mukumbira 
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(2012) and the NIJ (2018) agree, that the GIS and crime mapping can visualise and 
find crime patterns, highlight areas of risk, and assist with resource allocation. Using 
the GIS to combine geographic and police report data into a map, allows for practical 
analysis of crime incidents (NIJ, 2018: np). The application of the GIS allows a better 
understanding of the environment, which can assist law enforcement agencies and 
researchers to understand why specific crimes occur in certain places (Chainey & 
Ratcliffe, 2005: np; Mukubira, 2012:19; NIJ, 2018: np). 
 
Mukumbira (2012:19) studied the development of crime mapping using the GIS for 
crime analysis and as a prediction tool for Windhoek (Namibia). In Namibia, crime 
mapping is in its initial stages, with the aim of becoming an integral part of the 
Namibian Police (Nam Pol) operations. Crime mapping would enable officers at all 
levels to integrate crime data and geographic data with the aim of better 
understanding the link between crime and the role of the environment in the 
occurrence of crime. Mukumbira is of the opinion that crime mapping can enable 
decision-makers to identify hotspots, and therefore decision-makers will be in a better 
position to prevent crime. Crime mapping could assist Nam Pol with resource 
allocation (of limited resources) to areas where they will best serve the goal of crime 
prevention (Mukumbira, 2012:21-22). 
 
Mukumbira (2012:42) explained the process used by Nam Pol to record crime 
statistics at station level. Nam Pol records each crime reported in an Occurrence 
Book, and if further investigation is required the details will be entered into the Crime 
Register (CR) and allocated a CR number. A cell-register must be completed if a 
suspect is held in custody. Mukumbira highlighted the existence of a central crime 
register; and that each police station records their own monthly crime statistics on a 
Monthly Crime Return form. Monthly, the form is faxed to the sub-division which then 
compiles the crime statistics for the entire country (Namibia) using a system called 
Po16. The statistics, with each crime categorised or coded; and consisting mostly of 
figures and tables without maps, are printed and sent to the Inspector General, the 
Commissioner of Crime Investigation Division (CID) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (Mukumbira, 2012:42-43). 
 
The Nam Pol Geopolicing Unit, under the umbrella term e-policing system, was 
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established in 2010 in the Khomas region for the purpose of crime mapping, analysis, 
and identification of crime hotspots. The Nam Pol Geopolicing Unit was expected to 
include other regions by 2013. GPS is mounted on all police vehicles in the Khomas 
region; to collect the coordinate data from crime locations. However, portable GPS 
would be of better use for crime locations not accessible by vehicle. The GPS 
coordinates are included in the case-docket on the e-policing system, which is used 
to create crime maps, which include all coordinates and locations from all police 
stations throughout Namibia (Mukumbira, 2012:43). 
 
The Nam Pol Crime Investigation Unit, Organised Crime Division, and Internal 
Investigation Directorate makes use of the Geopolicing Unit. The Crime Investigating 
Directorate uses the Geopolicing Unit for crime analysis, crime scene visits and for 
statistical analysis, while the Internal Investigation Unit relies on it for crime scenes 
involving police officers (Mukumbira, 2012:43-44). Mukumbira (2012:45) proffers that 
GIS could provide police officers with information about a location, and GIS data and 
crime data could then be merged, which would enable visualision of any crime 
patterns, and potentially forecast future crime locations. GIS data is available in 
Namibia and can be visualised using the GIS or other web-based tools (Mukumbira, 
2012:43). Mukumbira’s research went into detail on the system implementation, 
database design, and the geo-database necessary to establish a fully functional GIS 
and database system for Nam Pol, which is beyond the scope of this research 
(Mukumbira, 2012:49, 51, 59). 
 
A detailed understanding of the geographic area or environment can aid police 
agencies to explain why specific crimes occur at certain locations or environments. 
The details of features at a location, such as the type of terrain, land use, and 
population demographics, can aid the development of crime prevention strategies 
and resource allocation (Mukumbira, 2012:19-20). Mukumbira’s (2012) research, 
correlates with this research in its use of  the GIS to store environmental and police 
data for a policing area, and as a visualisation tool to create crime maps, analyse 
crime locations in relation to the environment; and assist with resource allocation in 
areas of increased risk to prevent further crimes. 
 
Nigerian researchers, Balogun et al (2014:455) concur with Chainey and Ratcliffe 
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(2005), Mukumbira (2012) and the NIJ (2018) that the GIS is essential for modern 
crime prevention, specifically for crimes such as rape, kidnapping, murder, burglary, 
and armed robbery; all of which are prevalent in the Benin Metropolis, Nigeria 
(Balogun et al, 2014:457).  Research by Balogun et al (2014:453) commenced after 
drawing conclusions from questionnaires carried out on the police and the public, 
which revealed that crime in the Benin Metropolis was on the increase, and that 
Nigerian police were at a disadvantage to address crime due to a lack of resources, 
and outdated policing methods. Further analysis proved that the public had an 
extremely negative outlook of the police due to perceived levels of corruption, 
resulting in 80% of crimes going unreported (Balogun et al, 2014:453). 
 
The research conducted in the Benin Metropolis highlighted the potential benefits of 
using the GIS (ArcGIS) for crime mapping and analyses (Balogun et al, 2014:465). 
The research explored the methodology to establish a digital land-use map showing 
all crime locations, in order to create a geospatial database, and to use spatial 
analysis queries and buffering; applying an Integrated Land and Water Information 
System (ILWIS), ArcGIS software and GPS (Balogun et al, 2014:453, 465). The 
authors emphasised the need for the Nigerian police to upgrade their crime control 
tools by employing the GIS for crime mapping; to understand crime patterns in 
relation to road networks, police stations, offender location and to identify hotspots 
for crime. 
 
Balogun et al (2014:455) described crime as a spatial entity because it occurs in a 
geographic location and at a particular time. The GIS was able to merge spatial and 
non-spatial data by mapping and highlighting areas at risk and keeping the 
information up-to-date thereby allowing strategic advantage over traditional paper- 
methods of crime reporting and analysis. The proximity of a location to hotspots 
shows that some areas are more vulnerable, or at risk for the occurrence of crime 
compared to others, thereby allowing better resource allocation to the areas of risk 
(Balogun et al, 2014:455, 465). 
 
Balogun et al (2014:462) successfully created a GIS database, and the created maps 
of the Benin Metropolis to visualise and pinpoint crime hotspots within a 1km risk 
buffer area; police stations; different roads types (express, arterial street, major road 
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and highway); and the various land-uses ranging from agricultural and industrial, to 
residential use. Buffer zones were created, and spatial queries and crime pattern 
analyses carried out using the GIS. Single buffer zones, 500m each, were created 
and mapped for hotspots for robbery and rape, burglary, cultism, rape, and socio- 
economic activities (Balogun et al, 2014:461-462). 
 
Three maps were created representing the Benin Metropolis: one map represented 
the single buffers for the different crime types; one map represented the multiple 
buffers of crime, with a high overlap of buffers representing the high-risk of crime in 
that area; and one map represented the locations of  police station and crime 
hotspots in relation to other socio-economic activity in the area (Balogun et al, 
2014:462-464). From the single buffer map, it was established that most areas in the 
Benin Metropolis were at high-risk for the diverse types of crime. The multiple buffer 
maps revealed that as one moves away from a hotspot buffer, the risk of crime 
decreases notably in a north-eastern direction. In contrast, the overlap of hotspot 
buffers represented high-risk of crime in those areas, even though a police station 
was in the area of overlap of multiple hotspots. This strongly indicated the prevalence 
of crime, the ineffectiveness of the police and the need for change (Balogun et al, 
2014:461-462). 
 
 
Balogun et al (2014:462) further identified that most of the banks and marketplaces 
in the Benin Metropolis (socio-economic activities) were located within, or near crime 
hotspots. Banks and marketplaces attracted a number of people, including criminals 
(Balogun et al, 2014:463). The single 500m buffer around the burglary hotspot 
showed that burglary, combined with robbery, was prevalent around Saple Road 
New Santana Market, Adolo College Road in Umbowo, Iwoghan at Ikpoba Hill, Etete 
in GRA Ugbokum Quarters, Sokponba Road and St Savious. In addition, fieldwork 
identified a link between the nature of housing, and the distance or location from the 
police station, as factors contributing to the rate of burglaries in these areas (Balogun 
et al, 2014:463). This information was valuable to the Nigerian police, as a guideline 
for resource allocation and a better understanding of which areas experienced 
specific crimes, such as burglary and robbery. Other crimes such as cultism, robbery 
and rape were prevalent in most of the areas throughout the Benin Metropolis, such 
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as Uwelu, Uwasota, Ekosodin - an area where most Benin University students live - 
Nitel Junction at Ikpoba Hill along Benin-Auchi Road, and Uwa Primary School 
(Balogun et al, 2014:463). Again, such locations visually identified by the GIS can be 
used by Nigerian police as focus areas for preventing such crimes, and to prioritise 
areas like the Uwa Primary School, which houses a high number of vulnerable victims 
(i.e. children). 
 
The study and GIS analysis carried out by Balogun et al (2014:463) highlighted the 
type and extent of crime in the Benin Metropolis. The buffer around the various police 
stations indicated a lack of security and brought the distance that police needed to 
travel between the various hotspots to light, as well as areas where buffers 
overlapped with one another and thus should be continuously patrolled. The 
identification of hotspot areas for the various crimes enabled the police to respond or 
be dispatched strategically. Another strategic advantage available, using the routing 
layer in the GIS analysis, is the ability to forecast routes when police are in pursuit of 
a suspect, thereby increasing the chances of apprehending the suspect and 
potentially preventing future crimes (Balogun et al, 2014:464). 
 
These research findings strongly support the use of the GIS, as a DSS in crime 
management, and crime prevention by Nigerian police. Balogun et al (2014:465) 
concluded that effective crime control and management in Nigeria could be 
supported by the GIS method, which should be adjusted and integrated to make 
operations proactive. They suggested the establishment of the GIS, and training and 
of personnel on its use, by the Nigeria Police Education Department (Balogun et al, 
2014:465). In addition, they suggested that police vehicles have GPS facilities for 
active tracking that include digitally layered maps and data for every city (Balogun et 
al, 2014:465). Balogun et al (2014:455) concluded that without the application of the 
GIS and geodatabases, contemporary crime prevention would be costly and 
counterproductive. The research carried out by Balogun et al (2014) concurs with 
research conducted by Eloff (2006) and Mukumbira (2012). 
 
2.3.2  Research on the GIS in South Africa 
 
 
Schwabe and Schurink (1999), from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 
outlined the need for information, and the application of the GIS by the SAPS to 
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address the high crime rate in South Africa, during the Geographic Information 
Management Services User Conference in Midrand, South Africa in 1999. Schwabe 
and Schurink (1999: np) stressed that the basic building blocks of crime prevention 
in South Africa were not in place and then emphasised the need for the SAPS to map 
crime in order to direct crime prevention strategies. The researchers avered that it 
was essential for SAPS management to support and implement the GIS into existing 
procedures, as a management and crime prevention tool. They further added that 
effective communication, consultation, and integration of information from various 
departments of the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections, and parole 
systems) were essential for developing a management system for crime prevention 
in South Africa (Schwabe & Schurink, 1999: np). 
 
Schwabe and Schurink (1999: np) highlighted the necessity of crime information for 
crime prevention using the GIS including essential details in crime scene reports, 
such as the MO and the victim and suspect reports. Comprehensive crime statistics 
which are up-to-date and accurate, are essential. The geocoding of all the crime 
scenes, including the land parcel databases for police stations; and clear station 
boundaries, are necessary for crime management and prevention. The Crime 
Administration Systems (CAS), details of police resources available, along with an 
indication of efficacy, and the integration of crime statistics and socio-economic data, 
are all useful to prevent crime. Schwabe and Schurink (1999: np), emphasise the 
importance of crime statistics and the geo-coding of crime locations, the boundaries 
of policing areas and available resources. 
 
The medium-term objectives of a management system is that it will link all police 
stations on the same network, to a central database for the storage of all crime 
statistics, using a commercial GIS which allows customisation of data; a simple and 
user-friendly CAS, which runs on a Windows computer operating system; controlled 
access and data entry to management system. The management system should be 
implemented at priority police stations depending on the availability of information 
officers, and adequate training in the use of the GIS (Schwabe & Schurink, 1999: 
np). 
 
Long-term objectives of the management system would be the integration of all 
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systems within the SAPS (firearms, personnel, vehicles, and intelligence) and 
relevant systems (vehicle register, population register, and property register); and 
the expansion of the functions of the GIS to include hotspot analysis, shortest path 
analysis, crime forecasting, geographic profiling of crime, statistical analysis, and 
decision support models and expert systems (Schwabe & Schurink,1999: np). 
Schwabe and Schurink (1999: np) concluded that the success of crime mapping (and 
analysis) using the GIS lays primarily with the understanding and implementation 
thereof by SAPS management and personnel. 
 
Schmitz et al, (2000) conducted research on the implementation of the GIS for crime 
analysis and decision support in the SAPS. The research was funded by the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) in association with 
the CSIR, the HSRC and the Medical Research Council (MRC), and in consultation 
with the Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) (Schmitz et al, 2000:3). 
 
Schmitz et al (2000:10) described the GIS as consisting of computer hardware and 
software, and spatially referenced data which allows for management and analysis 
by a user. Schmitz et al (2000:16) further highlighted the potential use of the GIS 
towards saving time or working hours of staff members, and saving storage space 
The GIS allowed fast retrieval of data to update maps on a regular basis, allowed for 
interactive map production, enabled the creation of unique or standard maps, faster 
and lower map creation costs, and sharing of data-sets without unnecessary 
duplication. The disadvantages of using the GIS as outlined by Schmitz et al 
(2000:16), were the initial set-up cost, the initial data input and management which 
could be time-consuming, the training time required to use the GIS, the availability of 
commercial data, and the organisational changes required to successfully implement 
and use the GIS. 
 
Schmitz et al (2000:78-79) worked with several others from a vendor called GIMS, 
to firstly standardise road name formats, and secondly to ensure a standard set of 
sample cadastral data projected using the ArcGIS, which covered the area around 
the Johannesburg Zoo, Parktown and Hillbrow. Due to the expense of the 
Johannesburg Municipal street data at the time (estimated between R 800 000 and 
R 1.2 million), vendor-supplied sample data was used, and Schmitz et al (2000:79) 
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showed the geo-coding of carjacking cases from 1 October 1998 to 8 February 1999. 
The anti-carjacking initiative was a SAPS project that focused on preventing 
carjacking in the north-eastern and southern parts of Johannesburg. Carjacking data 
was collected daily which consisted of the details and descriptions of victims and 
offenders, and the MO used (Schmitz et al, 2000:73,78-79).  However, the results 
were low (only 101 hijack incidents out of 419) and the poor-quality data could thus 
not be geocoded. Several entries did not have street names or numbers which could 
be geocoded, and others fell outside of the study area (Schmitz et al, 2000:79). This 
early study by Schmitz et al (2000) demonstrated and highlighted the need for 
sufficient cadastral and street data to geocode incidents using the GIS. Schmitz et al 
(2000:84) suggested that one can carry out hotspot analysis using a software 
programme called Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime (STAC) which was 
developed by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority in the USA. STAC 
was used to identify hotspot for carjacking in Johannesburg. By mapping the hijack 
hots-pots in Johannesburg the SAPS were better placed to prevent further 
carjacking. ArcView GIS has an extension programme which can also calculate crime 
hotspots using various algorithms. 
 
Using the CAS Block level in the GIS, opens an analysis function which calculates 
the number of points, or incidents of crime in a polygon or CAS Block, thereby 
aggregating at station level to show the number of crimes per square kilometer 
(Schmitz et al, 2000:85-86). The CSIR used both ArcGIS and MapInfo GIS software 
tools in their crime prevention research and application (Schmitz et al, 2000:93), and 
aimed to promote the different tools available to the SAPS, without favouring one 
over the other. The CSIR’s aim was to assist the SAPS in evaluating and 
implementing the GIS for crime prevention and resolution (Schmitz et al, 2000:94). 
 
The CSIR has been assisting the SAPS to develop its crime mapping and analysis 
capabilities. They provided specialised crime mapping and analysis for detectives 
working on specific priority cases. In 2001, the SAPS commenced with a national 
crime mapping system using the GIS at police stations in South Africa to geocode 
priority crimes. The system’s primary objective was to improve crime prevention and 
management, but also included tactical crime analysis. In a number of cases, the 
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CSIR and SAPS created maps which were used as visualisation tools to explain 
complex cases in court and in some of the cases, tactical crime mapping using the 
GIS contributed towards the conviction of dangerous criminals (Cooper & Schmitz, 
2003:269, 270, 277). 
 
 
In his research, Dr. Eloff of the CSIR incorporated spatial technology to analyse and 
prevent crime. He focused on the use of remote sensing and GIS, and the correlation 
between land usage and crime in the Tshwane Municipality boundary (Eloff, 2006). 
Remote sensing is a method which relies on satellite or camera imagery (South 
African National Space Agency, [Sa]: np), used by scientists to observe the earth’s 
surface from various distances; to gather information about various features and their 
distribution (Eloff, 2007:14). 
 
Eloff’s research focused on the Tshwane Municipality area, South Africa, and 
entailed remote sensing technology integrated with the GIS and geocoded crime 
data, as a foundation to carry out crime analysis for crime prevention purposes (Eloff, 
2006:v). Tshwane’s diverse/heterogeneous race and social classes, along with 
various land uses in relation to crime, made it a practical research area covering 
284,057 ha. Using crime data from 28 police precincts that fell in Tshwane, 46 
categories of crimes, defined by the SAPS, were geocoded for the period 2002 to 
2004. ArcGIS 9.1 software was used to create maps and to carry out statistical 
analysis in conjunction with remote sensing imagery. Detailed crime analysis was 
carried out for murder, carjacking, residential burglaries, and rape (Eloff, 2006:9,14, 
34, 223). 
 
 
For the crime of murder, the crime analysis identified a high spatial correlation with 
specific land use classes of informal settlements (Eloff, 2006:14). The south-eastern 
part of Tshwane consisted of residential land use. Crime analysis identified a strong 
correlation for residential burglaries between high-density residential land use. 
Residential areas like Temba and Mamelodi, which grew significantly since 1994, 
were the same principal areas affected by residential burglaries. Areas such as 
Hercules and Pretoria West (Western parts of Tshwane) also showed an increase in 
residential burglaries, however not as high as in the south-east areas. The overall 
pattern of residential burglaries in the Tshwane areas was not successfully prevented 
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or displaced from 2002 to 2004 (Eloff, 2006:15). 
 
 
Carjacking incidents in Tshwane showed an increase of 15.7% from 2002 to 2003, 
with a slight increase of 1.4% from 2002 to 2004. The analysis found that carjackings 
occurred mostly in the southern, central, and north-western areas of Tshwane. The 
southern area of Tshwane predominantly consisted of high-density residential, 
industrial, and low-density residential land use classes. The main area consisted 
mostly of high-density residential and commercial land use classes, with the north- 
western areas consisting of informal settlements land use classes. The crime 
analysis showed a high correlation for carjacking with high-density land use classes 
and informal settlement areas. Carjacking patterns showed an insignificant change 
from 2002 to 2004, which suggested that carjacking was not successfully prevented 
or displaced during this period (Eloff, 2006:15-16). 
 
The geocoded crime statistics for rape in Tshwane showed a slight increase of 0.24% 
from 2002 to 2003 and a slightly higher increase of 0.8% from 2002 to 2004. The 
crime of rape mostly occurred in the central and north-western areas of Tshwane. 
The main area consisted mostly of high-density residential and commercial land use 
classes and the north-western part of informal settlements. The Mamelodi area, 
located east of Tshwane, and consisting predominantly of informal settlements and 
high-density residential land use classes, experienced the highest incidence of rape. 
The crime analysis identified a high correlation between rape and high-density 
residential and informal settlement areas, with both areas showing growth since 
1994. These findings suggest that rape in these areas was not successfully 
prevented or displaced during this period (Eloff, 2006:16). 
 
Eloff concluded that it was evident that a specific type of crime correlated to dominant 
land use class, including heterogeneous environments. Eloff’s research findings took 
into consideration the role that the environment played in the incidence of crime. Eloff 
stated that the sciences of urban planning, remote sensing, GIS, specific statistical 
and crime analysis techniques; combined into an integrated system could enhance 
the understanding and crime prevention capabilities on a macro (national) and micro 
(local) level. Spatial technology, like the GIS, is a tool that can aid in the development 
and monitoring of crime prevention strategies (Eloff, 2006:224, 229, 240). 
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Eloff identified that the building, development, and training of specialised skills (such 
as the GIS) were challenges for SAPS and related agencies in South Africa (Eloff, 
2006:240). Eloff’s research paved the way for further research using remote sensing 
imagery and the GIS, in conjunction with geocoded crime statistics, in order to carry 
out crime analysis for crime prevention strategies and policing. Eloff was at the 
forefront of GIS, and spatial technology research in South Africa and his work 
detailed various spatial technologies, and the implementation of technologies like 
remote sensing and the GIS for crime prevention and analysis; which could be of 
value to the SAPS (Eloff, 2006:224, 229, 240). 
 
Breetzke, (2007:67) in his review of the GIS and policing in South Africa, found that 
the GIS and crime mapping can assist the SAPS in a number of areas, namely 
interactive internet-based crime mapping, geographic profiling, and with the 
geodemographic segmentation system. Interactive internet-based crime mapping 
can visualise the annual crime statistics released by the SAPS on a national, 
provincial, and local station level. Geographic profiling, an investigative method of 
offender profiling developed by Rossmo, aims to narrow down the likely area that the 
offender lives in. The geodemographic segmentation system can be described as 
the clustering of the population into categories of neighbourhoods based on the 
demographic, socio-economic factors, and characteristics of the area (Breetzke, 
2007:67). 
 
 
Even with the GIS, the question remains whether the SAPS have the skills to apply 
it effectively (Breetzke, 2007:67). Accurate crime statistics are an essential ingredient 
to fully harness the GIS capabilities. Members of the SAPS must appreciate and 
understand the necessity of gathering accurate information at a crime incident, and 
precisely recording data on the SAPS system. Accurate crime statistics are essential 
for carrying out crime analysis (Breetzke, 2007:77-78). The importance of accurate 
crime statistics can be demonstrated by the fact that all the research discussed in 
this research, relies on police recorded data in the form of crime statistics. With the 
geo-coding of crime incidents, the GIS requires that each crime incident occurring in 
a policing area has an x and y coordinate and includes detailed information on the 
crime, the victim, and the suspect/offender. Areas that do not have a formal road 
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network or even a clearly defined road system, make it difficult if not impossible to 
geocode. Another challenge for the SAPS is to geocode an address that does not 
exist or has not been entered into the SAPS GIS database. Successful geo-coding 
requires data cleaning and database maintenance and management (Breetzke, 
2007:78-79). The use of the GIS in the SAPS can be attributed to the current 
technology (computer hardware and software) used by the SAPS. Policy, legislation, 
and funding alone cannot guarantee the successful and effective use of the GIS, 
which raises concern about SAPS knowledge and skill of the GIS. Breetzke 
(2007:82) concluded that the future success of the GIS and crime mapping in the 
SAPS, largely depends on the GIS private sector, local and provincial government, 
and GIS professionals in SA to address the problem of infrastructure, before the GIS 
can be widely and effectively used by the SAPS (Breetzke, 2007:82). 
 
Breetzke (2016a:np) stated that the GIS is able to identify and map crime patterns, 
support decision-making for distribution of police resources, target crime in high- 
crime areas and aid in the development of crime prevention initiatives and projects. 
Breetzke (2016a:np) is in agreement with other researchers (Balogun et al, 2014; 
Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np; Mukumbira, 2012:43; NIJ, 2018: np) regarding the 
importance of the GIS to policing and crime prevention.   According to the SAPS 
(2015:45), the GIS is now widely used by the SAPS divisions, components, and 
sections for the organisation of spatial information used by management for 
reporting, for analyses and crime for prevention strategies. Following the September 
release of the 2015/2016 national crime statistics in South Africa, Breetzke noted that 
the crime levels remain very high despite crime prevention initiatives which have 
largely failed to decrease crime (Breetzke, 2016a:np). In contrast to the SAPS 
(2015:45), Breetzke (2016a: np) suggested that now is the time to re-examine current 
crime prevention policies and initiatives and to strongly consider the value of the GIS 
to future policy directives and crime prevention strategies. 
 
Snyders (2016: ii) conducted research on the link between crime, the fear of crime 
and the built environment using a Built Environment Related Crime Analysis Model. 
The study area consisted of the Villieria SAPS Precinct Sector 2 (Kilner Park and 
Queenswood), Pretoria, South Africa. The Villieria Police Precinct crime statistics for 
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the period April 2014 to March 2015 were used (Snyders, 2016: ii, 66). According to 
Snyders (2016: ii), the BWT, Defensible Space Theory (DST), Situational Crime 
Prevention Theory (SCPT) and CPTED were the most applicable to crime prevention 
within the built environment. 
 
In the Villieria Precinct, between April 2014 and March 2015, it was evident that crime 
types varied from month-to-month. Property crimes were high in June 2014 and low 
in December 2014. In March 2014, 40% of all crime incidents were property related 
and 20% were contact crimes (Snyders, 2016:67). Property related crimes consisted 
of 7.9% burglary at non-residential premises, 42.5% burglary at residential premises, 
27.3% theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles, 22.3% theft out of or from motor 
vehicles and 0% stock theft (Snyders, 2016: np). According to Snyders (2016:55), 
property related crimes can be related directly to the built environment. Through a 
structured interview with Community Liaison Members (CLM) and Community 
Policing Forum (CPF) members, crime hotspot areas were identified at the Queens 
Corner Shopping Centre and along the railway line close to the N1 freeway. The CLM 
added that main roads, which link with exit and escape routes in the study area, were 
to be considered as hotspots for crime, as well as two drug houses in the area 
responsible for dealing in the parks (Snyders, 2016:73). 
 
All the crime incidents which occurred in Kilner Park and Queenswood were 
geocoded using the Q-GIS and Planet GIS (Snyders, 2016:67-68). The crime 
incidents included 13% contact crimes (crimes against the person), 8 % contact 
related crimes, 8% crimes detected by police action, 15% other serious crimes, 54% 
property-related crime and 2% subcategories of aggravated robbery (Snyders, 2016: 
np). Buffers were created around various environments in the study area to visualise 
and analyse crime incidents using the GIS. Hotspot areas were identified as follows: 
N1 Freeway (500m), the railway line (500m), main roads (250m), parks and open 
spaces (150m) and shopping nodes (300m) (Snyders, 2016:74). The analyses 
revealed that 60% of all crimes occurred within 250m of the main road, 46% within 
500m of the railway line, 29% within 150m of parks and open spaces, 27% within 
 
300m of shopping nodes and 26% near the N1 freeway (Snyders, 2016:74). 
Properties (majority residential) located opposite the N1 freeway experienced mostly 
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residential burglary. The primary land use along the railway line was residential, 
special (retail) and industrial in nature. The main crimes experienced within the 500m 
buffer of the railway were residential burglary and theft from or out of motor vehicles 
(Snyders, 2016:75). 
 
In the study area, 67% of crimes took place during the day (06:00-08:00) compared 
to 33% at night (18:00-06:00) (Snyders, 2016: np). The analysis showed that 55% of 
crimes were property related and occurred during the day (06:00-8:00), and 54% 
during the night (18:00-06:00) (Snyders, 2016: np). Property crime incidents during 
the day (06:00-18:00) consisted of 47% residential burglary, 30% theft from or out of 
motor vehicles, 18% theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles and 5% burglary at non- 
residential properties (Snyders, 2016: np). Crime incidents that occurred at night 
(18:00-06:00), were 24% residential burglary, 43% theft from or out of motor vehicle, 
31% theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles and 3% burglary at non-residential 
properties (Snyders, 2016: np). The residential burglary risk was found to be 
significantly higher during the day compared to night. These findings are valuable 
and can assist the Villieria police in the decision-making process for crime prevention 
strategies and resource allocation, tailored to specific crimes at specific periods of 
the day, such as residential burglary during the day and theft of motor vehicles at 
night. 
 
During the study, Snyders established, that the Villieria SAPS did not have enough 
tools to carry out crime trend analysis. This lacuna can be filled with the GIS, which 
can be used to represent and analyse the Villieria SAPS policing area, the built 
environment and crime incidents (Snyders, 2016:95). Using Snyder’s (2016) model 
(Built Environment Related Crime Analysis) and the GIS, a one-month crime 
prevention strategy was carried out in the Villieria SAPS precinct, along with the 
Metro Police, the CPF and private security companies operating in the area. The 
initiative successfully decreased crime incidents by 40% over that period (Snyders, 
2016:95). It was evident that the BWT and CPTED theories were applied through 
interventions such as clean-ups; removal of drugs and the relocation of homeless 
people to places of safety; carried out along the N1 freeway, the railway, and open 
spaces because of the preliminary outcome of the research (Snyders, 2016:96). 
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Overall, through mapping and analysis of crime statistics using the GIS, the Villieria 
Police were armed with vital information to aid in decision-making, the channelling of 
valuable resources, and the planning of crime-specific prevention strategies in 
specific areas at specific times. It is clear from Synders’s (2016) research in the 
Villieria Police Precinct, Pretoria, South Africa, that the built environment, the location 
of properties, and the time of day are significant factors that can attribute to various 
crime types in specific areas. Furthermore, the research highlighted the analysis and 
mapping capabilities of the GIS as a valuable tool that should be utilised by SAPS at 
station level. 
 
2.3.3  Environmental risk factors relating to residential burglary 
 
 
The previous section of this chapter examined the development and documentation 
of the GIS in South Africa by Cooper and Schmitz (2003); Eloff (2006); Schmitz et al 
(2000), Schwabe and Schurink (1999) and also included research conducted by 
Balogun et al (2014), Chainey and Ratcliffe (2005) and Mukumbira (2012). Eloff’s 
(2006) research on the development of spatial technology to prevent and combat 
crime in Tshwane, identified the relationship between different land use classes and 
specific crimes. It is evident that land usage forms part of environmental factors 
relating to certain crime types and risk, in this case, residential burglaries. The 
following section will examine the relationship between house, neighbourhood 
location, and environmental risk factors. 
 
Moreto et al (2014) posited that environmental risk factors exist in an area or 
neighbourhood before an initial burglary takes place, and further emphasised that 
specific house locations were at heightened risk. Moreto et al (2014) support 
Winchester and Jackson’s (1982) environmental risk index for property location. 
South African research findings (Mundell & Ayres, 2015; Olckers, 2007; van Zyl, 
2002) concur with Moreto et al (2014) and Winchester and Jackson (1982). 
 
 
Winchester and Jackson’s (1982) research focused on residential burglaries in Kent, 
UK. The Kent police area was made up of both urban and rural areas or land which 
brought different challenges to crime prevention efforts. The research area was 
confined to four adjacent subdivisions within the Kent police areas: Maidstone, 
Tonbridge,  Malling,  and  Sevenoaks.  These  areas  were  chosen  because  they 
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experienced a high rate of residential burglaries i.e. 920 burglaries of a total of 4,948 
reported residential burglaries reported to Kent police in 1979. A total of 434 victims 
were interviewed over eight and a half months (Winchester & Jackson, 1982:5,35). 
 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) analysed the various target hardening devices used 
in the sample areas and developed an index of burglary risk and vulnerability for 
house location, in order to establish the role that environmental risk can play in 
residential burglary victimisation (Winchester & Jackson, 1982, 9,14-15). 
 
A house with a score of 14 variables would be most at risk and property with zero 
variables least at risk on the variable index. The risk variables for property location 
included (Winchester & Jackson, 1982:39): 
 
• Situated in a rural area. 
 
 
• Isolated. 
 
 
• Located within sight of five or fewer houses. 
 
 
• Located on a major town road or village lane. 
 
 
• Located on the nearest major road. 
 
 
• Standing at a distance from the road. 
 
 
• Adjacent to the gardens of other houses. 
 
 
• Adjacent to open space or open land. 
 
 
• Accessible from the front and back. 
 
 
• The front is obscured from view by other houses. 
 
 
• Either side obscured from the view of neighbouring houses. 
 
 
• Most sides are obscured from view from the roadside or by the public. 
 
 
• Front side is similarly obscured. 
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 •  Located at a distance from the nearest house. 
 
 
Winchester and Jackson (1982:31) compared Kent police residential burglary data 
from 1979 and 1978. They established that rural areas experienced consistently 
higher rates of residential burglaries compared to urban areas, with some areas 
experiencing  a  concentration  of  residential  burglaries  (Winchester  &  Jackson, 
1982:31-32). While comparing the two year’s data, they found that certain areas in 
Maidstone that were closer to the town, and areas in Sevenoaks, in more accessible 
locations, both experienced higher residential burglary rates than other areas 
(Winchester & Jackson, 1982:31-32). 
 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) highlighted that certain housing types were more 
likely to be burgled than others. For example, detached houses are at higher risk 
compared to semi-detached houses (Winchester & Jackson, 1982:14). Some areas 
were more vulnerable than others at certain times, and the location and/or 
environmental factors played a significant role in the risk of residential burglary 
(Winchester & Jackson, 1982:32, 39). Winchester and Jackson (1982:22) identified 
the most critical risk factors between households that had experienced a burglary, 
and households that had not, and attributed these to environmental risk and not 
security levels. They further suggested that the role of environmental risk in 
residential burglaries was not the limited result of the various housing types found 
within the study area (Winchester & Jackson, 1982:22). 
 
Even though the research carried out by Winchester and Jackson (1982) is over 
three decades old, the environment risk index is applicable to the current residential 
burglary scenarios in South Africa. In a South African context, this will be 
demonstrated by discussing residential burglary research (Olkers, 2007; van Zyl, 
2002), the experience of security risk assessors regarding residential burglary risk, 
(Mundell & Ayres, 2015) and the different land uses and house locations, in relation 
to other establishments. Winchester and Jackson’s (1982) environmental risk 
indicator correlates with the principles of CPTED (Kruger et al, 2016:36; Safer 
Spaces, ([Sa]: np) in terms of the location of the property, accessibility and the clear- 
line of sight to neighbouring houses. 
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2.3.4 Residential burglary research in South Africa 
 
 
According to the Victims of Crime Survey (VOCS) 2016/2017 carried out in South 
Africa, residential burglary (housebreaking) was perceived to be the most common 
(61.7%) and the most feared crime (50.9%), followed by residential robbery (house 
robbery) (Lehohla, 2017a:57). Residential burglary has consistently been the most 
prevalent crime experienced in South Africa (2011-2016) (Lehohla, 2017b, 2017:63). 
In 2015/2016, 647 000 residential burglaries took place in South Africa with only 350 
000 cases reported to the SAPS, which equates to a 53.4% report-rate (Lehohla, 
 
2017b:65). The VOCS for 2016/2017 found that only 51% of residential burglaries 
were reported to the police (Lehohla, 2017a:1). The VOCS 2015/2016 (Lehohle, 
2017b:66) established that 11% of households experienced repeat burglaries while 
the remaining 89% experienced a single burglary. According to a media release (11th 
October 2018) by Statistics South Africa, residential burglary remains the most 
common crime making up 54% of all household crime (Statistics South Africa, 2018: 
np). 
 
Van Zyl (2002) conducted research on residential burglary in South Africa and 
focused specifically on two policing areas, to wit Pretoria West and Garsfontein in 
the east of Pretoria (Gauteng) (van Zyl, 2002:83). He made a comparison between 
affluent (Garsfontein) and less-affluent (Pretoria West) residential areas to establish 
the different risk levels for residential burglary victimisation (van Zyl, 2002:83). The 
Garsfontein policing area covered Lynnwood Manor, Lynnwood Ridge, Lynnwood 
Park, a part of Murrayfield, Die Wilgers, Wapadrand, Faerie Glen, Garsfontein, 
Constantiapark, Pretorius Park and Moreleta Park residential areas. The Pretoria 
West policing area covered Pretoria West, Proklamasie Heuwel, West Park, Danville, 
Kwaggasrand, Elandspoort, Loftus Gardens and Philip Nel Park residential areas 
(van Zyl, 2002:83). The Pretoria West policing area was made up of rural and 
industrial areas (land uses) which were excluded because the research aimed to 
compare residential areas specifically (van Zyl, 2002:83-84). 
 
Van Zyl’s (2002) research encompassed SAPS data, maps and residential values 
from the Property Valuation Directorate of the City Council of Pretoria and he carried 
out  semi-structured  interviews  with  burglary victims,  convicted  burglars  serving 
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sentences at the Atteridgeville prison, SMEs from the SAPS, security companies, 
insurance companies and CPFs (van Zyl, 2002:88). Through analysis, van Zyl 
(2002:70-71), like Winchester and Jackson (1982), identified a number of 
environmental factors that increased the risk of residential burglaries in an area. The 
affluence of the neighbourhood increased the risk of residential burglaries compared 
to less-affluent neighbourhoods. Burglars were likely to target properties in affluent 
neighbourhoods. The accessibility of the area and free movement of vehicles and 
people on the roads increased the risk of residential burglaries in the area compared 
to gated communities, or complexes which had controlled access. Neighbourhoods 
that were close to, or consisted of shopping centres, small businesses (commercial 
land use) and buildings under construction, were at a higher risk of residential 
burglaries because these activities and/or establishments attracted strangers or non- 
residents into the area. Criminals operating in such areas were thus able to blend in 
easier (van Zyl, 2002:70-71). 
 
Through semi-structured interviews with convicted burglars, van Zyl (2002:125) 
identified the cues that burglars tend to follow when targeting a property. Firstly, 
convicted burglars that participated in the research admitted to having prior 
knowledge of the area, either by carrying out legitimate work (for example, as a 
gardener) on the property (routine activities), or they gathered information from 
domestic workers or gardeners working at the burgled home. Secondly, burglars 
were reluctant to confront any occupants if anyone was at home. Rational choice 
was exercised to weigh-up the risk of someone being at home or whether there were 
any observing neighbours. Thirdly, the accessibility of a target property was 
considered in terms of whether the property was close to the main road or next to 
open or vacant property (land use) to allow easy access and escape. The fourth 
consideration is the design features of the target property (CPTED) such as 
concealed entrances and signs of affluence (rational choice of weighing up risk and 
rewards). The fifth consideration related to the security measures or target hardening 
devices present at the target property. Security measures ranged from alarms 
systems linked to armed response security, clear sight from neighbouring properties 
and barking dogs. During the interviews, it was emphasised that these security 
measures, or target hardening devices, would not deter burglars from carrying out a 
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burglary at a target property, but only make them more cautious in doing so. The 
sixth and the least defining considerations were severe weather, such as lighting and 
thunder, and barking dogs which tend to draw attention to the activities of burglars 
(van Zyl, 2002:125). 
 
It is evident from van Zyl (2002:125), that convicted residential burglars emphasised 
environmental risk factors such as house placement on the road, house location to 
nearby vacant property (land use) for easy access and escape, and house location 
to neighbouring houses. These risk factors are in line with Winchester and Jackson’s 
(1982) index of burglary risk and vulnerability for the location of houses and 
environmental risk factors, Mundell and Ayres (2015) research, and research carried 
out by Olckers (2007). 
 
Olckers (2007) conducted research on the impact of residential measures on the 
incidence of residential burglaries in two suburbs, namely Westcliff and Parkhurst in 
North Johannesburg (Gauteng), South Africa (Olckers, 2007: xi). Westcliff was 
described as an upper-income area with valuable heritage foundation and larger 
properties, and Parkhurst as an upmarket area consisting of a density of smaller 
properties (Olckers, 2007: xi). Olckers’s research made use of residential burglary 
data from residential burglaries reported to the Parkview police station  from 1 
January 2001 to 31 December 2002 (one year) (Olckers, 2007: xi). Descriptive 
mapping and the Microsoft Excel software package were used to carry out statistical 
analysis (Olckers, 2007:45). Each grid block was equivalent to two residential blocks 
(Olckers, 2007:7). 
 
Olckers focused on security measures and target hardening efforts for the prevention 
of residential burglaries while acknowledging the geographic location of the 
residential burglaries, and the location of other burgled properties, and environmental 
factors. Environmental factors included the distance of the burglarised property from 
places of entertainment, business properties, unoccupied properties, main access 
roads, location on the street and dead ends (cul-de-sacs or end nodes) (Olckers, 
2007: 137-138, 140, 142). 
 
 
Olckers’ (2007:138) findings suggest the existence of near repeat residential burglary 
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patterns in the Parkhurst and Westcliff during the period of investigation. In the case 
of repeat victimisation, burglars tend to return to the same homes to victimise, while 
near repeat patterns suggest general foraging behaviour of burglars who target 
houses in close proximity to previously burgled houses (Johnson et al, 2007:215). 
The burglar becomes aware of the different properties in the area that share the 
same access routes and other surroundings (Johnson et al, 2007:215). 
 
Through descriptive mapping analysis, Olckers (2007:139) identified residential 
burglaries in relation to main access roads and found that 40% of the burglaries 
occurred in the same grid as a main access route; 24% within one grid distance of a 
main access route; 11% within a two grid distance of a main access route; 18% within 
a three grid distance, 6% within a four grid distance; and, 1% within a five grid 
distance of a main access route (Olckers, 2007:139). Residential burglaries in 
relation to dead-end or cul-de-sacs (end node) found that 33% of the burglaries 
occurred in the same grid as dead-ends, 41% within one grid distance, 14% within 
two grid distances, 8% within three grid distances and 4% within four grid distances. 
The quantification of residential burglaries on the street within a grid found that 41% 
of the properties burgled were close to a corner property, 37% were located in the 
middle of the street, and 22% were corner properties which made them least 
vulnerable (Olckers, 2007:141-142). It is evident from these findings that the number 
of residential burglaries decreased further away from the main access route, in a 
similar way that residential burglaries decreased further away from places of 
entertainment, business properties (commercial land use) and unoccupied land 
(vacant land). Main access routes, near the house on the street, contributed to 
residential burglary risk.  Olckers’ opined that descriptive mapping could be a useful 
tool to the SAPS and the CPF, by highlighting environmental factors that could 
contribute to the incidence of residential burglaries (Olckers, 2007:222). Olckers’ 
(2007) research highlighted environmental risk factors linked to residential burglaries 
and suggested the potential clustering of residential burglaries close to one another 
in a South African context. 
 
According to independent risk assessors (Alwinco) in South Africa, Mundell, and 
 
Ayres (2015:7) found that houses located in the middle of a street are at higher risk 
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of being burgled compared to houses located on street corners. This difference in 
risk could be attributed to the line of visibility (Mundell & Ayres, 2015:7). An example 
is a view of passing traffic. The location of the house within the neighbourhood plays 
a prominent role in the environmental risk factors contributing to residential 
burglaries. Houses located close to woods or bushy areas, open spaces or open 
grounds, or parks and rivers are easily accessible, and a means of hiding and escape 
for burglars (Mundell & Ayres, 2015:7). According to Mundell and Ayres (2015:7), 
houses located in a cul-de-sac (dead-end or end node) are at higher risk of burglary 
victimisation because patrols carried out by the police, or security companies are 
less frequent compared to other roads. 
 
This section concludes with consistent research findings (Mundell & Ayres, 2015; 
Olkers, 2007; van Zyl, 2002) regarding environmental factors linked to residential 
burglaries in a South African context and connects with earlier research by 
Winchester and Jackson (1982) relating to the UK. News articles pertaining to 
residential burglaries in the KZN will be discussed in the next part of this Chapter. 
 
2.3.5 Relevant news articles on residential burglary in KwaZulu- 
Natal, South Africa 
 
A news article by Erasmus and Radebe (2013:np), regarding the SAPS 2012/2013 
crime statistics, highlighted that households are at a higher risk of residential burglary 
when located in middle to upper-income suburbs (formal settlements) and next to, or 
close to, an impoverished area (such as an informal settlement). In other words, 
crime rates (in this case burglary) are influenced by the location of an affluent area 
next to a poorer area, where people are more likely to carry out crimes such as 
residential burglary (Erasmus & Radebe, 2013: np). 
 
Durban, (KZN) was used as an example, where residential burglary hotspots fall 
mostly in established suburbs (formal settlements). In KZN, households from Hillcrest 
to Berea are at a two to five times higher risk of been burgled compared to adjacent, 
less affluent neighbourhoods. Cato Manor (Near Berea), is made up of low-cost 
housing and is surrounded by middle-upper class income neighbourhoods, and thus 
experienced a low level of residential burglaries compared to the surrounding 
suburbs (Erasmus & Radebe, 2013: np). This news article highlighted the role that 
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different land uses play in residential burglaries. 
 
 
According to the 2012/2013 crime statistics, Prestonbury and Town Hill experienced 
the highest number of residential burglaries in Pietermaritzburg (PMB) in KZN.  The 
Mountain Rise area which consists of the most substantial number of households 
has experienced a decline in residential burglaries between 2011 and 2012. 
Examples of residential burglary gangs operating in the PMB area are the ‘Five 
Minute Gang’ and the ‘Morning Gang’. The Five-Minute Gang is believed to have 
been operating in the PMB area since 2007, and target Town Hill and Prestbury, in 
some cases using hired cars to carry out residential burglaries (Erasmus & Radebe, 
2013: np). 
 
 
The Five-Minute Gang got their name from their MO, as the burglars successfully 
carried out the residential burglary within five minutes; before the police and security 
companies could respond (Erasmus & Radebe, 2013: np). Some of the members of 
the Five-Minute Gang are believed to have been arrested in 2008. However, a 
number of years later the same MO continues in the area (Erasmus & Radebe, 2013: 
np). 
 
Members of the Morning Gang were arrested in 2013, using the same MO as the 
Five-Minute Gang, with a deviation in terms of when they carried out their deeds to 
wit between 9 am and noon. It is believed that both these gangs travelled from a base 
in Durban to carry out residential burglaries in the PMB area (Erasmus & Radebe, 
2013: np). 
 
 
A recent residential burglary trend was identified in the Greenwood Park policing 
district in Durban, KZN, where burglars break and enter via the roof (North Glen 
News, 2016: np). Warrant Officer (WO) Audh of the Greenwood Park police (SAPS) 
advised residents to install latches and burglary alarm contact points on the trap 
doors to their ceilings. Another recent trend by residential burglars is to detach or 
remove the garage door to gain access. WO Audh urged residents to install burglar 
alarm contact points and to reinforce garage doors where possible (North Glen News, 
2016: np). These examples of residential burglary trends in KZN highlight the 
different MOs used by burglars to carry out residential burglaries. 
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2.3.6 The link between national and international research 
 
 
International research on residential burglary has identified near repeat patterns in a 
number of countries. These findings highlight the potential that identifying near repeat 
patterns can have for crime prevention and resource allocation by police. At the time 
of writing, there was no known research on near repeat residential burglary patterns, 
and the application of the NRC in South Africa. 
 
The GIS, which originated in North America (Tomlinson, 1962; Tomlinson, 1963) 
quickly, gained popularity across the world because of its functionality and ease of 
interface (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2015; Mukumbira, 2012; NIJ, 2018). The value of the 
GIS to policing in developing countries like Namibia (Mukumbira, 2012) and Nigeria 
(Balogun et al, 2014) has been highlighted. The initial research carried out in South 
Africa on the application and use of the GIS found useful but not yet fully valued and 
used by the SAPS, more specifically at station level. At the time of the qualitative 
interviews, the GIS was not utilised by the Hillcrest police (station level). Applying the 
GIS at station level to represent the Hillcrest policing area, and   geo-coding 
residential burglary points, can promote the analysis of residential burglary locations, 
and environmental risk factors as outlined by early research conducted by 
Winchester and Jackson (1982), and more recent research by Moreto et al (2014); 
Mundell and Ayres (2015); Olckers, (2007); Piza and Carter (2018); Snyders (2016) 
and van Zyl (2002). The GIS can be used to visualise the spatial and temporal near 
repeat calculations, generated by the NRC for the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Morgan’s (2000) research on repeat residential burglary victimisation was the first to 
identify repeat burglaries, subsequent to the spatial-temporal risk that was 
transferred to nearby houses following an initial incidence of burglary. His 
identification of near repeat burglary patterns in Australia, was a catalyst  for further 
near repeat residential burglary research not only in Australia (Townsley et al, 2003), 
but also in the UK by Bowers and Johnson (2005), Fielding and Jones (2012), 
Johnson and Bowers (2004), Moreto et al (2014); and Piza and Carter (2018), in the 
USA; and in five different countries by Johnson et al (2007).  In more recent years, 
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near repeat burglary research were conducted by Chainey and da Silva (2016) in 
Brazil, Chen et al (2013), Wang et al (2017); and Wu et al (2015) who all identified 
near repeat burglary patterns in China. Even though near repeat burglary patterns of 
risk varied from country to country, the fundamental point is that near repeat patterns 
were identified across an array of countries and cities. 
 
Wang and Lu (2017) highlighted the difference between near repeat patterns of crime 
and hotspots for crime. When crime clusters in space-time hotspots result, whereas 
near repeats suggest that the risk of crime is transferred to the surrounding area. In 
contrast, Moreto et al (2014) argued that risky environments, conducive to crime, 
exist before an initial burglary takes place. Bowers and Johnson (2005) concluded 
that crime prevention strategies and resource allocation should be tailor-made to 
address near repeat patterns and would be more efficient than using hotspotting 
techniques. Wang and Lui (2017) suggested that near repeat patterns of risk are a 
significant contribution to the formation of hotspots, with both hotspots and near 
repeat patterns enhancing one another. Fielding and Jones (2012) suggested that 
tools used for near repeat calculations of risk, and the creation of predictive maps, 
should be added to the tools used by police agencies and are not a sole replacement 
for current crime analysis tools. Research conducted by Chainey and da Silva (2016), 
Chen et al (2013), Fielding and Jones (2012), Moreto et al (2014), Piza and Carter 
(2018) and Wu et al (2015) applied Ratcliffe’s NRC to identify the existence of near 
repeat residential burglary patterns in their studies. These near repeat patterns can 
be valuable to police agencies because they enable the planning and deployment of 
valuable resources to specific areas, at a specific time, in order to prevent near repeat 
residential burglaries from taking place. The NRC was a product of prior international 
research originating from the Knox Test. The NRC was applied in research by 
Chainey and da Silva (2016), Chen et al (2013), Fielding and Jones (2012), Moreto 
et al (2014), Piza and Carter (2018) and Wu et al (2015). The near repeat burglary 
research by Chainey and da Silva (2016), Chen et al (2013), Fielding and Jones 
(2012), Moreto et al (2014), Piza and Carter (2018), Wang and Lui (2017) and Wu et 
al (2015) relied on the GIS for geo-coding residential burglary points, spatial analysis 
and/or visualisation. The NRC and the GIS will be applied in this research in the 
same fashion as in international research. 
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The early development of the GIS in Canada during the 1960s by Tomlinson (1962, 
 
1963) was instrumental for the international development and application of the GIS 
across the world (Aguirre, 2014). The GIS has proved to be an effective tool, used 
by police agencies throughout the world, due to its functionality and analysis 
capabilities (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005: np; NIJ, 2018: np). Research by Balogun et 
al (2014) in Nigeria and Mukumbrira (2012) in Namibia, concur that the GIS should 
be a fundamental tool used by police agencies to represent their policing areas, 
geocode crime, plan resource allocation and respond to crime, and to identify 
hotspots for certain crimes in specific areas. Schwabe and Schurink (1999) were 
among the first to investigate the application and capabilities of the GIS for the SAPS. 
Their initial research was followed shortly by research by Schmitz et al (2000). 
Cooper and Schmitz (2003) further promoted the use of the GIS by the SAPS. This 
early research lay the foundation for the application of the GIS for crime mapping and 
analysis by the SAPS.  Eloff’s (2006) research paved the way for further South 
African research by Breetzke (2016a), Olckers (2007) and Snyders (2016) utilising 
the GIS as visualisation and crime analysis tool. 
 
The role that the environment plays in residential burglaries was identified in the UK 
by Winchester and Jackson (1984) who developed an index of environmental risk to 
house location. Different housing types have been identified as contributors to near 
repeat burglary patterns. Morgan’s (2000) research focused on residential burglary 
patterns in Australia and acknowledged the role that housing types, proximity to 
alleyways, paths, and public transport; play in residential burglary victimisation. 
Townsley (2003) concluded that the link between housing types (homogenous and 
heterogeneous) and target vulnerability (risk) depends on the first incident of 
residential burglary. If housing in an area is similar, the risk will spread (like a disease) 
to nearby houses, while an area with diverse housing types will restrict the spread or 
risk of disease to nearby houses. Research by Bowers and Johnson (2005) 
concurred with Townsley’s (2003) findings, as they identified the role that different 
housing types (homogenous and heterogeneous) contribute to the risk of near repeat 
residential burglaries. Areas with predominantly detached and semi-detached 
housing allowed near repeat patterns to spread, whereas areas that were 
predominantly   terraced   houses   or   flats   experienced   more   repeat   burglary 
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victimisation (Bowers & Jonhson, 2005; Townsley, 2003). Moreto et al (2014) stated 
that risk factors in environments exist before an initial burglary (or crime) incident 
takes place. 
 
Research by Eloff (2006) in South Africa, identified the relationship between specific 
land use and specific crimes. Olckers’ (2007) research on residential burglary in 
Westcliff and Parkhurst, Johannesburg, South Africa identified the link between 
house location and environmental factors such as house location on the street or cul- 
de-sac, the proximity to entertainment places, business properties, unoccupied or 
vacant land, and main access roads. According to Olckers, the risk of residential 
burglary appeared to diminish if the houses were located further away from these 
environments. Research by Snyders (2016) in Pretoria, South Africa concurred with 
the research finding by Olckers (2007) and South African independent risk 
assessors, Alwinco (Mundell & Ayres, 2015). The location of the house in relation to 
certain environmental factors, such as main roads, railway lines, open spaces, as 
well as land use contributed significantly to residential burglary. The research 
conducted by Snyder’s (2016) further highlighted hotspots for specific crime types in 
the vicinity of specific environments. Spatial analysis was conducted using the GIS 
to highlight the relationship between the environment and residential burglary points 
in his research study. 
 
Fielding and Jones (2012) used the RAT and Foraging Theory to explain near repeat 
residential burglary patterns in Manchester, UK. The theory that burglars forage for 
potential properties to burgle concurs with research by Johnson et al (2007) and 
Wang and Lui (2017). Wang and Lui (2017) and Chen et al (2013) found that the 
RCT, RAT, and CPT explained repeat and near repeat residential burglary patterns 
in China. Piza and Carter (2018), Wang and Lu (2017) and Wu et al’s (2015) research 
findings supported the FBT to explain the occurrence of repeat and near repeat 
burglary patterns. In contrast to the FBT, Morgan (2000) highlighted that the 
attractiveness and accessibility of the surrounding area or neighbourhood plays a 
more significant role than the characteristics of the home. Research conducted by 
Snyders (2016), in South Africa, highlighted the BWT, DSF, SCPT and the CPTED 
to reduce crime in the study area. Criminological and crime prevention theories 
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pertaining to near repeat burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area, KZN, South 
 
Africa will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
The NRC is applied in this research, for the first time, to identify near repeat 
residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area, KZN, SA. The GIS is used 
to represent the Hillcrest policing area, to geocode 12-months of residential burglary 
data or points, to visualise near repeat calculations of risk in the form of buffers, and 
to conduct spatial analysis. The success of crime prevention strategies, based on 
predictive risk maps of near repeat calculations in Trafford BCU, GMP, UK, as 
illustrated by Fielding and Jones (2012), and GIS spatial analysis in Villieria SAPS 
precinct in Pretoria, South Africa, by Snyders (2016) could likewise contribute to 
crime analysis and prevention in the Hillcrest policing area. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
CRIMINOLOGICAL CRIME PREVENTION THEORIES 
 
 
This chapter discusses the Crime Pattern Theory (CPT) and the Flag and Boost 
Theory (FBT) to explain the occurrence of near repeat residential burglary patterns 
in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area. In contrast, the Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) and the Broken Windows Theory (BWT) are 
explained as a means to prevent initial residential burglaries and near repeat 
residential burglaries from occurring in the Hillcrest policing area (KZN). Hillcrest 
Park Neighbourhood Watch (HPNW) base their philosophy on the BWT and CPTED 
(Hillcrest Park Neighbourhood Watch, 2015: np) which has brought down opportunist 
crimes down (like residential burglary) by 80% in the Hillcrest Park suburb (Philip, 
2014: np). 
 
3.1 CRIME PATTERN THEORY (CPT) 
 
 
Professor Kevin Lynch, of the faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) wrote, “The image of a City” (1960) and 
therein identified five elements of an image or cognitive map: paths, edges, districts, 
nodes and landmarks (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984:359; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1993:15-22; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, [Sa]: np). 
Cognitive maps represent awareness spaces and are a process that individuals learn 
about,  remember,  and  use  regarding  an  area  (Brantingham  &  Brantingham, 
1984:358-359). The CPT was developed through the work of Canadian 
environmental criminologists Patricia and Paul Brantingham (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995) and intersects with the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), Routine 
Activities Theory (RAT) and environmental factors, to explain crime distribution (Eck 
& Weisburd, 2015:6; Hill & Paynich, 2014:46-47). 
 
 
The RCT has its origins in the Classical School of Criminology and the work of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century philosophers Cesare Beccaria (1785) and Jeremy 
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Bentham (1823), who focused on the control of crime by punishment rather than the 
observation of criminals, or analysis of crime data (Winfree & Abadinsky, 2017:20- 
22). This early work was outlined in Beccaria’s “Essay of crime and punishment” 
(1785) and Bentham’s, “An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation” 
(1823) (Winfree & Abadinsky, 2017:20-22). The RCT suggests that criminals and 
potential criminals make choices about committing a crime based on the anticipated 
or perceived risks and rewards of committing the crime and getting away with it 
(Cornish & Clarke, 2014:6; Santos, 2017:43; Walklate, 2017:80-81). The RCT differs 
from other criminological theories which suggest that criminal behaviour is 
unavoidable (Santos, 2017:43) and can be distinguished from modern theories of 
crime causation because of their clear focus on crime prevention (Newman, Clarke 
& Shohom, 2016: np). The RCT is practical for crime analysis and police agencies 
because it helps to explain why individuals, or groups, commit certain types of crime, 
such as residential burglary (Santos, 2017:43). It is imperative for crime analysts and 
the police to be equipped with a solid understanding of behavioural patterns to better 
address and prevent crime (Santos, 2017:43). 
 
The RAT originated from Amos Hawley’s theory of human ecology (1950), which 
focused on the temporal aspects of human behaviour in communities (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979:590; Hawley, 1950:289). Before the 1970s, criminologists paid little 
attention to the role that opportunity plays in crime (Natarajan, 2016: xviii). Lawrence 
Cohen and Marcus Felson (1979), two North-American criminologists (Walklate, 
2017:83), adapted Hawley’s (1950) principles to explain crime, which formed the 
RAT as an ecological perspective to explain criminal behaviour. The RAT states that 
for a crime to take place, three elements are required: a motivated offender, a 
suitable target, and lack of guardianship (Natarajan, 2016: xviii; Walklate, 2017:83). 
 
According to CPT, crime will most likely occur in places where the activity space of 
offenders or potential offenders’ overlaps with the activity space of potential victims 
or targets. The CPT suggests that offenders commit crimes in places they are familiar 
with (Santos, 2017:44). Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:359) stated that 
cognitive maps, of residents from the same or similar area, could be a good indicator 
of criminals’ awareness of space. 
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The place or location of the crime is vital to the CPT, which analyses the interaction 
of offenders, their environment and how they select targets or victims (Eck & 
Weisburd, 2015:6). The CPT explains crime patterns through the distribution of 
willing offenders, the potential victim, targets, and capable guardians within space 
and time (Eck & Weisburd, 2015:6). Most crime-types, like residential burglary, occur 
within a short distance of the offender’s home. People interact with the environment 
or surroundings and other people near their home, rather than further away. This is 
known as ‘distance decay’ (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984:344). The distance 
decay function has been established in residential burglary, robbery, and rape 
(Bruinsma & Weisburd, 2014:27). 
 
The  criminal  has  both  activity spaces  and  awareness  spaces  (Hill  &  Paynich, 
 
2014:46-47). The criminal’s awareness space is made up of the areas that he or she 
is familiar with (Hill & Paynich, 2014:46-47; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984:349). 
Individual awareness along a familiar path is limited, as the individual may not know 
what lies a block or two from the side of the familiar path (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1984:352). 
 
The CPT suggests that for a crime to take place, criminals or potential criminals must 
have an opportunity to commit a crime in a location within their awareness space. 
Awareness space is shaped by a person’s current routine activities (Bruinsma & 
Weisburd, 2014:697). Offenders are likely to commit a crime near their current 
residence and/or near their previous residence (Bruinsma & Weisburd, 2014:697). 
The routes individuals use to travel between nodes are called paths (Hill & Paynich, 
2014:46-47). Crime patterns tend to occur around offender and victim nodes and 
along interconnecting paths (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995:10). Burglars 
commit most of their burglaries within their awareness space along the nodes and 
paths intersecting with their routine activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995:10). 
The CPT states that potential offenders usually search (or forage) for opportunities 
to commit crimes along the nodes and paths of their activity and awareness spaces. 
Edges are those areas on the border of spaces where most crimes are committed 
because the level of diversity encountered, limits the surveillance capabilities of 
potential guardians (Hill & Paynich, 2014:46-47). According to the CPT, potential 
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targets are flagged and catch the attention of burglars during their routine activities 
along the nodes and paths of their activity space. Recent research by Chen et al 
(2013:2-4) and Wang and Liu (2017:2) applied the RCT, RAT and the CPT to explain 
the occurrence of residential burglaries and near repeat residential burglaries in 
China. 
 
3.2 THE FLAG AND BOOST THEORY (FBT) 
 
 
Ken Pease (1998) was the first to term the FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12), and 
to explain repeat residential burglary victimisation. The FBT developed through 
research studies on repeat victimisation of residential burglaries (Everson & Pease, 
2001; Farrell & Pease, 1993; Forrester, Chatterton & Pease, 1988; Pease, 1998; 
Polvi, Looman, Humphries & Pease, 1991). Moreover, Morgan (2000) was 
researching repeat burglary victimisation in Australia when he first identified near 
repeat patterns. Morgan (2000) coined the term ‘near repeat’ to describe residential 
burglaries that clustered within time and space. 
 
The risk of repeat burglary victimisation is at its greatest immediately after the first 
victimisation (Polvi et al, 1991). Polvi et al (1991) researched residential burglary in 
Saskatoon, Canada, and found that repeat victimisation made up a large number of 
total burglary victimisations. In addition, these researchers found that there was a 
12-times greater risk of repeat victimisation within a month after the initial burglary 
(first victimisation) and that most repeat victimisation occurred within seven days of 
the initial event. According to Farell and Pease (1993:8), this heightened risk declines 
rapidly over time. Johnson et al (2007:206) concurred; following an initial crime (like 
residential burglary), a similar crime (burglary) may occur at the same place or 
location, shortly after the first or original crime, but this increased risk decays quickly 
over time. 
 
Farrell and Pease (1993:13) suggest that risk decay could be the result of target- 
hardening carried out by the victimised resident installing a burglar alarm system, 
burglar bars, security gates or lighting which could take a few days to install or to 
complete. The burglars may take advantage of the brief period after the initial 
burglary because target-hardening measures may not have been carried out or 
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installed yet. The burglars will be familiar with their burglary victims’ properties 
regarding their layout and vulnerability (i.e. access and escape routes, level of target 
hardening, hiding places in an overgrown garden). The same burglar(s) may return 
to steal things that they forgot or did not steal the first time (Farrell & Pease, 1993:13). 
Housing heterogeneity refers to the diversity of the different housing types (Bowers 
& Johnson, 2005:71). The Flag Theory which focuses on risk heterogeneity suggests 
that certain properties are flagged, or brought to the attention of potential burglars, 
and future burglaries carried out at these properties are the result of the 
attractiveness of the targets and independent of burglars sharing information 
(Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 
(2015:178). The Boost Theory is event dependent, meaning when an initial burglary 
occurs, it increases (boosts) the likelihood of future burglary victimisation (Pease, 
1998:8-9; Wu et al, 2015:178). According to Pease (1998: 8-9), offenders prefer to 
repeat victimise the same location rather than seek out a new property to victimise. 
Burglars may return to the same property to steal the remaining items that they could 
not carry the first time (Pease, 1998:8). The Boost Theory implies that burglars pass 
on information about items and valuables to other burglars, which motivates these 
burglars to carry out future burglaries at the same locations (Bowers & Johnson, 
2004:12; Wang & Liu, 2017:2). 
 
 
When victims implement target hardening after a burglary to reduce the 
attractiveness and vulnerability of the property (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 
2016:26), burglars who are now familiar with the area will seek out nearby properties 
 
to victimise (Johnson et al, 2007:2015). This foraging behaviour takes place within 
the burglar’s awareness space, along similar access routes and environments of 
previously victimised properties. Burglaries are committed in properties close to the 
first burglary victims within a brief period. This behaviour could be the result of 
changes in the environmental characteristics of an area (i.e. the clearing of vacant 
land, the clearing of overgrown gardens and verges) or target hardening of the 
properties and the neighbourhood. Over time, the burglar’s memory of burgled 
properties and the surrounding area fades (Johnson et al, 2007:2015). The FBT 
continues to be used to explain the occurrence of both repeat and near repeat 
residential burglary patterns (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang 
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& Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178). 
 
3.3 CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 
(CPTED) 
 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) can be traced back to 
the early work of Jacobs (1961), Jeffery (1971), and Newman (1972) (Cozens & 
Love, 2017:2). In 1971 Clarence Ray Jeffrey wrote, “Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design”, and began researching the relationship between crime and 
the environment (Nichols, 2012:4). CPTED refers to the design of the built 
environment (i.e. buildings, houses, or flats/apartments) to minimise crime 
opportunities which in turn promotes the well-being of residents and the public 
(Krehnke, [sa]: np). CPTED aims to change human behaviour by changing the 
environment, for example, by altering the physical landscape and surroundings like 
lighting, enhanced natural surveillance and the re-allocation of areas where people 
gather (Bernard et al, 2010:26). 
 
In South Africa, the National Development Plan (2030) identified the significance of 
considering situational factors like environmental (spatial) design when developing 
community safety and crime prevention initiatives. The Integrated Urban 
Development Framework (IUDF) is responsible for planning, design, and 
management of safer living environments in South Africa (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). 
 
In South Africa, spatial and socio-economic characteristics are largely the result of 
the Apartheid era (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). Often the poorest communities are 
located on the outskirts of urban areas, forcing residents to travel far distances to 
work or to make use of the commercial, social, recreational, and other facilities that 
the urban areas have to offer. These impoverished areas often lacked basic human 
necessities in the form of electricity, sanitation; facilities such as community halls, 
sports facilities, and safe public parks (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). These environmental 
factors, along with the lack of lighting in public spaces, streets without road names 
or house numbers, and informal taverns create a breeding ground for crime and a 
feeling of insecurity. 
 
Such areas make it difficult for the police to patrol and respond to calls due to the 
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poor condition of the streets (or in some cases, no road/vehicle access). Most South 
Africans cannot afford motor vehicles, and in most cases, roads do not accommodate 
the safe travel of cyclists and pedestrians (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). Poor communities 
have limited access to finances for security measures to safeguard themselves, their 
families, and properties; compared to affluent areas (like Hillcrest), that have the 
resources to implement security measures and target hardening, with gated 
communities growing in popularity in response to crime. Gated communities take the 
form of large security estates, smaller security complexes and enclosed 
neighbourhoods where roads have been closed or boomed off (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: 
np). 
 
CPTED is a set of principles to design the physical environment so that it reduces 
crime opportunities (Santos, 2017:432). The physical or built environment can be 
considered the most crucial factor for determining whether a crime will likely take 
place in a location and can be a significant factor in perceptions of safety (Safer 
Spaces,  [Sa]:  np). CPTED  consists  of  overlapping  principles  (Cozens  &  Love, 
2017:3; Palmiotto, 2011:171). An example of overlapping principles includes 
perimeter fencing around a property, which is a form of target hardening but also 
sends a message of ownership or territoriality. Another example, well-kept gardens, 
and verges promote surveillance, visibility, image, and aesthetics. According to Safer 
Spaces ([Sa]: np) and Kruger, Lancaster, Landman, Lieberman, Louw, and 
Robertshaw (2016:36), there are five principles of CPTED in South Africa: 
 
• Surveillance and visibility (e.g. a clear view or line of sight from the property 
to the street and neighbouring houses). 
• Territoriality (e.g. perimeter fencing around the property). 
 
• Access and escape routes (e.g. roads or pedestrian paths). 
 
• Image and aesthetics (e.g. neatly trimmed verges and well-kept gardens). 
 
• Target hardening (e.g. security gates and burglar alarm system). 
These principles are explored below. 
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3.3.1 Surveillance and visibility 
 
 
Surveillance and visibility refer to ensuring that public areas such as parks and roads 
and restricted areas, like properties/houses and gardens (passive surveillance) allow 
maximum observation of the routines of residents and law enforcement (active 
surveillance). Factors that enhance opportunities for observation: uninterrupted lines 
of sight, effective lighting, the window and door positioning on houses, the building 
layout, the distance between the buildings, the size of the public space and land 
usage (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). Passive surveillance is also known as the presence 
of ‘protective eyes’ or ‘eyes on the street’ (Kruger et al, 2016:36; Safer Spaces, [Sa]: 
np; Snyders, 2016:25). 
 
Natural surveillance can increase opportunities for residents to notice or observe 
strangers in the neighbourhood. Increased surveillance of strangers sends criminals 
a message of increased risk of being caught if they commit a crime and instils a 
sense of safety for legitimate public users (Cozens & Love, 2017:2; Palmiotto, 
2011:171). Palmiotto (2011:171) highlighted that surveillance includes police patrols, 
security patrols, and lighting. Design can provide opportunities to see and be seen, 
for example, opportunities to view adjacent properties, perimeter parking areas, 
walkways, and buildings. These features need to be supported by potential observers 
(residents) who will report suspicious behaviour to relevant authorities. Lighting 
improves the ability to identify individuals; windows allow both inside and outside 
viewing, and properly maintained trees, shrubs and gardens can obviate hiding. 
Furniture arrangements and interior design can support viewing, and the location of 
the building itself can restrict or create views (Zahm, 2007:8-9). 
 
The clear line of sight from private properties like houses, and public areas such as 
the street or parks, can instil a sense of safety in residents and users. The zoning of 
areas (land usage) and the activities carried out at the properties and buildings 
determine if and when ‘protective eyes’ are present or not. Surveillance is enhanced 
providing there is good visibility in the form of effective lighting on dark streets and 
alleys, and the line of sight from windows and doorways are clear (Safer Spaces, 
[Sa]: np). 
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3.3.2  Territoriality 
 
 
Access control and natural surveillance (i.e. well-kept gardens, cleared vegetation 
and trees) allow a clear line of sight to neighbouring properties and contribute to 
territoriality (Palmiotto, 2011:171). Territoriality sends a strong message of ownership 
of a property (Zahm, 2007:9; Kruger et al, 2016:36). Territoriality can instil a sense 
of ownership and responsibility for space. This sense of ownership and responsibility 
enhances the likelihood that passive observers will respond or assist in the case of 
a criminal event. Furthermore, the owners or users are more likely to maintain the 
space if they feel responsible for it. Thus, territoriality includes public, semi-public, 
and private space (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:25). 
 
3.3.3  Access and escape routes 
 
 
Access and escape routes refer to limiting opportunities for burglars to access and 
utilise vacant land and enhancing escape routes for the public (potential victims) 
through clearly signposted streets, buildings and exit routes (Kruger et al, 2016:36; 
Safer Spaces, [Sa]:np; Snyders, 2016:25). Access control aims to reduce 
opportunities for crime by clearly defining public and private space. Gates, locks, or 
guards are used to control access to the property, increasing the perceived risk to 
criminals so that the risk outweighs the potential reward of committing the crime 
(Cozens & Love, 2017:2; Palmiotto, 2011:171). Access can be controlled through 
real and perceptual barriers to entry and movement while guiding legitimate public 
users through the environment with a sense of safety (Cozens & Love, 2017:2; Zahm, 
2007:7-8). 
 
 
The environment must suggest cues about who belongs there (i.e. parents and 
children) what they do and the duration of their stay (i.e. parents and children playing 
in a park for an afternoon or in the garden before dinner). Guardians or residents can 
control access by noting people and activities and reporting unwanted or suspicious 
behaviour to the relevant authorities (Zahm, 2007:7-8). For example, residents can 
report suspicious people or vehicles to the police, security companies or 
neighbourhood/street watch groups. Other examples of access control are fences, 
hedges, tree lines, gates and doors that restrict entry to a property or building (Zahm, 
2007:7-8). 
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3.3.4  Image and aesthetics 
 
 
Image and aesthetics refer to the physical appearance of an environment and 
whether it transmits a positive picture and instils a sense of safety among residents 
and the public (Kruger et al, 2016:36; Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:25). A 
sideroad with overgrown grass verges and vegetation, graffiti on walls and litter 
scattered all over may not send a sense of safety compared to a side road with well- 
kept grass verges and vegetation, fenced-off properties with a clear line of sight from 
the windows and doors; and which is litter free. The image of an environment or 
neighbourhood should be enhanced through the on-going upkeep and maintenance 
of the environment (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). Urban decay makes people reluctant to 
use areas that appear unsafe, and in turn, reduces the number of people (passive 
surveillance) that use that space, and therefore increases the risk of crime occurring 
within that environment. Superior design and effective management of public spaces 
are essential to prevent the environment from becoming a hotspot or perceived 
hotspot for crime (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). 
 
3.3.5  Target Hardening 
 
 
Target hardening refers to reducing the attractiveness and vulnerability of a property 
(Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:26). Kruger et al (2016:36) highlighted that 
target hardening should reduce the attractiveness and vulnerability of the potential 
target by elevating the risk or perceived risk and effort to would-be criminals. Snyders 
(2016:29-30) and Zinn (2010:155) strongly suggest that target hardening should 
consist of burglary alarm systems, electric fences, and garden beams linked to an 
armed response security company (in the event that they are activated), strong 
security fencing around the property, strong burglar bars on windows, solid security 
gates on all doorways to the building, and that dogs should be kept inside the house. 
Such target hardening efforts aim to deter potential criminals, or at least give an early 
warning that the property has been infiltrated. It must be noted that fences support 
and walls limit surveillance (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). 
 
The criticism levelled against CPTED is that the interventions believed to be positive 
may have a drawback or negative effect (Cozens & Love, 2017:2). For example, 
more street lighting promotes surveillance and allows better visibility for pedestrians 
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and on-lookers, however, it also allows offenders to catch sight of suitable victims or 
target properties. A potential victim wearing valuable jewellery or the affluence of a 
property may be illuminated by extra lighting which otherwise may not have been 
seen by offenders or burglars. 
 
Target hardening efforts in the form of over-fortification of properties combined with 
efforts to discourage people, especially young people, from using public spaces 
(parks) can have an unintended negative impact for the social environment of the 
community or neighbourhood (Cozens & Love, 2017:2). For example, properties with 
high walls that block the view from the street and neighbouring properties, mean 
residents can no longer see their children playing in the park across the road or with 
the neighbour's children next door. 
 
The principles of CPTED have been highlighted: if the environment is designed, 
managed, and effectively maintained, it can enhance the safety and well-being of the 
citizens of South Africa. The application of CPTED principles on a micro level can 
reduce crime in those areas and neighbourhoods. On a macro level intervention can 
target spatial characteristics of impoverished areas, where residents are forced to 
travel long distances to work which further exposes themselves to victimisation. 
Vacant land (buffer strips), used in the past to separate areas and people, now serve 
as breeding grounds for criminals (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). The same land use or 
zoning leaves some areas deserted at night or during the day thereby increasing 
opportunities for crime. The exclusion of many people residing in cities from basic 
amenities (e.g. running water and electricity) and lack of employment opportunities 
available in cities must be remedied. Conditions of poverty, unemployment, and a 
lack of basic needs, allow crime to manifest and make the people that live in these 
circumstances feel vulnerable (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). It is essential that CPTED is 
implemented on various levels consisting of planning, design, and management. The 
following levels are outlined: 
 
• Planning:  strategic  urban  planning  is  necessary  to  reduce  vacant  land, 
promote mixed land-use and to bring communities together (Safer Spaces, 
[Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:26). An example implemented by the HPNW saw 
residents conducting clean-ups along the railway line that borders with the 
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suburb, making it easy to patrol by bicycle, motorbike or on foot (Philp, 2014: 
np). Official state role-players are not maintaining the area along the railway 
line which provides an access route to the suburb, and HPNW have had to 
continue clean-ups, including brush cutting of grass that was more than two 
metres long, and where criminal elements could hide and manifest (Hitchcock, 
2016: np). 
 
• Design: detailed design of various urban elements ranging from transport 
systems, roads, public open spaces, buildings, and the environments in which 
these elements fall (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:26). As an 
example, the residents of Hillcrest Park identified the taxi rank located across 
the railway line from the suburb, as a source of criminal activity that attracts 
crowds, beggars, hawkers, loiterers and drug dealers (Clark, 2014:27). Design 
elements could consider the relocation of such places as taxi-ranks in close 
proximity to suburbs. 
• Management: the effective management of the entire urban system and 
precincts is essential. The infrastructure, on-going maintenance and effective 
enforcement of by-laws must be carried out, including the implementation of 
CPTED initiatives in communities (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np; Snyders, 2016:26). 
A maintained   environment   can   enhance   community   pride   in   the 
neighbourhood and encourage residents to take active responsibility for 
maintaining the standards of the environment. A fundamental and important 
ingredient for the success of CPTED intervention is community participation. 
A key objective of CPTED is to encourage residents’ ownership of their 
neighbourhoods (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). Residents must be encouraged to 
get involved in their communities and neighbourhoods, to identify 
environment-related crime and develop a proactive approach to preventing 
crime in their communities and neighbourhoods (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np). The 
effort of HPNW, in clearing and patrolling their neighbourhood, and taking 
ownership show that on-going management and maintenance is essential. 
HPNW have had to take on the responsibility of state role-players who are not 
meeting their obligations in this regard (Hitchcock, 2016: np). 
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3.4 THE BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY (BWT) 
 
 
In 1969 a Stanford psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, placed two unoccupied cars in two 
different neighbourhoods. One car was in upmarket Palo Alto, California, one block 
away from the famous Stanford University, and the other in the Bronx, New York City, 
one block away from New York University, Bronx Campus (Zimbardo, 2007:304- 
305). The Bronx car was vandalised within minutes, and within 24 hours nothing of 
value remained inside. Passers-by continued to vandalise the car by ripping up the 
upholstery and breaking the windows. The car parked in Palo Alto remained 
untouched for almost a week. It was only after Zimbardo hit the car with a 
sledgehammer that people began to vandalise it. The car was destroyed within a few 
hours of Zimbardo’s action. This experiment shows that when a ‘no one cares’ cue 
is sent out, crime can and will occur in any neighbourhood (Hill & Paynich, 2014:28; 
Kelling & Wilson, 1982: np; Miller, Hess & Orthmann, 2014:64). 
 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling (1982) based their BWT partly on Zimbardo’s 
research. This theory proposes that if a neighbourhood or place suggests that ‘no 
one cares’; disorder and crime will flourish. Broken windows and smashed cars are 
visible signs implying that people do not care about the community. Other signs 
include unmowed lawns, piles of accumulated rubbish, graffiti, rowdiness, 
drunkenness, fighting, prostitution, abandoned buildings, litter and broken windows - 
all of which can be referred to as ‘incivilities’ (Kelling & Wilson, 1982: np; Miller et al, 
2014:64-65). 
 
 
Police Chief William Bratton applied the BWT and contributed significantly to a 
decrease in crime in New York City in the 1990s. This policing strategy aimed to 
reduce crime by focusing on incivilities and keeping the physical environment clean 
and safe. The police focused on stamping out incivilities such as drinking in public, 
begging, and all crimes considered petty. The BWT was linked with a zero-tolerance 
approach to crime reduction (Isenberg, 2010:6; Kelling & Wilson, 1982: np). 
 
The appearance of disorder in a neighbourhood signals to a potential offender that 
no one cares and that no one will call the police (Winfree & Abadinsky, 2017:10). 
When social control mechanisms are eroded, incivilities and social disorder occur. 
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Increased incivilities may heighten fear of crime and reduce the sense of safety. As 
a result, people may physically or psychologically withdraw from their neighbours. 
On the other hand, incivilities, and disorder in the form of crime could bring people 
together to ‘take back the neighbourhood’ (Miller et al, 2014:65). 
 
The HPNW has been running since August 2012 because of crime in the area. The 
HPNW polices the Hillcrest Park area which is a formal urban settlement and they 
base their philosophy on the BWT and the CPTED (HPNW, 2015: np). The efforts 
and dedication of a few residents doing patrols and clean-ups have brought certain 
types of opportunist crimes (like residential burglary) down by 80%, but these efforts 
did not stop organised crime in the highway area (Philip, 2014: np). 
 
Snyders (2016:28) highlighted that community participation is essential if residents 
want to take ownership and control of their neighbourhood. Participation should be 
in collaboration with local law enforcement to eradicate incivilities and maintain order 
(i.e. enforcement of by-laws). 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter applied the CPT and the FBT to explain initial residential burglaries and 
near repeat residential burglaries in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area. The CPT is a 
combination of both the RCT and the RAT and highlights awareness space of 
burglars or would-be burglar along nodes and paths of the environment encountered 
during their routine activities. 
 
The FBT states that certain properties attract or flag the attention of burglars or 
potential burglars, resulting in an initial burglary in the area. The Boost Theory refers 
to risk which is elevated or ‘boosted’ following the initial burglary, where burglars may 
return for goods they did not take the first time or share information about the property 
with other unsavoury elements. However, this elevated risk quickly deteriorates as 
time lapses, or when burglary victims have taken target hardening measures leaving 
the burglars to seek their next burglary target nearby. 
 
The CPTED and BWT were used as a means of minimising initial residential 
burglaries, and near repeat burglaries from occurring in the study area. The CPTED 
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is based on five principles namely: surveillance and visibility, territoriality, access and 
escape routes, image and aesthetics and target hardening. The BWT is largely based 
on maintaining the order of the environment or neighbourhood by ensuring gardens, 
and verges are well kept and not overgrown; streets and neighbourhood are litter 
free; graffiti is removed, and incivilities are not allowed to manifest or prosper. To be 
successful, both the CPTED and BWT need community involvement and 
collaboration with local law enforcement agencies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
International research (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et 
al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; 
Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang 
& Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) on near repeat residential burglary patterns has 
highlighted the potential benefits of these patterns. The NRC is a tool that can identify 
near repeat residential burglary patterns (Ratcliffe, 2009:np, Tech Beat, 2008:np; Wu 
et al 2015:181) and assist police agencies, like Hillcrest (KZN) police station, with 
the decision-making process regarding resource allocation and crime prevention 
strategies in specific areas for a specific period of time, to prevent near repeat 
residential burglaries. This chapter outlines the research methods followed in the 
study. The researcher discusses the research approach; type of research; research 
design; aims and objectives of the research; sampling procedures; data collection 
methods; data analysis and interpretation; and ethical considerations applicable to 
this study. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
 
This research follows a mixed methods research approach found to be popular in the 
areas of social, behavioural and health sciences (Porche & Spencer, 2017:3). The 
advantages of a mixed methods approach include the potential to answer questions 
that single approaches (exclusively qualitative or quantitative research) cannot 
answer, a deeper understanding of the research topic and more divergent research 
findings (Porche & Spencer, 2017:13). The disadvantages or challenges of mixed 
methods research is the time distribution needed to conduct both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods and integrate the data (dos Santos et al, 2017:7). Dos 
Santos et al (2017:8) highlighted the importance of a solid understanding of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods when conducting mixed methods 
research. 
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4.3 TYPE OF RESEARCH 
 
 
Exploratory research is used to explore or gain a deeper understanding of a specific 
topic or area of interest (Babbie, 2016:92; Bachman & Schutt, 2018:9, Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2016:313). According to Babbie (2016:92), exploratory research is used to 
investigate the viability of further studies and to develop methods that can be used 
in future studies. However, the drawback of exploratory research is that it rarely 
concludes with clear or definite answers (Babbie, 2016:92). In this research, 
exploratory research was used to apply the NRC tool to identify near repeat burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area for the first time. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
Before scientific research can begin, the researcher must decide on the nature of the 
desired research and choose the proper research design to carry out the research 
(Babbie, 2016:89). A mixed methods research design makes use of quantitative and 
qualitative data, which is collected, analysed and merged to provide a deeper 
understanding of the research topic when compared to a single research approach 
(Bryman, 2016:692; Creswell, 2014:4, 215; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 2013: 207; 
dos Santos et al,  2017:3; Porche & Spencer, 2017:3). 
 
An explanatory sequential mixed method approach is followed when the researcher 
carries out quantitative research, analyses the results and explains them in more 
detail using qualitative research (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:277; Creswell, 2014:13; 
DeCuir-Gunby & Schutz, 2017:86; dos Santos et al, 2017:4). The researcher 
selected an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach as it is best suited to 
exploratory research. The explanatory sequential method is popular in research that 
has a solid quantitative orientation (Creswell, 2014:14). The calculation of near 
repeat residential burglary risk is the basis of this research. 
 
Firstly, the quantitative aspect of the research was conducted which required 
secondary data analysis of closed-case residential burglaries and the calculation of 
near repeat risk patterns, using the NRC. The near repeat results were illustrated 
using the GIS and then analysed. The quantitative research was followed by 
qualitative research in the form of structured interviews with five detectives, and 
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electronic interviews with SMEs in the area of the topic. 
 
4.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
Research aims can be described as the broad aims or intentions of the research and 
what is to be achieved (eResearch Methods, [Sa]: np; Dudovskiy, 2017: np; Thomas 
& Hodges, 2010:38). Research objectives outline the specific processes used in 
order to meet the aim of the research (Dudovskiy, 2017: np; eResearch Methods, 
[Sa]: np; Thomas & Hodges, 2010:39). The aim of the research is to apply the NRC 
to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area using 
12-months of reported residential burglary cases at the Hillcrest police station. In 
order to test the ability of the NRC, the near repeat calculations are illustrated using 
the GIS for each of the 12 months, creating a predictive near repeat risk map for the 
following month. The findings are analysed and discussed. 
 
This mixed methods research approach is applied to analyse the near repeat 
residential  burglary  patterns  identified  in  the  study  area  (Bachman  &  Schutt, 
2018:315; Bryman, 2016:692; Creswell, 2014:4, 215; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 
 
2013: 207). The secondary data analysis of residential burglary cases reported to the 
Hillcrest (KZN) police station, the geocoding of the burglary points and the 
visualisation of the near repeat residential burglary patterns identified by the NRC, 
make up the quantitative part of this research. Structured interviews with five 
detectives from Hillcrest police drew their views, attitudes, experience, and opinions 
of residential burglaries in the Hillcrest (KZN) police area. E-mail interviews with 
SMEs form the qualitative aspect of this research. Both the quantitative and 
qualitative findings are combined to form a concise account of the exploratory 
research. 
 
In order to remain ethical and in line with the CRIMSA code of conduct, to uphold the 
agreement and to ensure anonymity of the voluntary participants, the researcher 
cannot include any names, ranks, ethnic groups or races of the five detectives 
(respondents) who participated in this research. The five detectives consisted of two 
females and three males ranging in rank from Constable to Captain, and ages from 
the  mid-20s  to  mid-40s.  Their  experience  of  case  investigation  of  residential 
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burglaries ranged from dozens to several hundred cases. 
 
 
Research questions that the researcher aimed to answer: 
 
• Can the NRC identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest 
 
(KZN) policing area? 
 
• Can the NRC predict near repeat risk of residential burglaries in the Hillcrest 
policing area? 
• Can the NRC be of value or use to the Hillcrest police for resource allocation, 
crime prevention strategies and investigations in the Hillcrest policing area? 
• Can the GIS be a valuable visualisation and analytical tool at Hillcrest police 
station? 
 
4.6 MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
 
 
The SAPS Annual Crime Statistics for the period April 2017 to March 2018 stated 
that there were 765 residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest police station (SAPS, 
2018: np). This equates to at least two residential burglaries reported per day to 
Hillcrest police station. According to a news report (Mabena, 2017: np), the lack of 
essential police resources, such as vehicles and manpower, impacts negatively on 
the SAPS’s ability to carry out their duties effectively. With a direct focus on Hillcrest 
SAPS, a local Councillor (Guy et al, 2016: np) stated that the high residential burglary 
rates in the Hillcrest policing area were the direct result of a lack of visible policing 
and inadequate resources. The crime waves experienced by communities in the 
Hillcrest policing area have made the local news, stressing the need for effective 
policing (Naicker, 2015: np; Nair, 2013a: np; Nair, 2013b: np). It is evident from these 
news reports and official SAPS crime statistics that Hillcrest SAPS lacks resources 
to meet the needs of the community it serves. The Hillcrest police need to streamline 
and effectively use the limited resources they have at their disposal. 
 
Near repeat, patterns have become a major aspect in predicting crime and are further 
enhanced when integrated with other data such as land use or environment factors 
(Groff & Taniguchi, 2016: np). Extensive international research (Bowers & Johnson, 
2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson 
et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 2000; Piza & 
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Carter, 2018; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) has identified 
near repeat residential burglary patterns, by highlighting the predictive value of near 
repeat patterns that could be applied by police agencies in resource allocation and 
crime prevention strategies. 
 
The research study carried out by Fielding and Jones (2012) in Manchester, UK, 
applied the NRC and created predictive risk maps for residential burglaries to focus 
police deployment. This had a considerable influence on the decline of residential 
burglaries. Furthermore, research conducted by Snyders (2016) in Villieria, South 
Africa, highlighted the use of the GIS for the geocoding of reported crimes, spatial 
analysis, and resource allocation to specific areas by local law enforcement, and 
proved successful in crime prevention of certain crimes in certain areas. 
 
International near repeat residential burglary research suggests that the identification 
of near repeat residential burglary patterns allow police agencies to deploy resources 
to specific areas at specific times, to prevent near repeat residential burglaries from 
taking place. However, to date, there is no known research on near repeat burglary 
patterns, or the application of the NRC, in a South African context, and more 
specifically in the Hillcrest policing area. The GIS is used to geocode residential 
burglary points and represents the Hillcrest policing area using eThekwini Municipal 
GIS data including roads, railway lines, suburbs, the various land uses. 
 
A clearer picture of the nature and extent of residential burglaries is provided through 
closed-case analysis. This study included an analysis of 490 closed-case dockets of 
residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest Police Station between April 2012 and 
March 2013. The majority of these residential burglaries occurred in the formal urban 
settlements of the Hillcrest policing area. The findings of this research could be 
valuable to the SAPS, as the application of the NRC could prevent future incidents 
of residential burglary, more specifically near repeat residential burglaries. 
 
Furthermore, the NRC can aid on-going investigations and resource allocation for 
crime prevention. The NRC can, for instance, indicate which areas (spatial) and for 
how long (temporal) they are at risk of near repeat burglaries so that crime prevention 
patrols can be more focused. Thus, the prediction of locations of house burglaries 
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would assist the police in allocating patrols, reducing response times, and preventing 
further burglaries (Groff & Le Vigne, 2002:31). 
 
Like the NRC, the Q-GIS is freely available software, and both the NRC and Q-GIS 
are valuable and cost-effective tools for the prevention and investigation of residential 
burglary, which can be utilised by the Hillcrest police at station level. The GIS was 
used to geocode residential burglary points, to illustrate the NRC results, highlight 
the various land uses in the area (like formal urban settlements, farmland, vacant 
land, informal settlements and so on) and environmental factors (such as main roads, 
railway lines, road nodes and end nodes or cul-de-sacs). 
 
This research applied the NRC to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in 
the Hillcrest policing area, and the GIS to visualise these results in the form of month- 
to-month predictive risk maps. This research is by no means a replacement for any 
processes used by Hillcrest police, but these tools are proposed as additional aids 
to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns. 
 
4.7 RESEARCH POPULATION, SAMPLE AND SAMPLE METHOD 
 
 
A population in research terms refers to all the elements of a context in which the 
research is focused. Examples of a population are towns, cities, countries, prisons, 
or universities (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:94). The Hillcrest SAPS policing area forms 
the research population in this study. A sample can be described as a subset of a 
population or elements of a larger group used in a research study (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2018:94; Schutt, 2016:44). Residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest SAPS, 
police station between April 2012 and March 2013 are the samples used in this 
research. Furthermore, only closed-case residential burglaries were included in the 
sample. 
 
Both probability and non-probability sampling methods are applied in this research. 
In probability sampling, each element has a chance or opportunity of being selected 
or included in the research sample (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:100). Non-probability 
sampling methods are best suited for research where random sampling is not 
possible, or when the research needs a detailed analysis of a small group or 
population, or when the researcher is carrying out exploratory research (Bachman & 
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Schutt, 2018:106). Probability and non-probability sampling methods are followed. 
 
4.7.1  Research unit 
 
 
The research unit or unit of analysis refers to the area in which the research is 
focused (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:319). The research unit consisted of residential 
burglaries reported to Hillcrest SAPS police station between April 2012 and March 
2013. 
 
4.7.2  Sample 
 
 
A probability sampling method was followed with the quantitative data sample 
process where prior knowledge on the residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest 
police was utilised to determine the sampling process. The elements of the 
residential burglaries differed in terms of essential data (i.e. fixed residential / street 
address) and formed the sampling strata (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:103). 
 
A sample of 490 closed-case residential burglaries was drawn through secondary 
data analysis for this research. The researcher was only permitted access to closed 
residential burglary cases and made use of cases which had a fixed residential 
address, and which could be identified on the eThekwini Municipal GIS data. For 
example, residential burglary cases that had a vague address, such as ‘off Inanda 
Road’ or ‘near XYZ tuck-shop’ could not be included in the sample. All 490 residential 
burglary points were geocoded to the relevant street addresses, generating the 
required x and y coordinates necessary for near repeat calculations. 
 
Purposive or judgement sampling was followed to carry out qualitative interviews with 
detectives at Hillcrest police station based on these participants unique positions with 
the SAPS. The researcher contacted the detectives privately and invited them to 
voluntarily participate in the research. Qualitative interviews with five detectives from 
Hillcrest police station were conducted to gain insight into their experiences, 
knowledge, attitudes, and views on residential burglaries in their policing area. 
Purposive or judgement sampling was also used to request electronic interviews with 
the SMEs who were known professionals in their areas of expertise. Several SMEs 
responded to the researcher’s request for electronic interviews to draw on their 
experience, expertise, and feedback. 
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4.7.3  Sample method (probability and non-probability) 
 
 
There is a significant difference between probability and non-probability sampling 
methods. Probability sampling permits the researcher to identify in advance the 
likelihood of an element of a population that will be included in the sample, whereas 
in non-probability sampling methods, the probability of a selection of a population 
element is unknown (Bachman & Schutt, 201:99). Probability sampling methods are 
more desirable, because the elements included in the sample are determined by 
chance and can be generalised to a larger population (Bachman & Schutt, 201:100). 
Non-probability sampling methods are preferred for research where random 
sampling is not appropriate, when the research demands a detailed analysis or 
investigation on a small population or when the research underway is exploratory in 
nature (Bachman & Schutt, 2018:106). 
 
The probability sampling method of stratified random sampling was applied during 
the quantitative data collection for this research. Stratified random sampling is a 
process where samples are selected because of a specific or relevant characteristic 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2018:103).   A total of 490 closed-case residential burglaries 
were included in the probability sample. A non-probability sampling method was used 
for the qualitative data collection aspect of this research. Purposive or judgment 
sampling is when the researcher selects certain individuals for a specific purpose 
because of their experience or knowledge about the research topic (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2018:108).  The research used a non-probability sample of five detectives 
from the Hillcrest police, and several SMEs for this research. 
 
4.8 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
 
 
Since this is a mixed methods research, the researcher applied quantitative and 
qualitative data collection methods discussed separately below. 
 
4.8.1  Quantitative data collection 
 
 
The quantitative data in this research was collected through secondary data 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2016:18; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 2013: 81; Schutt, 2017:44; 
Withrow, 2014:273) in the form of a docket analysis of closed-case residential 
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burglaries reported to Hillcrest police station during the period April 2012 to March 
 
2013. The essential date and street address for each residential burglary was 
collected during the docket analysis. Van Graan and Van der Watt (2014:144) 
highlighted that docket analysis can support scientific research and supply a deeper 
understanding of the crime. To conduct near repeat calculations of risk, the data must 
be in the correct format.  The NRC requires the x and y coordinates and the date of 
each residential burglary in comma separated values (.csv format) (Ratcliffe, 2007:5- 
6). The residential burglaries were geocoded using the Q-GIS to visualise the 
residential burglary locations and to provide x and y coordinates required for near 
repeat calculation of risk. 
 
The researcher made provisions with the Hillcrest SAPS Station Commander, who 
introduced the researcher to the Detective Clerk in charge of the docket room. The 
researcher then made arrangements with the Detective Clerk to access the closed- 
case residential burglary dockets, for analysis at the Hillcrest police station, under 
supervision. 
 
4.8.1.1 Setting 
 
 
The researcher conducted secondary data analysis of closed-case dockets in the 
Docket Room, at Hillcrest police. The researcher was supervised and allowed access 
only to closed cases of residential burglaries. 
 
4.8.1.2 Duration 
 
 
The secondary data analysis of closed-cases was carried out between July 2014 and 
December 2014. The researcher made arrangements in advance with the Detective 
Clerk to access the docket room, and the researcher conducted the docket analysis 
at the convenience, and under the supervision of the Detective Clerk. Over a period 
of 19 days, the researcher completed the secondary data analysis (docket analysis) 
of all closed-case residential burglary cases available. A sample of 490 residential 
burglary cases was selected for this exploratory research, out of a total of the 1013 
residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest police between April 2012 and March 2013 
(SAPS, 2018: np). 
 
All 490 residential burglary cases had street addresses which could be located on 
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the GIS using eThekwini Municipality GIS data. Each residential burglary address 
was pinpointed and geocoded for the purpose of this research. Closed-case 
residential burglaries without a street address were excluded from the analysis, as a 
street address is required to geocode the residential burglary points essential for the 
near repeat calculation. Excluded residential burglaries without street addresses, that 
could not be identified from the eThekwini Municipal GIS data, were normally in 
informal residential and rural areas within the Hillcrest SAPS policing area. 
 
4.8.2  Qualitative data collection 
 
 
The researcher followed a structured interview schedule consisting of structured 
interviews using an open-ended questionnaire. An interview schedule refers to the 
structure of the interview which may consist of questions prepared in advance 
(Maxfield & Babbie, 2016: 315) and determines how detailed and interactive the 
interviewee or participant will be (Maxfield & Babbie, 2016: 315).  According to 
Bachman & Schutt (2016:155), an interview schedule is made up of questions, which 
the interviewer will pose to the interviewee or research participant either face-to-face 
or on the phone. Structured interviews are considered a process of gathering specific 
information for a certain purpose (Maxfield & Babbie, 2016: 203). A disadvantage of 
structured interviews is that they could hamper in-depth responses, or the opportunity 
to probe deeper into unexpected responses from the interviewee or participant 
(Maxfield & Babbie, 2016: 203). Open-ended questions prompt the interviewee or 
participant for his or her own answers (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:74,158; Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2016: 316). 
 
Qualitative data collection in the form of structured interviews was carried out with 
five detectives from the Hillcrest police. Structured interviews are a research 
instrument to ask questions and record the answers or feedback exactly as it is given 
(Bryman, 2016:21). It ensures each participant is asked exactly the same questions, 
verbatim to ensure no variation of questions which may result in a variation of 
answers (Bryman, 2016:207). 
 
The researcher made an appointment with the Station Commander of Hillcrest 
SAPS, with regards to conducting interviews with five detectives for the research. 
The Station Commander introduced the researcher to the Branch Commander, Head 
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of Detectives of Hillcrest SAPS. Following this introduction, the Head of Detectives 
at Hillcrest made an announcement about the research during a morning meeting 
with the detectives. The researcher was introduced and supplied all the detectives 
with a letter of introduction (Annexure 6) outlining the purpose of research while 
highlighting voluntary and confidential participation. The Head of Detectives further 
added during the same meeting, that the researcher would be contacting them 
individually to see if they would like to participate in the research. The researcher 
was provided with a list of names and contact numbers for the detectives by the Head 
of Detectives and contacted detectives to see if they would like to participate in the 
research. The researcher contacted detectives randomly from the list until he had 
five detectives who were willing to participate in the research. The interviews were 
set up at a convenient time for each detective and carried out in the privacy of the 
detective’s office at Hillcrest police station. 
 
A structured questionnaire with open-ended questions was prepared in advance, and 
the researcher read the questions to the participants whose feedback was recorded 
accurately. The interviews were carried out on a one-on-one basis at Hillcrest police 
station, where the researcher asked the detectives about their experience, opinions, 
attitudes and views of burglars, residential burglaries, predicting residential 
burglaries, and the application of the NRC and creation of predictive risk maps for 
residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
Several SMEs were contacted for their opinions, feedback and comments on the 
research methods used as follows: 
 
• Dr Schmitz, a Principal Researcher at the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR), South Africa. Schmitz has carried out extensive research in 
geospatial analysis, crime analysis, logistics and forensic geography in a 
South African context. 
• Professor Greg Breetzke, of the Department of Geography, Geoinformatics 
and Meteorology, at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Breetzke, holds 
a PhD in Geoinformatics, and has carried out a number of research studies, 
and promotes the use of the GIS for crime prevention by the SAPS. 
• Dr  Katrina  Landman  (previously  a  Principal  researcher  at  CSIR,  Built 
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Environment, South Africa), and who is currently a lecturer at the University 
of Pretoria. 
• Professor Tinus Kruger, a Principal researcher at CSIR, South Africa, who is 
an expert in CPTED, crime science, situational crime prevention, architecture, 
housing, and community development. 
• Professor Rudolph Zinn of the University of South Africa (UNISA), College of 
Law, School of Criminal Justice, Department of Police Practice, who 
specialises in intelligence-led policing, house robbery (home invasions), 
carjacking, violent crime, community safety networks and policing. 
 
 
The valued SME feedback will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.8.3  Sourcing the NRC and the Q-GIS 
 
The Near Repeat Calculator (NRC) is freely available and was downloaded from the 
following link and applied in this research. 
 
http://www.cla.temple.edu/center-for-security-and-crime-science/projects/ 
 
The Q-GIS is an open source GIS  software programme which the researcher 
downloaded from the following link for use in this research. 
 
http://www.qgis.org/en/site/forusers/download.html 
 
4.8.4  Docket analysis 
 
 
Data that has previously been collected but used by someone else for a different 
analysis is called secondary data (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:18; Crowther-Dowey & 
Fussey, 2013: 81; Schutt, 2017:44; Withrow, 2014:273). Docket analysis has the 
capacity to enhance the understanding of crime data and promote scientific research 
(Van Graan & Van der Watt, 2014:144). According to Van Graan and Van der Watt 
(2014:144), docket analysis allows a deeper understanding of the known 
circumstances and factors surrounding the crime incident. Dockets analysis should 
not be underrated or disregarded as an option, because it can assist crime 
investigators, crime analysts and crime researchers to narrow down or focus 
investigations; by highlighting dynamics and contributing factors; and assist in 
decision-making; enable specific crime incident analysis; and identify MO and case 
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linkage (Van Graan & Van der Watt, 2014:144). 
 
 
Docket analysis provides valuable information that cannot be obtained through any 
other method and allows an insight into the crime, how the investigation was carried 
out the outcomes and case closure. The contents of a docket normally include the 
nature and circumstances surrounding the crime, the victim and offender profiles, the 
relationship between the victim and offender, state any substance (drugs and 
alcohol) used by either the victim and/or offender, and ultimately an indication of 
whether the case will proceed to court (Mistry, Snyman & van Zyl, 2001:21-22). 
 
The advantages of a docket analysis are: dockets are accessible (with permission) 
and consist of “source data”, rather than information through the police computer 
system, thereby eliminating secondary data capturing errors. As said above, dockets 
potentially hold a wealth of information on the crime incident, the victim, and the 
offender (if known). Dockets further outline the duration of the case investigation, the 
level of experience of the investigating officer and how the case was closed (Mistry, 
2001:21-22; Van Graan & Van der Watt, 2014:150-151). The disadvantages of 
docket analysis include: dockets may have incomplete statements; the handwriting 
could be illegible or difficult to read due to poor language use. Further, docket 
analysis cannot determine the extent of the crime, the impact the crime has had on 
the life of the victim/s nor the reason or motivation of the offender/s to carry out the 
crime (Mistry, 2001:21-22; Van Graan & Van der Watt, 2014:150-151). The 
researcher relied on a docket analysis of secondary data in the form of closed-cases 
of residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest police between April 2012 and March 
2013. A total of 490 close case dockets of residential burglary were analysed by the 
researcher. 
 
4.8.5  Structured interviews 
 
 
Participation was on a voluntary basis, and each participant (detective) was informed 
by the researcher of the purpose of the research interview. The interviews were 
arranged in advance at the convenience of the participant and conducted in the 
privacy of his or her office at the Hillcrest police station. All detectives had to give 
written and signed consent to the interview and give consent for the researcher to 
contact him or her at a later date regarding the research if necessary. The researcher 
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followed a structured interview schedule, asked the questions exactly as they were 
worded and wrote down the feedback received. Only the researcher knew which 
detectives participated and only the researcher can link the feedback received to 
each participant. 
 
4.9  RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF DATA COLLECTION 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
There is a noteworthy difference between reliability and validity. Reliability can be 
met when a measurement procedure is consistent in scoring a phenomenon that is 
not changing. When a measure is considered reliable, it is less affected by random 
errors or variations compared to an unreliable measure (Bachman & Schutt, 2019:85- 
86). Measurement validity is achieved when a measure measures what it is intended 
to measure (Bachman & Schutt, 2019:83). 
 
Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of a measure of a concept which can 
be repeated by different researchers and in different research projects (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2016:85; Creswell, 2014: np; Schutt, 2017:244). Reliability needs to be 
assessed before measurement validity can be tested (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:85). 
Validity refers to the extent that an indicator, used to measure a concept, is accurate 
(Bachman  &  Schutt,   2016:39;   Bryman,   2016:275;   Gray,   2014:150;   Schutt, 
2017:245). The validity and reliability of the NRC are tested by using and geo-coding 
 
12-months of residential burglaries reported at Hillcrest police, illustrating near repeat 
calculations, creating month-to-month prediction risk maps and finally analysing the 
calculations for their predictive accuracy of the following month’s near repeat 
residential burglaries. 
 
4.9.1 Reliability 
 
 
Reliability is essential for measurement validity (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:85). 
Twelve consecutive months of residential burglary data and near repeat calculations 
of risk were mapped, and the findings were analysed month-to-month to establish 
the consistency and reliability of the NRC to predict near repeat residential burglary 
patterns. The research findings are compared to previous research on the NRC in 
order to establish the reliability of the research findings. Internal reliability refers to 
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the extent that the indicators of measurement are consistent (Bryman, 2016:692). 
The predictive value of the NRC in this research is limited to the Hillcrest policing 
area and is not representative of South Africa as a whole, as outlined by Dr Schmitz 
(2016: np). However, near repeat residential burglary patterns have been identified 
by international research. Even though the spatial and temporal patterns may vary 
from country to country, and place to place, the underlining point is that near repeat 
patterns can be identified and potentially hold crime prevention value for police 
agencies. 
 
4.9.2  Validity 
 
 
This research aims to ensure measurement validity, predictive validity, statistical 
validity, construct validity and external validity. Predictive validity refers to how well a 
test or instrument can forecast or predict (Bryman, 2016:694; Gray, 2014:153). 
Predictive validity is measured by analysing the NRC results and the month-to-month 
predictive risk maps for a period of 12 months. Starting with residential burglaries in 
April 2012, which were geocoded, near repeat risk calculations are illustrated in the 
form of risk buffers, creating a predictive risk map for May 2012. In another layer, the 
May 2012 residential burglaries are represented on the same predictive risk map, 
showing the number of burglaries that occurred within the predicted risk buffers using 
spatial analysis. This process was repeated for each month. The predictive map for 
each month is compared and analysed with the following month’s map showing 
where the residential burglaries occurred in order to determine how accurate the near 
repeat calculations of risk were for predicting near repeat residential burglaries during 
the following month. 
 
Measurement validity is achieved when a measure, measures what it says it 
measures (Bachman & Schutt, 2016:83). Measurement validity will be achieved by 
comparing the month-to-month predictive maps, and the location of the month-to- 
month residential burglaries to determine whether the NRC was able to predict or 
forecast near repeat resident burglaries. 
 
Statistical validity is the extent to which research has utilised appropriate design and 
statistical methods that allow it to detect the effects that are present (Gray, 2014:153). 
The x and y coordinates and dates are entered in the required format into the NRC 
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and calculated using the settings outlined in section 4.10 (data analysis and 
interpretation). Drawing from the concluding process for predictive validity (above), 
the number of residential burglaries that occurred within the predicted risk buffer or 
area is calculated to represent a statistic to indicate the accuracy of the NRC and the 
predictive risk map. This process was carried out for each month. 
 
Construct validity refers to the quality of conceptualisation or operationalisation of the 
relevant concepts, and to the extent which the research findings test or investigate 
what it claims to have found (Gray, 2014:279). According to Bryman (2016:69), 
construct validity is a measurement of validity which tests a hypothesis that is 
relevant to the fundamental concept. Construct validity has been established when a 
measure is similar to, or like other measures as stated in a theory (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2016:85; Schutt (2017:240). Depending on the findings supporting predictive 
validity and statistical validity, construct validity can be established on the basis of 
the NRC ability to identify near repeat residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing 
area. 
 
External validity refers to the degree to which the research findings can be 
generalised beyond the research study itself (Bryman, 2016:691; Crowther-Dowey & 
Fussey, 2013:109; Gray, 2014:280). As already discussed, near repeat burglary 
patterns have been identified through international research in a number of countries. 
The NRC itself is externally valid, and international research on near repeat 
residential burglaries has been conducted using various measures. As noted by Dr 
Schmitz (2016: np), research findings on the application of the NRC in the Hillcrest 
policing area, cannot be generalised to South Africa as a whole. This would require 
further research studies using different policing areas, for example, rural and city 
policing areas in South Africa (Schmitz, 2016: np). This research is only valid within 
the sample area of Hillcrest policing area, KZN, South Africa, thus making it internally 
valid in nature. Internal validity is the extent to which a finding integrates a 
relationship or link between two or more variables (Bryman, 2016:692). 
 
 
What can be generalised beyond the study area is the identification of near repeat 
residential burglary patterns similar to international research findings (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen, Yuan & Li, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 
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2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 
 
2000; Piza & Carter, 2018; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu, Xu et al, 
 
2015). 
 
4.9.3  Trustworthiness 
 
 
Trustworthiness consists of credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformity 
(Devault, 2017: np). Credibility can be assured when the same research participants 
are asked the same questions consistently and when the researcher has referred to 
various sources (Devault, 2017: np). Transferability refers to whether the research 
findings can be generalised and applied to other situations and/or contexts beyond 
the research (Devault, 2017: np). Dependability is established if the research findings 
are consistent and can be repeated by other researchers using the same data (Anon, 
[sa]:np). Conformity refers to whether an individual’s behaviour has been influenced 
by others (Cherry, 2018:np). 
 
All five participants (detectives) were asked the same questions in the form of a 
structured, one-on-one interview, in the privacy of his or her office. All participation 
was voluntary, and the participants have no reason to blur the truth or facts. Only the 
researcher knows who the participants are, and their identity remains private, 
confidential and anonymous. No personal details of residential burglary victims are 
revealed. The research findings are only applicable to the research area. All SMEs 
are well known in their fields of expertise. 
 
4.10 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 
Twelve consecutive months of residential burglary data and NRC results are 
geocoded using the GIS. The geocoded residential burglary points (x and y 
coordinates) and dates of the burglaries for each month were captured into Microsoft 
Excel columns with x-coordinates, y-coordinates, and the date.  The number of 
burglaries varied each month from 33 to 76. Each entry or row was termed 
“iterations”. The Excel worksheet was converted into .csv (Comma Deliminated) 
format and entered into the NRC. The NRC has various settings. Temporal 
bandwidths of 30, 14, 10 and 7-days were tested, as were spatial bandwidths of 
500m, 400m, and 300m. Temporal bands for seven days was selected, as it was the 
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only temporal setting that would identify or produce near repeat calculations of risk. 
 
 
Different statistical settings of p= 0.05 (by chance once in 20 times) is the standard 
minimum threshold for statistical significance. P=0.01 (one in 100) produces results 
that are statistically valid and universally acceptable. Statistically, p=0.001 (one in 
1000) would be ideal. The more iterations, the more reliable the results (Ratcliffe, 
 
2009:8). The NRC was set for Manhattan Measure with temporal bandwidths of 7- 
days with 30 bands, and 400m spatial bands with 13 spatial bands using p=0.01. 
P=0.01 was selected because it produces statistics that are universally accepted. 
This process was repeated month-to-month. 
 
Dr Schmitz (2016: np), an SME, agreed with testing the NRC using bandwidths up 
to 500m, which is equivalent to two street blocks. Schmitz (2016: np) further 
emphasized that the aim of the NRC was to identify repeat or near repeat residential 
burglary patterns of risk close (spatial) to where the initial burglary occurred within a 
specific period (temporal), allowing the police time to set up a crime prevention 
operation. There are two separate ways for measuring the distance between two 
points - Manhattan and Euclidean. Briefly, the Euclidean method measures the 
distance between two points ‘as the crow flies.’ Euclidean measures tend to 
underestimate the distances of routes. The Manhattan Method is better suited for 
those urban environments where it is impossible to calculate the actual routes taken 
between points. Research suggests, that the Manhattan Method is more accurate 
than the Euclidean Method (Ratcliffe, 2009:8-9). The Manhattan measure was used 
for this research because the majority, being 449 out of 490 (91.6%) residential 
burglaries occurred in formal urban settlements in the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
The near repeat calculations, in the form of temporal and spatial calculations, were 
illustrated using the GIS and represented by risk buffers or bandwidths in relation to 
each geocoded residential burglary point. Apart from being a visualisation tool, the 
GIS was used to carry out month-to-month analysis to measure the accuracy of the 
near repeat calculations, and the number of the following month’s residential 
burglaries which occurred within the predicted near repeat residential burglary risk 
buffers (or bandwidths). 
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The GIS was used to conduct spatial query analysis for all 490 residential burglary 
cases to highlight the residential burglary locations from environmental factors like 
neighbouring land uses, railway lines, road nodes and cul-de-sacs.  Through case 
analysis, the housing type for each burglary was recorded either as a stand-alone 
house or inside a gated community. 
 
The qualitative feedback from five interviews with detectives is analysed for their 
valued opinions, views, experiences, and attitudes on residential burglaries in the 
Hillcrest policing area, and insight into crime mapping tools and/or predictive tools 
that may be of use at station level. The valued feedback and opinions from SMEs 
ensured that the methodology used was appropriate and any pitfalls that may exist 
were brought to light in this exploratory research. 
 
4.11 ETHICAL ASPECTS 
 
 
The researcher followed the CRIMSA code of conduct. The CRIMSA code of conduct 
states that the researcher will remain professional, ethical, competent, and be aware 
of his or her limitations and expertise (CRIMSA, 2012: np). All people will be valued 
and respected by the researcher, who will ensure informed consent is granted before 
carrying out any research or interview. The personal details of research participants 
remain confidential. However, the researcher has the right to share research findings 
providing it will not harm anyone, or any organisation, or breach any prior 
agreements. All aspects of the research will be carried out to a high standard and 
reported accurately, truthfully and within the agreed timeframe (CRIMSA, 2012: np). 
 
The fundamental ethical principles and guidelines from the Belmont Report, 1979 
were applied to this research i.e. respect for persons, beneficence, and justice 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2018:50; the Belmont Report, 1979: np). 
 
The researcher must respect the independence and views of individuals and provide 
protection in the form of assistance, safety and security to persons in need. 
Beneficence is ensured, by causing no harm to others, maximising the probable 
benefits of the research while simultaneously ensuring risk or harm is kept to a 
minimum. Justice refers to fairness to the participants in the research (the Belmont 
Report, 1979:np; Bachman & Schutt, 2018:50-51). No street numbers or the personal 
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details of residents or victims of residential burglaries are mentioned in this research 
to ensure confidentiality and privacy, thus contributing to this research being 
categorised as low-risk. The data was stored and password-protected electronically, 
and the researcher was the only one with access to the data. All participation was 
voluntarily in the structured one-on-one interviews, and all five participants were 
informed beforehand of the purpose of the research. The participants were provided 
with a letter of introduction, containing the researcher’s name and contacts details, 
and were required to sign the consent form before commencing with the interview. 
 
Email communication interviews were conducted with SMEs. The researcher 
included a brief outline of the research aims and objectives, research questions and 
methodology. A structured questionnaire, comprised of questions related to the 
aforementioned areas, was included in the emails. The responding SMEs granted 
permission to include their feedback and opinions in the study. 
 
4.11.1 Ethical approval for research: UNISA and SAPS 
 
 
This research was approved by the University of South Africa (UNISA), College of 
Law Research and Ethics Committee (Ref: CLAW 2015 ST 11, see Annexure 3). The 
researcher sent a request to the SAPS (see Annexure 4) which was approved by the 
SAPS’s Head of Strategic Management; the Divisional Commissioner of the 
Detective Service; and the Provincial Commissioner. This approval was granted in 
terms of SAPS Research Policy (National Instruction 1/2006 - see Annexure 5) which 
stipulates that the findings of this research may only be published with permission 
from the SAPS. All conditions were adhered to in the research, namely the research 
was conducted at the exclusive cost of the researcher, arrangements were made in 
advance to access the closed-case dockets, the research did not disrupt the duties 
of any SAPS members, interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis and all 
information was treated in confidence. To ensure the ethical requirements of the 
UNISA College of Law Research and Ethics Committee were fulfilled, a letter of 
permission from Professor Ratcliffe, to use the NRC was included (see Annexure 2). 
 
4.11.2 Level of risk 
 
 
The researcher only had permission and access to analyse closed-case residential 
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burglary cases. There is no risk of any open cases being jeopardised because of the 
secondary data analysis carried out by the researcher. No names or street numbers 
of victims of residential burglaries, or names of detectives who participated are 
mentioned in this research Only the researcher has access to personal details of the 
samples drawn, and interviews conducted, making the level of risk low. 
 
The researcher followed all ethical considerations of CRIMSA, UNISA, College of 
Law Research and Ethics Committee and the SAPS, while under the supervision of 
UNISA, thus making the level of risk low. 
 
4.11.3 Informed consent 
 
 
All five participants (detectives) were provided with a letter of introduction, to read 
before agreeing to continue with the interview.  The participants had to give signed 
consent before beginning the interviews. There were two consent forms, one to 
consent before the start of the interview (Annexure 7) and the other for consent for 
the interviewer to contact the detective at a later stage if necessary (Annexure 8). If 
the participant still wished to continue, the consent form had to be read, agreed to, 
and signed before the start of the interview. The signed consent forms were kept by 
the researcher for safe keeping. The NRC is freely available for download and use 
for research purposes, however, a permission letter from Professor Ratcliffe was 
obtained (Annexure 2). The SMEs were contacted by electronic communication 
(email), and consent to use their feedback was granted via electronic communication 
(email). 
 
4.11.4 Anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy 
 
 
No sensitive, private, or confidential information about any individuals or residential 
properties that were burgled are mentioned in this research dissertation. No names 
of individuals, nor house or property numbers are mentioned in this dissertation. 
There is no mention of the names and ranks of detectives who participated in the 
qualitative interviews. These measures have been taken to ensure the privacy and 
confidentiality of residential burglary victims in the Hillcrest policing area and the 
identity of detectives who voluntarily participated. SMEs names, opinions and views 
are mentioned in this dissertation with their permission. 
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4.11.5 Conflict of interest 
 
 
There is no conflict of interests identified in this research, as the research was firstly 
approved by the UNISA, College of Law Research and Ethics Committee (Ref: 
CLAW 2015 ST 11 – see Annexure 3). A detailed request was sent to the SAPS and 
was approved by the Head of Strategic Management; the Divisional Commissioner 
of the Detective Service; and the Provincial Commissioner. This approval was 
granted in terms of SAPS Research Policy (National Instruction 1/2006 – see 
Annexure 5) which stipulates that the findings of this research may only be published 
with permission from the SAPS. All conditions were adhered to in the research, 
namely the research was conducted at the exclusive cost of the researcher, 
arrangements were made in advance to access the closed-case dockets, the 
research did not disrupt the duties of any SAPS members, interviews were conducted 
on a voluntary basis, and all information treated confidentially. The Provincial 
Commissioner: KwaZulu-Natal and the Divisional Commissioner: Detective Service, 
will read the final draft of this research dissertation to ensure research ethics have 
been followed before publication of the research dissertation is permitted. The 
research was conducted following the CRIMSA code of conduct which states that the 
researcher will remain professional, ethical, competent, and be aware of his or her 
limitations and expertise (CRIMSA, 2012: np). 
 
4.11.6 Deception of respondents 
 
 
All five participants volunteered and were informed from the start of the purpose of 
the research and the researcher had no reason to distort the truth. All detectives 
(participants) gave signed consent to take part. The SMEs are known experts in their 
areas of expertise and have no reason to distort the truth in any way, and their 
opinions, experience and expertise are valued. 
 
 
The researcher was truthful and transparent in conducting the data collection, and 
all participants were informed of the purpose of the research. Detectives were 
supplied with a “Letter of introduction” (Annexure 6), and the SMEs were contacted 
via electronic mail which outlined the research underway. The researcher, the five 
detectives who participated and the SMEs have no reason to be dishonest or distort 
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the truth as this research may be beneficial to all parties. 
 
4.11.7 Benefits of research 
 
 
The application of the NRC as a tool to identify near repeat residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest policing area can assist the police in resource allocation and 
crime preventions strategies in certain areas, to prevent near repeat burglaries from 
occurring. Using the GIS in the Hillcrest policing area NRC results can be visualised 
and used to produce month-to-month predictive near repeat residential burglary 
maps based on the results. The NRC and the GIS are valuable tools which the 
Hillcrest police could use in their crime prevention toolbox. Through reducing crime, 
like residential burglaries, the police may be considered more productive by the 
community while reducing the fear of crime like residential burglaries. The fear of 
residential burglary victimisation in the community could also be reduced (VOC, 
2015:2) 
 
4.11.8 Safekeeping and storage of data 
 
 
The data collected was entered and stored on a computer hard drive, backed up and 
is password protected. The original signed consent forms are stored in a safe place, 
and only the researcher can identify which completed interview schedule belongs to 
which participant (detective). 
 
4.11.9 Sharing of research findings and publication of data 
 
 
No confidential or personal data used in this research will be shared. Only once the 
dissertation has passed the UNISA examination, will the Provincial Commissioner 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Divisional Commissioner: Detective Service test the final draft 
of this research dissertation to ensure research ethics have been followed before 
publication is permitted. 
 
4.12 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The research was exploratory in nature and applied the NRC to identify near repeat 
residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area in a South African context 
for the first time. The NRC could assist in specific crime prevention strategies and 
resource allocation to certain areas for a certain period of time. The GIS was used to 
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represent the Hillcrest policing area, geocode residential burglary points, to illustrate 
the near repeat calculations of risk and carry out spatial analysis. 
 
The explanatory sequential mixed method approach was found to be the best suited 
for this research because it has a solid quantitative basis. In an explanatory mixed 
method approach, the quantitative aspect of the research is completed, the results 
are analysed and further explained through the qualitative data collection. The 
quantitative research entailed secondary data analysis of 490 closed-case residential 
burglaries reported to Hillcrest police between April 2012 and March 2013. The 
residential burglaries for each month were geocoded using the GIS, and the required 
data was entered into the NRC and calculated. The near repeat calculations of risk 
were illustrated using the GIS and analysed for each of the 12-months. The 
qualitative research consisted of five structured interviews with detectives from 
Hillcrest police and electronic communication with several SMEs on the research 
topic. Both quantitative and qualitative data is merged to ensure detailed and concise 
research findings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the research findings and analysis of the application of the 
NRC. The first section begins with the time of day that the residential burglaries 
occurred, followed by the spatial analysis of 490 residential burglaries in relation to 
their location and proximity to environmental factors. These environmental factors 
were neighbouring or boarding land use, railway lines, main arterial roads, road 
nodes or intersections and cul-de-sacs or end-nodes. The spatial analysis highlights 
the environments in which these residential burglaries occurred and suggests the 
role  that  environmental  factors  may  play in  residential  burglary risk  (Breetzke, 
2016a:np; Clark, 2014; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 2000; Mundell & Ayres, 2015; 
Olckers, 2007; Piza & Carter, 2018; Schmitz, 2016:np; Snyders, 2016; VanZyl, 2002; 
Winchester & Jackson, 1982;  Zinn, 2017:np). The month-to-month near repeat 
residential burglary risk calculations are illustrated using the GIS (Q-GIS) and are 
analysed and compared to actual reported cases of residential burglary for that 
month, hence allowing one to determine the accuracy of the risk calculation. The GIS 
was used to conduct month-to-month spatial analysis of residential burglaries in 
relation to the locations of the previous months residential burglaries, to determine if 
there was a crime prevention value to focusing crime prevention strategies on 
previous residential burglary victims (Farrell & Pease, 1993:22; Forrester et 
al,1988:3; Pease, 1998:v). 
 
This chapter consists of feedback and opinions from SMEs regarding the research 
methodology and the application of the NRC in a South African context. The third 
section is composed of feedback from qualitative interviews with detectives from the 
Hillcrest police station. The detectives shared their experiences, opinions, and 
attitudes and provided valuable insight into the mapping and predictive tools used for 
the investigation and prevention of residential burglaries at the Hillcrest policing area 
at that time. 
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5.2 FINDINGS OF THE SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
The findings of a spatial analysis of the residential burglary locations in relation to 
environmental factors are discussed below. These environmental factors ranged 
from the location of residential burglary victims to various neighbouring land usages, 
such as undeveloped land, urban settlements informal, peri-urban settlement 
informal, other farming and sugarcane land. Other environmental factors were 
railway lines, main arterial roads, road nodes or intersections and cul-de-sacs or end- 
nodes. 
 
5.2.1  Time of day 
 
 
Vis-à-vis this research, 224 (45.7%) of the 490 residential burglaries between April 
 
2012 and March 2013 were carried out during the day (between 06:00 and 17:59), 
 
162 (33.1%) occurred at night (between 18:00 and 05:59), and 104 (21.2%) over an 
extended period of more than 12 hours. Snyders (2016: np) showed similar findings 
in the Villieria Police Precinct (Kilner Park and Queenswood) in Pretoria, in that most 
residential burglaries occurred during the day (06:00-18:00). However, research 
findings by van Zyl (2002) differed between the two areas in Garsfontein and Pretoria 
West, Pretoria. 
 
DIAGRAM 1: 
 
 
 
Burglaries between April 2012 and March 2013 
 
 
 
Day 06:00 - 17:59 Night 18:00 - 05:59 Extended period 
 
 
 
Research by Snyders (2016: np) found that residential burglary rates were higher 
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during the day (06:00-18:00) making up 47% of all property crime, whereas 
residential burglaries at night (18:00-06:00) made up 24% of all property crimes. 
Research conducted by van Zyl (2002:129) established that 66.6% of residential 
burglaries (in Garsfontein and Pretoria West) occurred when no one was home. 
However, 33.3% took place when the residents were at home. Van Zyl (2002:130- 
131) identified that 42% of residential burglaries in Garsfontein occurred between 
 
24:00-06:00, and 33% between 06:00-12:00. The majority (84%) of residential 
burglaries in Pretoria West occurred between 24:00 and 06:00. 
 
5.2.2  Environmental factors 
 
 
Secondary data analysis of the 490 residential burglary cases found that 411 (83.9%) 
residential burglaries occurred at stand-alone houses or properties, while only 79 
(16.1%) happened within gated communities between April 2012 and March 2013. 
Townsley et al’s (2003:630) research in Australia identified the relationship between 
the various housing types and target vulnerability in the initial residential burglary. 
Townsley et al (2003:630) further stated that if housing was similar in the area, the 
risk of burglary victimisation spreads like a virus to nearby houses, but diverse 
housing types hamper the spread of risk to nearby houses in the area. 
 
DIAGRAM 2 
 
 
 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES 
 
 
 
Stand-alone houses / properties Gated communities 
 
 
 
Using the GIS (Q-GIS), a spatial analysis of the 490 residential burglary cases in 
relation to environmental factors, like the various neighbouring land uses, railways 
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lines, main roads, road nodes, and cul-de-sacs, is outlined showing the 
environmental context in which these burglaries occurred. Moreto et al (2014:1120- 
1121) argued that environmental risk factors exist before an initial residential burglary 
takes place. These researchers highlighted that specific environments or locations 
are riskier than others and are therefore more conducive to crime like residential 
burglary (Moreto et al, 2014:1120-1121). The month-to-month spatial relationships 
of the residential burglaries have been included for each month, following the 
analysis of the near repeat calculations of risk. In this regard, see Table 2: Month-to- 
month near repeat calculations (April 2012 to March 2013). 
 
5.2.3  Neighbouring land usage 
 
 
The following statistics are based on the spatial analysis of this study using the GIS 
(Q-GIS) for the location of the 490 residential burglaries from the neighbouring or 
bordering land usages in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area. It was established that out 
of 490 cases, 449 (91.6%) occurred within the urban formal settlements, whereas 
only 38 (7.8%) occurred within other farming lands. 
 
5.2.4  Undeveloped land 
 
 
The spatial analysis of this study found that the following residential burglaries 
occurred on/near undeveloped land: 144 (29.3%) residential burglaries bordered with 
undeveloped land within 100m, 240 (48.9%) within 200m, 327 (66.7%) within 300m, 
390 (79.6%) occurred within 400m, and a staggering 425 (86.7%) within 500m of 
undeveloped land. These findings square with research by Clark (2014), Mundell and 
Ayes (2015), Olkers (2007), Snyders (2016), Winchester and Jackson (1982) and 
van Zyl (2002) regarding the high risk of residential burglary victimisation for houses 
located close to undeveloped land. Residents of Hillcrest Park identified Springside 
Nature Reserve (undeveloped land) as a hiding place for criminal elements and 
stolen goods (Clark, 2014:27). Mundell and Ayres (2015:7) stated that houses 
located in the vicinity to bushy areas, open space, open grounds or parks provide 
hiding places and escape routes for burglars. Olkers (2007:137) established that 
50% of residential burglaries occurred within one grid reference (equivalent to two 
residential blocks) of open or unoccupied properties and decreased further away 
from open or unoccupied land. Snyders (2016:74) analysed crime in the Villieria 
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SAPS Precinct in Pretoria and identified that 29% of all crime occurred within 150m 
of parks and open spaces. According to Winchester and Jackson’s (1982:39) 
environmental risk index, houses located adjacent to open space or open land pose 
a risk for residential burglary victimisation. These spatial findings concur with 
Winchester and Jackson (1982), particularly that 144 (29.3%) of residential 
burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area occurred within 100m of undeveloped land. 
Van Zyl (2002:125) received feedback from convicted residential burglars, confirming 
that the location of the target properties in relation to their proximity to vacant land 
facilitated easy access and escape. 
 
5.2.5  Urban settlement informal 
 
 
From the 490 residential burglaries studied in this research, only two cases (0.4%) 
occurred within 100m, 16 (3.3%), within 200m, 22 (4.5%) within 300m, 41(8.4%) 
within 400m, and 46 (9.4%) within 500m, of a neighbouring urban informal 
settlement. Urban formal residential areas that bordered with urban informal 
settlements did not seem to be significantly affected by residential burglaries within 
500m (9.4%)  when  compared  to  boarding  with  undeveloped  land  within  500m 
 
(86.7%). 
 
5.2.6  Peri-urban settlement informal 
 
 
Based on the location of the 490 residential burglaries analysed in this research, the 
spatial analysis found that none (0%) occurred between 100m and 300m of a peri- 
urban informal settlement, and three (0.6%) within 400m, and 11 (2.3%) within 500m 
of a peri-urban settlement. The spatial analysis furthermore revealed that urban 
formal residential areas, that border with informal peri-urban settlements, do not 
appear to pose significant environmental risk factors in comparison to boarding with 
undeveloped land.  A total of 2.3% of residential burglaries occurred within 500m of 
the peri-urban settlements’ informal border, in comparison to undeveloped land 
within 500m (86.7%). 
 
5.2.7  Other farming 
 
 
The spatial analysis identified that 51 (10.4%) of residential burglaries occurred 
within 100m, 64 (13%) within 200m, 84 (17.2%) within 300m, 107 (21.9%) within 
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400m, and 134 (27.4%) within 500m, of other farming lands. More than a quarter of 
residential burglaries occurred within 500m of farming land. The spatial findings 
correspond to findings by Mundell and Ayres (2015:7), that houses in proximity to 
woods, bushy areas or opens spaces, which are easily accessible facilitate cover for 
burglars to hide and escape. Winchester and Jackson (1982:39) stated that houses 
located in a rural area or opposite to open land are at higher risk of experiencing a 
residential burglary. 
 
5.2.8  Sugarcane fields 
 
 
Concerning this research, no residential burglaries occurred (0%) within 100m of 
sugarcane fields, while seven (1.4%) happened within 200m, 13 (2.6%) within 300m, 
21 (4.3%) within 400m, and 23 (4.7%) within 500m of such land use. The spatial 
analysis established that 4.7% of the houses located within 500m of sugarcane were 
burgled. Even though sugarcane fields can be described as open or bushy spaces 
in which residential burglars could hide and escape (Mundell & Ayres, 2015:7; 
Winchester & Jackson, 1982:39), this statistic appears to be low which could be 
attributed to the small land use designated for sugarcane in the area under 
investigation. 
 
5.2.9  Railway lines 
 
 
The spatial analysis revealed that out of the 490 residential burglaries, 43 (8.7%) 
 
occurred within 100m of a railway line, 88 (17.9%) within 200m, 124 (25.3 %) within 
 
300m, 157 (32%) within 400m and, 186 (37.9%) within 500m from a railway line. 
Research by Clark (2014), Piza and Carter (2018) and Snyders (2016) correlates 
with these findings. Residents of Hillcrest Park identified the railway line as access 
and escape route to the neighbourhood, which is used by the general public as a 
footpath and by criminals who target Hillcrest Park (Clark, 2014:27). These findings 
concur with the research (spatial analysis) by Piza and Carter (2018:12) and Snyders 
(2016:74). Piza and Carter’s (2018:2) research in Indianapolis, the USA, identified 
that 12.21% residential burglaries occurred within two blocks of railroad tracks or a 
railway. Snyders (2016:74), through spatial analysis (using the GIS), identified the 
vicinity of railway lines as a hotspot and revealed that 46% of all crime occurred within 
500m of a railway line. 
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5.2.10 Main arterial roads 
 
 
Apropos to this study, a spatial analysis of residential burglaries to main arterial roads 
(Inanda Road and Old Man Road) was conducted. The Old Main Road runs through 
Hillcrest up to Botha’s Hill and beyond, and Inanda Road runs from Hillcrest through 
Waterfall to Molweni. 
 
Concerning Old Main Road, 32 (6.5%) out of 490 residential burglaries happened 
within 100m, 63 (12.8%) ensued within 200m, 107 (21.8%) within 300m, 140 (28.5%) 
within 400m, and 161 (32.8%) transpired within 500m of Old Main Road. In the 
vicinity of Inanda Road, the following residential burglaries took place: 16 (3.2%) 
within 100m, 42 (8.5%) within 200m, 55 (11.2%), within 300m, 81 (16.5%) within 
400m, and 116 (23.6%) within 500m of Inanda Road. These spatial statistics 
correspond to research findings by Olckers (2007), Snyders (2016) and Winchester 
and Jackson (1982). Olckers (2007:7,139) established that 40% of residential 
burglaries occurred in the same grid block (equivalent to two residential blocks) as 
the main access route (main road). Winchester and Jackson’s (1982:39) risk and 
vulnerability for burglary check-list stipulate that houses on a major town road, or on 
or near a major road, are at risk of burglary. Research by Snyders (2016:74), 
identified the vicinity of main roads as a hotspot, with 60% of all crimes occurring 
within 250m of the main road in the research area. 
 
5.2.11 Road nodes or intersections 
 
 
In the proximity of road nodes or intersections, the spatial analysis of this study 
identified that out of the 490 residential burglaries, 44 (8.9%) occurred within 50m of 
a road node, 188 (38%) within 100m of a road node, 306 (62.4%) within 150m of a 
road node, and 393 (80.2%) within 200m of a road node. These findings suggest that 
a large majority of burgled homes were situated close to a road node or intersection. 
These spatial statistics correspond to Olckers’ (2007), research which found that 
house placement on a street can play a role in residential burglary risk. Olckers’ 
(2007:141-142) research correlates with this study’s findings, in terms of one grid 
block where 41% of residential burglaries happened close to a corner property, 37% 
residential burglaries occurred on the middle of the street, and 22% of residential 
burglaries took place at houses located on corners, thus making corner properties 
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the least vulnerable to burglary. 
 
5.2.12 Cul-de-sacs or end nodes 
 
 
Out of the 490 residential burglaries that were analysed in this study, the spatial 
analysis found that the following burglaries occurred within the vicinity of cul-de-sacs 
or end nodes: 20 (4%) occurred within 50m, 65 (13.2%) within 100m, 123 (25.1%) 
within 150m and 176 (35.9%) within 200m of a cul-de-sac or end node.  These 
findings suggest that there are fewer burglaries in a cul-de-sac and that burglary 
incidents increase further away from a cul-de-sac. 
 
Statistics from this research concur with research by Olckers (2007:140) who 
highlighted that 33% of residential burglaries occurred within the same grid block as 
a dead end or cul-de-sac, 41% of residential burglaries occurred within one grid 
distance and deteriorated (risk decay) by 15% within two grid distances, 8% within 
three grid references and 4% within four grids. 
 
5.3 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
 
 
The data for 490 residential burglaries reported to Hillcrest police station (April 2012 
to March 2013) was used in the application of the NRC. Dr Schmitz (2016: np), an 
SME, agreed that the sample of 490 residential burglary cases would be sufficient to 
test the NRC’s ability to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the 
Hillcrest policing area. 
 
Based on the residential burglary data, the NRC identified diverse types of risk 
patterns, such as repeat victimisation, near repeat and statistical risk. The statistical 
significance for risk calculations were p= 0.05 (by chance once in 20 times), when 
p=0.01 (one in 100) and, p=0.001 (one in 1000) (Ratcliffe, 2009:8). These risk 
calculations were illustrated and analysed to demonstrate the application of the NRC 
to identify near repeat patterns of risk using the Hillcrest police station’s residential 
burglary data. 
 
The following month-to-month near repeat calculations and analysis support the near 
repeat residential burglary theory, which cautions that every burglary heightens the 
risk of further residential burglary to surrounding properties for a period (Morgan, 
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2000, Groff &Taniguichi, 2016: np; Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). The 
identification of the near repeat patterns of risk can give the police the opportunity to 
set up crime prevention strategies, in the form of patrols, and manpower allocation 
to specific areas for a specific period. 
 
The research findings on the application of the NRC, can be explained by the CPT 
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995;    Chen et al, 2013; Wang & Liu, 2017) where 
burglars seek out suitable targets along paths and nodes during their routine 
activities, and the FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; 
Wu et al, 2015), where a property initially catches the attention, or flags the attention, 
of burglars, and boosts the risk of repeat or near repeat residential burglaries, close 
to the initial burglary victim. 
 
The researcher’s identification of near repeat residential burglary patterns took place 
for the first time in the Hillcrest policing area, and within a South African context. The 
findings of this research concur with international research (Bowers & Johnson, 
2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson 
et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018; 
Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015)  on near 
repeat residential burglary. 
 
In some instances (as with the near repeat risk calculations in this study for May 2012 
and July 2012 that projected 4001m - 4400m distances), the near repeat calculations 
of risk projected further distances in comparison to international research findings 
and projected beyond the Hillcrest policing area, in some calculations. An 
explanation for this could be that burglars use motor vehicles to carry out residential 
burglaries (Erasmus & Radebe, 2013: np; Respondent 4, 2015). The use of motor 
vehicles by burglars suggest that they can cover a wider area to commit residential 
burglaries. In support of this, Respondent 3 (2015: np), commented that burglars 
travel up to three to five kilometres to carry out residential burglaries. 
 
It is evident from the following month-to-month near repeat calculations of risk that 
residential burglaries in this study tended to cluster in space and time. The spatial 
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analysis highlighted the predictive accuracy of the NRC over a 12-month period. 
These results can be explained by the CPT (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 
2013; Wang & Liu, 2017), where burglars travel along paths (roads and paths) 
between nodes (work and home) where suitable targets (houses) catch or flag their 
attention. The FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; Wu 
et al, 2015) suggests these houses catch the attention of burglars who carry out the 
burglary. The burglars may return to revictimise the property or share the information 
about the burgled premises. The burglars were familiar with the access and escape 
routes to the neighbourhood and the surrounding properties and targeted the nearby 
houses. In addition, the Near Repeat Burglary Theory (NRBT) (Bernasco, 2008:414; 
Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178) explains that burglars seek out suitable 
targets in the vicinity of houses that they have already burgled. 
 
Pertaining to this study, the month-to-month spatial analysis of the residential 
burglaries in relation to one another is explained by the CPT (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 2013; Wang & Liu, 2017), the FBT (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) and the NRBT 
(Bernasco, 2008:414; Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). Previous research 
(Farrell & Pease, 1993:22; Forrester et al, 1988:3; Pease, 1998: v) suggested that 
by channelling crime prevention resources spatially and temporally, towards the 
prevention of repeat residential burglary victimisation, was found to be an effective 
use of valuable crime prevention resources. 
 
In this regard, see Table 2: Month-to-month near repeat calculations on the following 
page. See also Residential Burglaries (April 2012 to March 2013) Annexure 9 and 
Annexures 10-44 for the month-to-month risk maps 
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TABLE 3: Month-to-month Near Repeat Calculations 
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Twenty-eight (70%) of 
the 40 residential 
burglary cases in May 
2012 occurred within 
the 158% increased risk 
bandwidth of 4001m - 
4400m   of   April   2012 
residential    burglaries. 
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40 
 
70%> 
Near 
Repeat 
2401- 
2800m 
     
Twenty-nine  (87.9%) 
out of 33 residential 
burglaries in June 2012 
occurred   within    the 
70% near repeat risk 
bandwidth of 2401m - 
2800m   of   May   2012 
residential burglaries. 
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33 
  
165%> 
801- 
1200m 
p=0.05 
 
79%> 
4001- 
4400m 
p=0.05 
    
Twenty-four (72.7%) out 
of 33 residential 
burglaries in July 2012 
occurred   within    the 
165% greater risk 
bandwidth  of  801m  - 
1200m for June 2012 
residential burglaries. 
Fifteen  (45.5%)  out  of 
33 residential burglary 
cases    in    July    2012 
occurred   within    the 
79% greater risk 
bandwidth of 4001m - 
4400m of June 2012 
residential burglaries. 
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81%> 
Near 
Repeat 
401-800m 
p=0.05 
 
164%> 
4001- 
4400m 
p=0.05 
 
318%> 
1-400m 
p=0.01 
   
Fifteen  (40.6%)  out  of 
37 residential burglaries 
in        August        2012 
occurred   within    the 
81% near repeat risk 
bandwidth of 401m to 
800m of July 2012 
residential burglaries. 
Twenty-two (59.5%) out 
of 37 residential 
burglary cases in 
August 2012 occurred 
within the 164% greater 
risk      bandwidth      of 
4001m - 4400m of July 
2012 residential 
burglaries. 
Eleven (29.7%) out of 37 
residential burglary 
cases  in  August  2012 
occurred   within    the 
318% greater risk 
bandwidth   of   1m   - 
400m of July 2012 
residential burglaries. 
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37 
  
67%> 
3601- 
4000m 
p=0.05 
    
Twenty-eight (75.7%) 
out of 37 residential 
burglaries in 
September 2012 
occurred   within    the 
67% greater risk 
bandwidth of 3601m - 
4000m of August 2012 
residential burglaries. 
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49%> 
Near 
Repeat 
1201- 
1600m 
p=0.05 
  
223%> 
4401- 
4800m 
p=0.01 
   
Fifty-seven (75%) out of 
76 residential burglaries 
in       October       2012 
occurred   within    the 
49% near repeat risk 
bandwidth of 1201m - 
1600m  of  September 
2012 residential 
burglaries. 
Thirty-five (46%) out of 
76 residential burglaries 
in October 2012 
occurred   within    the 
223% greater risk 
bandwidth of 4401m - 
4800m  of  September 
2012 residential 
burglaries. 
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28%> 
Near 
Repeat 
401-800m 
   
50%> 
801- 
1200m 
p=0.05 
 
 
65%> 
1201- 
1600m 
p=0.05 
 
191%> 
2001- 
2400m 
p=0.05 
 
Twenty-eight (75.6%) 
out of 37 residential 
burglary cases in 
November 2012 
occurred   within    the 
28%  near  repeat  risk 
bandwidth  of  401m  - 
800m of October 2012 
residential burglaries. 
Thirty-four  (91.9%)  out 
of 37 residential 
burglary cases in 
November  2012 
occurred within  the 
50% greater risk 
bandwidth  of  801m  - 
1200m of October 2012 
residential burglaries. 
Thirty-three (89.2%) out 
of 37    residential 
burglary  cases     in 
November  2012 
occurred within  the 
65% greater risk 
bandwidth of 1201m - 
1600m of October 2012 
residential burglaries. 
Thirty-six (97.3%) out of 
37  residential  burglary 
cases in November 
2012  occurred  within 
the  191%  greater  risk 
bandwidth of 2001m - 
2400m of October 2012 
residential burglaries. 
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37 
 
40%> 
Near 
Repeat 
2801- 
3200m 
     
Thirty-one  (86.1%)  out 
of 36 residential 
burglaries in December 
2012 occurred within 
the  40%  near  repeat 
risk      bandwidth      of 
2801m    -    3200m    of 
November 2012 
residential burglaries. 
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36 
 
65%> 
Near 
Repeat 
2801- 
3200m 
p=0.05 
      
Thirty-two (78%) out of 
41  residential  burglary 
cases in January 2013 
occurred within the 
65%  near  repeat  risk 
bandwidth of 2801m - 
3200m   of   December 
2012 residential 
burglaries. 
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41 
    
169%> 
3601- 
4000m 
p=0.05 
 
146%> 
4001- 
4400m 
p=0.05 
   
Twenty-six (72.2%) out 
of 36 residential 
burglaries  in  February 
2013 occurred within 
the  169%  greater  risk 
bandwidth of 3601m - 
4000m of January 2013 
residential burglaries. 
Thirty-one  (86.1%)  out 
of 36 residential 
burglaries  in  February 
2013 occurred within 
the 146% greater risk 
bandwidth of 4000m – 
4400m of January 2013 
residential burglaries. 
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57%> 
Near 
Repeat 
4001- 
4400m 
  
111%> 
1601- 
2000m 
p=0.05 
 
156%> 
2401- 
2800m 
p=0.05 
   
Thirty-four (81%) out of 
42 residential burglaries 
in         March        2013 
occurred   within    the 
57% near repeat risk 
bandwidth of 4001m - 
4400m     of     February 
2013 residential 
burglaries. 
Twenty-nine (69%) out 
of 42 residential 
burglary  cases  in 
March 2013 occurred 
within the 111% greater 
risk      bandwidth      of 
1601m    -    2000m    of 
February 2013 
residential burglaries. 
Thirty (71.4%) out of 42 
residential burglary 
cases in March 
2013  occurred  within 
the 156% greater risk 
bandwidth of 2401m - 
2800m     of     February 
2013 residential 
burglaries. 
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140%> 
Repeat 
at 
the same 
property. 
 
39%> 
Near 
Repeat 
1601- 
2000m 
  
95%> 
401- 
800m 
p=0.05 
   
No data for April 2013. 
This  research  covered 
the  period  from  April 
2012-March 2013. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1  April 2012 
 
 
For April (2012), data from 42 residential burglary cases were entered into the NRC. 
According to the results, the NRC predicted that in May (2012) there will be an 
elevated risk of 158% (p=0.01) for residential burglaries throughout 15 to 21-days 
and within the area of 4001m and 4400m of the burglaries that occurred in April 
(2012). The chances of a residential burglary occurring in May (2012) within the 
167 
 
specific area (4001m – 4400m) from burglaries that occurred in April (2012), and 
specific time (15 to 21 days) as predicted, were at least one in 20 chance of taking 
place as predicted. The elevated risk was forecasted to project beyond the Hillcrest 
policing area (see Annexures 10 and 11). 
 
5.3.2  May 2012 
 
 
The NRC forecasted the locations of 28 (70%) out of the 40 residential burglaries in 
 
May 2012. These burglaries occurred within the elevated risk of 158% bandwidth of 
 
4001m – 4400m over the period of 15 to 21-days of the April 2012 residential 
burglaries (see Annexure 12). 
 
Based on the residential burglary data of May (2012), the NRC identified a near 
repeat residential burglary pattern in June (2012) with 70% risk over a period of zero 
to seven days, likely to occur in the space of 2401m and 2800m (see Annexures 13 
and 14). 
 
In May (2012), three burglaries (7.5%) occurred within 100m, 10 (25%) within 200m, 
 
14 (35%) within 300m, 18 (45%) within 400m, and 21 (52.5%) within 500m of the 
previous month’s residential burglaries (April 2012). If the police had this foresight, 
crime prevention strategies focused in the vicinity of 500m of April’s residential 
burglaries could have prevented up to 52.5% of the residential burglaries that took 
place during this period. However, if crime prevention strategies were focused on the 
near repeat calculations of risk for May, the police may have prevented up to 70% of 
the residential burglaries. 
 
5.3.3  June 2012 
 
 
In June (2012), 29 (87.9%) out of 33 residential burglaries occurred within the 70% 
near repeat risk bandwidth of 2401m – 2800m. The burglary data for June (2012) 
was entered into the NRC and calculated to identify near repeat risk for residential 
burglaries for July (2012) (see Annexure 15). 
 
The NRC identified two instances of statistical risk that forecast for July (2012). 
Firstly, the risk was predicted to be at 165% elevation (at least p=0.05 or better) than 
normal for the period of eight to 14-days, and between the area of 801m –1200m. 
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Secondly, the NRC predicted a 79% greater risk than normal (p=0.05 or more) for 
the period of eight to 14-days and in 4001m – 4400m. In this instance, the 79% risk 
projected beyond the Hillcrest police area (see Annexures 16 and 17). 
 
From the 33 residential burglaries experienced in June 2012, the spatial analysis 
identified that none (0%), occurred within 100m, five (15%) within 200m, nine (27.3%) 
within 300m, 10 (30.3%) within 400m, and 16 (48.5%) transpired within 500m of the 
previous month’s residential burglaries (May 2012). According to the spatial analysis, 
had police resources been allocated to the 500m surrounding areas of the residential 
burglaries that occurred in May, they could have prevented up to 48.5% of the 
residential burglaries. Conversely, if the police resources were allocated based on 
the near repeat calculations for June, the police could have prevented up to 87.9% 
of the residential burglaries that took place during this period. 
 
5.3.4  July 2012 
 
 
A considerable number of residential burglaries in July (2012) occurred within the 
areas of elevated risk identified by the NRC. A total of 24 (72.7%) out of 33 residential 
burglaries occurred within the 165% greater risk bandwidth of 801m – 1200m, and 
15 (45.5%) out of 33 residential burglary cases in July 2012, occurred within the 79% 
greater risk bandwidth of 4001m – 4400m. The NRC forecasted the location of 
residential burglaries in July (2012) with an accuracy ranging between 45.5% and 
72.7% (see Annexure 18). 
 
 
The residential burglary data for July (2012) was calculated for August (2012) and 
identified three spatial-temporal areas of risk: firstly, the NRC identified a near repeat 
pattern of risk, which was 81% greater (p=0.05) than normal over the period of zero 
to seven days and ranging between the area of 401m – 800m. Secondly, the NRC 
predicted that the risk was 318% greater (p=0.01) for residential burglaries to occur, 
throughout 15-21-days and within 1m – 400m from the burglary locations in July 
(2012). Thirdly, the NRC identified elevated risk of 164% (at least p=0.05 or better) 
for residential burglaries to occur, over the period of eight to 14-days and 4001m – 
4400m from the previous months (July 2012) burglary locations (see Annexures 19 
and 20). 
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The spatial analysis of the 33 residential burglaries in July (2012) identified that five 
(15.1%) residential burglaries occurred within 100m, eight (24.2%) within 200m, 11 
(33.3%) within 300m, 13 (39.4%) within 400m, and 16 (48.5%) happened within 
500m of the previous month’s residential burglaries (June 2012). With this foresight, 
if police resources had focused on the 500m radius of residential burglaries that 
occurred in June 48.5% of the residential burglaries in July could have been 
prevented. However, the near repeat calculations of risk were significantly higher, 
which could have facilitated the prevention of up to 72.7% of burglaries. 
 
5.3.5  August 2012 
 
 
Out of 37 residential burglaries in August (2012), 15 (40.6%) occurred within the 81% 
 
near repeat risk bandwidth of 401m to 800, a further 11 (29.7%) happened within the 
 
318% greater risk bandwidth of 1m - 400m, and 22 (59.5%) transpired inside the 
 
164% greater risk bandwidth of 4001m - 4400m (see Annexure 21). The accuracy of 
the NRC forecast in August (2012) ranged from 29.7% up to 59.5%. 
 
The NRC calculated August’s (2012) burglary data to project the likely locations of 
residential burglaries in September (2012). The NRC anticipated the heightened risk 
(at least p=0.05 or better) to be 67% greater for residential burglaries to occur than 
normal for the period of eight to 14-days and 3601m – 4000m (see Annexures 22 
and 23). 
 
Out of the 37 residential burglaries that happened in August 2012, four (10.8%) 
occurred within 100m, six (16.2%) within 200m, 11 (29.7%) within 300m, 11 (29.7%) 
within 400m, and 13 (35.1%) within 500m of the previous month’s residential 
burglaries (July 2012). Police resources that focused on the 500m of the residential 
burglaries in July may have prevented up to 35.1% of the residential burglaries from 
taking place. In parallel, if the resources had been channelled based on the near 
repeat calculations of risk, up to 59.5% of the burglaries in August may have been 
prevented. 
 
5.3.6  September 2012 
 
 
The analysis identified that 28 (75.7%) out of 37 residential burglaries in September 
 
(2012) occurred within the 67% greater risk bandwidth of 3601m - 4000m. This near 
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repeat calculation based on August’s (2012) residential burglary data was 75.7% 
 
accurate (see Annexure 24). 
 
 
Based on the September 2012 burglary data, the NRC calculated the following for 
October 2012: firstly, the NRC identified a near repeat residential burglary pattern in 
October (2012), which was 49% greater (p=0.05 or better) for zero to seven days 
and between the area of 1201m – 1600m. Secondly, the elevated risk of residential 
burglary was expected to be 223% (p=0.01) greater than normal, over the period of 
15-21-days and between 4401m – 4800 (see Annexures 25 and 26). 
 
 
The spatial analysis highlighted that from the 37 residential burglaries, three (8.1%) 
happened within 100m, eight (21.6%) within 200m, nine (24.3%) within 300m, 16 
(43.2%) within 400m, and 22 (59.4%) within 500m of the previous month’s residential 
burglaries (August 2012). 
 
If crime prevention strategies had focused on the 500m surrounding area of the 
residential burglaries that occurred in August; up to 59.4% (more than half) of the 
burglaries in September could have been prevented. If the same prevention 
strategies focused on the area of the near repeat calculations, up to 75.7% (three 
quarters) of residential burglaries could have been prevented. 
 
5.3.7  October 2012 
 
 
The analysis of residential burglaries that occurred in October (2012), concluded that 
 
57 (75%) out of 76 residential burglaries occurred within the 49% near repeat risk 
bandwidth of 1201m - 1600m. 35 (46%) out of 76 residential burglaries occurred 
within the forecasted 223% greater risk bandwidth of 4401m – 4800m. These findings 
highlighted that the NRC predicted with accuracy (46% – 75%) the location of 
residential burglaries in October (2012) (see Annexures 27). 
 
The NRC calculated the residential burglary data for October (2012) and identified 
the following four risk calculations for November (2012): firstly, a near repeat 
residential burglary pattern was identified, the likeliness of near repeat residential 
burglaries were 28% greater for zero to seven days, between the areas of 401m – 
800m. Secondly, the risk of burglary was elevated by 50% (p=0.05) compared to 
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normal, for the period of 22-28-days and between 801m – 1200m. Thirdly, the risk of 
residential burglary was heightened by 65% (at least p=0.05 or better), than normal 
for the period of 22-28-days and between the area of 1201m – 1600m. Lastly, the 
predicted risk escalated to 191% (p=0.05 or better) for a residential burglary to occur 
over the period of 29 to 35-days and 2001m – 2400m (see Annexures 28 and 29). 
 
Based on the location of the 76 residential burglaries in October 2012, the spatial 
analysis found that five (6.5%) occurred within 100m, 15 (19.7%) within 200m, 24 
(31.5%) within 300m, 35 (46%) within 400m, and 40 (52.6%) within 500m of the 
previous month’s residential burglaries (September 2012). For October, if police 
resources had focused on the 500m surrounding area of Septembers residential 
burglary locations, they could have prevented half (52.6%) of the residential 
burglaries from happening in October. If police resources had been focused on the 
NRC forecast for October, up to 75% (three quarters) of the burglaries could have 
been prevented. 
 
5.3.8  November 2012 
 
 
The NRC forecast for November (2012) was incredibly accurate compared to 
previous months, which could be attributed to October (2012) experiencing the most 
burglaries, with 76 residential burglaries (geocoded) in this research. The analysis 
confirmed that 28 (75.6%) out of 37 residential burglaries  occurred within the 28% 
near repeat risk bandwidth of 401m - 800m, 34  (91.9%) out of 37 residential 
burglaries occurred within the 50% greater risk bandwidth of 801m-1200m, 33 
(89.2%) out of 37 residential burglaries occurred within the 65% greater risk 
bandwidth of 1201m - 1600m, and finally 36 (97.3%) out of 37 residential burglary 
cases in November 2012 occurred within the 191% greater risk bandwidth of 2001m- 
2400m. The accuracy of the NRC's location prediction of residential burglaries for 
 
November (2012) was exceptionally high, with the precision ranging from 89.2% to 
 
97.3% (see Annexure 30). 
 
 
Using the November (2012) residential burglary data, the NRC recognised a near 
repeat residential burglary pattern, with 40% greater risk over the space of 2801m – 
3200m from the previous month’s burglaries (see Annexures 31 and 32). 
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The spatial analysis established that out of the 37 residential burglaries that 
happened in November (2012), three (8.1%) occurred within 100m, eight (21.6%) 
within 200m, 18 (48.6%) within 300m, 21 (56.7%) within 400m, and 25 (67.5%) within 
500m of the previous month’s residential burglaries (October 2012). With reference 
to November, if the police had insight into this spatial analysis, they may have 
prevented up to 67.5% of the residential burglaries that occurred in November, by 
allocating resources to the 500m radius of the residential burglaries that occurred in 
October. However, if the resources had been focused on the near repeat 
calculations, a staggering 97.3% of residential burglaries may not have occurred. 
 
5.3.9  December 2012 
 
 
The NRC was accurate in its projection for December 2012, as 31 (86.1%) out of 36 
residential burglaries were committed within the 40% near repeat risk bandwidth of 
2801m – 3200m (see Annexure 33). 
 
 
Based on the December (2012) burglary data, the NRC identified a near repeat 
residential burglary pattern for January 2013. This near repeat risk was 65% greater 
(p=0.05 or better) for zero to seven days and between 2801m–3200m (see 
Annexures 34 and 35). 
 
Based on the location of the 36 residential burglaries that took place in December 
 
2012, one (2.8%) occurred within 100m, four (11.1%) within 200m, eight (22.2%) 
within 300m, 15 (41.6%) within 400m, and 23 (63%) within 500m of the previous 
month’s residential burglaries (November 2012). In December, if resources had been 
channelled to the vicinity of 500 metres of the residential burglary locations in 
November 63% of the burglaries could have been prevented. However, the near 
repeat calculations were more accurate, which may have facilitated the prevention 
of up to 97.3% of the residential burglaries in December. 
 
5.3.10 January 2013 
 
 
As anticipated by the NRC, 32 (78%) out of 41 residential burglaries occurred within 
the 65% near repeat risk bandwidth of 2801m - 3200m (see Annexure 36). 
 
Based on the residential burglary data for January (2013), the NRC forecasted the 
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following for February (2013): firstly, the risk was 169% greater (at least p=0.05 or 
better) than normal for residential burglaries to occur during the period of 22 to 28- 
days, and between 3 601m–4 000m. Secondly, the risk was elevated to 146% (at 
least p=0.05 or better) greater than normal, for 22 to 28-days, and between 4001m 
– 4400m (see Annexures 37 and 38). 
 
 
Based on the location of the 41 residential burglaries in January 2013, two (4.8%) 
occurred within 100m, six (14.6%) within 200m, 11 (26.8%) within 300m, 19 (46.3%) 
within 400m, and 26 (63.4%) within 500m of the previous month’s residential 
burglaries (December 2012). If crime prevention resources were deployed to the 
500m radius of the residential burglary locations in December, the SAPS may have 
prevented up to 63.4% of the residential burglaries that took place in January. If the 
resources focused on the near repeat calculations of risk, up to 78% of the burglaries 
may not have occurred. 
 
5.3.11 February 2013 
 
 
In February (2013), it was established that 26 (72.2%) out of 36 residential burglaries 
occurred within the 169% greater risk bandwidth of 3601m – 4000m and 31 (86.1%) 
out of 36 residential burglaries in February (2013) occurred within the 146% greater 
risk bandwidth of 4001m – 4400m of (January 2013) burglary risk calculations. The 
precision of the NRC forecast ranged from 72.2% to 86.1% (see Annexure 39). 
 
The NRC applied the residential burglary data for February (2013) and projected the 
following risk: firstly, the near repeat risk was 57% greater for zero to seven days and 
between 4001m – 4400m. Secondly, the NRC identified an increase of risk of 111% 
(at least p=0.05 or better) greater than normal, for 15 to 21-days, and between 1 
601m – 2000m. Thirdly, it was projected that risk was 156% (at least p=0.05 or better) 
 
greater than normal for 15 to 21-days, and between 2401m – 2800m (see Annexures 
 
40 and 41). 
 
 
The spatial analysis revealed that out of the 36 residential burglaries in February 
 
2013, three (8.3%) occurred within 100m, seven (19.4%) within 200m, 13 (36.1%) 
within 300m, 16 (44.4%) within 400m, and 25 (69.4%) within 500m of the previous 
month’s residential burglaries (January 2013). In February 69.4% of the residential 
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burglaries may have been prevented if crime prevention resources had been 
allocated to the area of a 500m radius of the residential burglary locations of January. 
Moreover, if the resources had focused on the near repeat calculations of risk, up to 
86.1% of the burglaries could have been prevented. 
 
5.3.12 March 2013 
 
 
The analysis identified 34 (81%) out of 42 residential burglaries occurred in March 
(2013), within the 57% near repeat risk bandwidth of 4001m – 4400m, 29 (69%) out 
of 42 residential burglaries occurred within the 111% greater risk bandwidth of 1 
601m – 2000m and a further 30 (71.4%) out of 42 residential burglaries occurred 
within the 156% greater risk bandwidth of 2401m – 2800m. The NRC’s accuracy 
ranged from 69% to 81% (see Annexure 42). 
 
The NRC identified significant repeat and near repeat residential burglary risk for 
April (2013). The repeat victimisation to the same property was at 140% greater risk 
for zero to seven days, and the near repeat risk was also 39% greater for zero to 
seven days, between 1601m – 2000m. Furthermore, the NRC projected elevated risk 
(at least p=0.05 or better) of 95% greater for 15 to 21-days, and between 401m - 
800m. The researcher was unable to provide an analysis of the results or accuracy 
for the NRC calculations for March 2013, as this research does not include April 2013 
(see Annexures 43 and 44). 
 
For March (2013), the spatial analysis established that out of the 42 residential 
burglaries three (7.1%) occurred within 100m, six (14.2%) within 200m, eight (19%) 
within 300m, 11 (26.1%) within 400m, and 14 (33.3%) within 500m of the previous 
month’s residential burglaries (February 2013). If the police had focused resources 
on the surrounding area of 500m of the residential burglary locations in February, 
then they may have prevented up to 33.3% (one third) of the residential burglaries 
that occurred. If, however, the resources had focused on the near repeat 
calculations, up to 81% of the burglaries could have been prevented. 
 
5.3.13 Interpretation of near repeat calculations 
 
 
The NRC identified repeat, near repeat and elevated statistical risk patterns over the 
 
12-month period under examination. June 2012 and July 2012 experienced the least 
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amount of residential burglaries, both with 33 cases, while October 2012 experienced 
the most, with 76 cases. The NRC was able to predict residential burglary locations 
(spatial) from 29.7% for August (2012) up to 97.3% in November (2012). The average 
accuracy of the near repeat calculations was 64.3% over a 12-month period. The 
NRC identified near repeat burglary patterns scattered over and beyond the Hillcrest 
policing area. It is evident that the near repeat risk calculations projected a greater 
distance compared to prior international research (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey 
& da Silva, 2016; Chen, et al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; 
Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 2000; Piza & Carter, 2018; 
Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) and for some months, the 
risk calculations projected beyond the study area. 
 
An explanation for projection of risk calculations over a greater area could be 
attributed to the size, and the layout of the various land uses within the Hillcrest 
policing area. Another reason could be that burglars used vehicles (Erasmus & 
Radebe, 2013: np; Respondent 4, 2015) and they were able to cover a larger area 
than if they were on foot. To add, Respondent 3 (2015: np), believed burglars travel 
up to three to five km to carry out burglaries, which explains the spread of risk over 
greater distances in this research. 
 
Based on the application of the NRC and the analysis of the month-to-month 
calculations, the findings suggest that the near repeat risk calculations of risk hold a 
crime prevention value that can assist in resource allocations to intercept and prevent 
near repeat residential burglaries from occurring;  in a similar way to the GMP area 
(Fielding & Jones, 2012). Further research on the NRC calculator using present data 
from current residential burglary reports is required to enhance and build on this 
exploratory research. 
 
5.4 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
 
 
The Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who provided valuable feedback in this research 
included: Dr Schmitz, a Principal Researcher at the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR), Built Environment (South Africa) and Professor Breetzke 
of the Department of Geography, Geoinformatics and Meteorology at the University 
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of Pretoria (South Africa). These experts were the first SMEs approached by the 
researcher. Another expert was Dr Landman (previously a Principal researcher at 
CSIR, Built Environment, South Africa), and currently a lecturer at the University of 
Pretoria. Dr Landman referred the researcher to Professor Kruger, a Principal 
Researcher at CSIR, Built Environment, South Africa and to Professor Breetzke (who 
the researcher had already consulted with). Professor Kruger suggested to the 
researcher to contact Professor Zinn of the University of South Africa (UNISA), 
College of Law, School of Criminal Justice, Department of Police Practice. 
 
Dr Schmitz and Professor Breetzke were presented with questions relating to the 
study’s focus and broad goal, the background of the NRC, the study aims, objectives 
and sample method used to obtain an example of near repeat calculations, including 
an outline of the possible benefits of the NRC to the SAPS. However, Schmitz 
provided elaborated answers to all the questions posed to him while Breetzke did not 
answer all the questions, due to his workload and time constraints. He provided short 
answers. Hence, Breetzke’s answers are only included in the questions he 
answered. 
 
 
The following questions were posed to Dr Schmitz and Professor Breetzke: 
 
 
 
- What are your comments and opinion on the research focus areas and the 
goal of this research? 
- What are your comments and opinion on the study aims, objectives and 
sample of this research? 
- What  are  your  comments  and  opinion  on  the  data  collection  and 
application of the NRC related to this study? 
- What are your comments and opinion on the background of the NRC? 
 
- What are your comments and opinion on the possible benefits of the NRC 
 
in South Africa? 
 
- Can environmental factors, such as the location of the residence to main 
roads, end nodes (cul-de-sacs), various land usages, and railway lines be 
related to the risk of residential burglary victimisation? 
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5.4.1  What  are  your  opinion  and  comments  on  the  research 
focus areas and the goal of this research? 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) commented that 490 residential burglary cases should be 
sufficient to test the NRC, but he cautioned that the research findings would be 
applicable only to Hillcrest police station and could not be extrapolated to South 
Africa. In line, Breetzke (2016: np) agreed that the sample of 490 residential 
burglaries would be sufficient to test the NRC. 
 
5.4.2 What are your comments and opinion on the background of the 
 
NRC related to this study? 
 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) commented that the NRC is a handy tool to use and to be applied 
in a South African context, but he questioned whether police stations (SAPS) have 
the capability to conduct near repeat calculations and analysis on a regular basis (as 
required). He further proclaimed that the NRC and Q-GIS are freely available 
software tools which can run on a standalone computer, but that financial cost is not 
the issue; rather the skills to carry out the analysis remain a challenge (Schmitz 
(2016: np). Schmitz’ statement is in line with news articles (Guy et al, 2016: np; 
Mabena, 2017: np) referring to the police being under-resourced. Schmitz (2016: np), 
accentuated that the NRC has been applied by various law enforcement agencies 
around the world, and it has been valuable in crime prevention, but he cautioned that 
these law enforcement agencies are better resourced, both in equipment and staff in 
comparison to the SAPS. Breetzke did not answer this question. 
 
5.4.3 What are your comments and opinion on the study aims, 
objectives and sample of this research? 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) concurred with the aims, objectives and sample to test the NRC 
for this research. He commented that further research on the application of the NRC 
should include various types of police stations, for example, a rural police station 
(dense rural such as certain areas in KZN, sparse rural with a small town such as 
the Free State or the Northern Cape), and other residential areas similar to Hillcrest, 
and downtown areas such as Durban Central. 
 
According to Breetzke (2016:np), the application of the NRC to examine burglary 
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patterns in a South African context would provide interesting research findings. 
Breetzke (2016:np) suggested that there is no reason the NRC would not be accurate 
in a South African context. However, Breetzke (2016: np) cautioned that the 
usefulness of the NRC may vary depending on the urban area under investigation. 
 
5.4.4 What are your comments and opinion on the data collection 
and application of the NRC related to this study? 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) agreed that the sample of 490 residential burglaries over a 12- 
month period would be sufficient to test the application of the NRC. Schmitz (2016: 
np) proclaimed that the NRC aims to identify repeat and near repeat burglary patterns 
as close as possible to the initial burglaries, within a certain period so that the police 
can develop crime prevention strategies. Schmitz (2016: np) also agreed that using 
a spatial bandwidth up to 500m (which equates to about two street blocks) may be 
sufficient for urban areas (formal and informal) but stressed that this may not be 
appropriate for rural areas. Schmitz (2016: np) further emphasised that research 
findings would only apply to the Hillcrest policing area and not to South Africa as a 
whole. In addition, Breetzke (2016) commented that Hillcrest (KZN) is a relatively 
affluent area and comprises of a well-established road network with accurate 
cadastral boundaries (eThekwini Municipal GIS Data), however, this may not be the 
case for the informal areas. 
 
5.4.5 What are your comments and opinion on the possible benefits 
of the NRC in South Africa? 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) replied that this research holds possibilities, but he highlighted 
that the sample size should include different police stations in different policing areas 
to ascertain accuracy. Breetzke (2016:np) answered that using a crime analysis tool, 
(like the NRC) in a South African context is innovative and original because little 
spatially based crime research has been carried out. He further noted that the 
probable cause of this research gap is the lack of crime data from the SAPS. Beetzke 
(2016: np) commented that there is no reason the NRC should not be an accurate 
tool in a South African context, depending on the area that is focused on. 
179  
5.4.6 Can environmental factors, such as the location of the 
residence to main roads, end nodes (cul-de-sacs), various land 
usages, and railway lines be related to the risk of residential 
burglary victimisation? 
 
Schmitz (2016: np), stated: “Literature and experience indicate that certain areas are 
crime attractors, and these can be addressed through Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) principles.” These CPTED principles are discussed 
in Chapter 3. Professor Kruger and Dr Landman are experts in the field of CPTED. 
Breetzke (2016:np) confirmed “That is one of the most important theoretical 
underpinnings of environmental criminology. That the 'environmental backcloth' of an 
area creates or reduces the opportunities for crime.” This statement by Breetzke 
(2016:np) concurs with the CPT regarding the backcloth or environment, and the 
CPTED which can reduce opportunities for crime. 
 
Dr Landman’s responses are discussed hereunder. 
 
5.4.7 Are you aware of any past or present research on the NRC or 
near repeat residential burglary patterns in South Africa? 
 
Dr Landman (2017: np) responded that she was not aware of any research on the 
 
NRC in South Africa. 
 
5.4.8 To what extent is the GIS used by the SAPS at the station, 
provincial and national levels? 
 
Landman indicated that she was not aware of any other research on the GIS at 
station, provincial and national levels, apart from one of her earlier master’s student’s 
(Snyders, 2016) who completed a Master’s Degree in Town and Regional Planning. 
The student made use of crime statistics and the GIS at a station level of one precinct 
in Pretoria. 
 
5.4.9 Are you aware of any past or present research on the use of the 
 
GIS at the SAPS station level? 
 
 
Again, Dr Landman referred the researcher the work of her previous master’s student 
 
(Snyders, 2016) who completed a Master’s Degree in Town and Regional Planning. 
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The research by Snyders (2016) has been included in this research. 
 
On this matter, Kruger’s responses to the above two questions are reflected below. 
Professor Kruger (2017: np) was asked the following questions: 
 
- Are you aware of any past or present research on the NRC or near repeat 
residential burglary in South Africa? 
- To what extent is the GIS used by the SAPS at the station, provincial and 
 
national levels? 
 
5.4.10 Are you aware of any past or present research on the NRC or 
near repeat residential burglary in South Africa? 
 
Kruger (2017: np) was not aware of any research on the NRC or near repeat 
residential burglary in South Africa. He suggested that the lack of accurate 
(geocoded) data identifying locations could be a contributing factor. Kruger further 
added that he has some reservations about the application of models or tools in 
countries like South Africa, but he was interested in this research on the application 
of the NRC in a South African context. 
 
5.4.11 To what extent is the GIS used by the SAPS at the station, 
provincial and national levels? 
 
Kruger (2017: np) answered that the use of the GIS varies considerably between 
police stations, as does the understanding of how the GIS can be applied. 
 
Professor Zinn (2017: np) was asked the following questions: 
 
- To what extent are the Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) and the Crime Threat 
 
Analysis (CTA) tools used by the SAPS? 
 
- How effective are the CPA and the CTA tools in predicting residential 
burglary patterns? 
- Are you aware of any past or present research on the Near Repeat 
 
Calculator (NRC) or near repeat residential burglary in South Africa? 
 
- Do you think the NRC could be a valuable tool for the SAPS at station level 
to predict near repeat residential burglary patterns? 
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of the SAPS using the GIS? 
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- If the NRC results are used in conjunction with the GIS to create predictive 
near repeat residential burglary maps, do you think the SAPS will be better 
informed to allocate resources such as crime prevention patrols in areas 
with increased risk for residential burglaries? 
- At station level, do you think the SAPS has the ability, skills, and resources 
to run the NRC and the GIS software on a standalone computer, and 
create up-to-date month-to-month near repeat residential burglary risk 
maps? 
- Can  the  location  of  a  neighbourhood  or  houses  in  relation  to  the 
environmental factors, like main roads, road nodes, end nodes (cul-de- 
sacs), railway lines and land use play a role in the risk of residential 
burglaries? 
- Under  which  circumstances  could  a  residential  burglary  in  progress 
escalate to become a house robbery? 
 
 
 
5.4.12 To what extent are the Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) and the 
 
Crime Threat Analysis (CTA) tools used by the SAPS? 
 
 
Zinn (2017: np) was not aware of research data to indicate to what extent the CPA 
and CTA are used at station level. However, he highlighted that the SAPS do have 
the capacity at station level and confirmed that the CPA and the CTA tools are used 
at the cluster and provincial levels. Zinn further added that a problem that researchers 
come across in their research, or with regards to assistance to police students, is that 
some individuals do not use the available tools effectively. 
 
5.4.13 How effective are the CPA and the CTA tools in predicting 
residential burglary patterns? 
 
Zinn (2017: np) proclaimed that the effectiveness of predictive tools (like the CPA 
and the CTA) is a highly contentious issue. All these models come under scrutiny at 
international conferences resulting in critical debates on the accuracy of these 
tools/instruments. Zinn revealed that if a tool is currently accurate in any predictions 
(or forecasting), it may change overnight as a result of a change in some of the 
elements that caused the problem in the first place. The researcher submits that 
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these elements could range from target hardening initiatives in a neighbourhood, 
such as the clearing of overgrown vacant land which harbours criminal activity, 
community patrols following a newly established neighbourhood watch, or extra 
police patrols in the area due to crime. 
 
5.4.14 Are you aware of any past or present research on the Near 
Repeat Calculator (NRC) or near repeat residential burglary 
in South Africa? 
 
Zinn (2017: np) was not aware of any NRC or near repeat residential burglary 
research in South Africa. 
 
5.4.15 Do you think the NRC could be a valuable tool for the SAPS at 
station level to predict near repeat residential burglary 
patterns? 
 
Zinn (2017: np) commented that the NRC could be a valuable tool to be utilised at 
the station level, but he emphasised that current residential burglary data must be 
used in the calculation of near repeat risk. 
 
5.4.16 What are the advantages and disadvantages of the SAPS 
 
using the GIS? 
 
 
Zinn (2017: np) could not answer this on behalf of the SAPS. 
 
5.4.17 If the NRC results are used in conjunction with the GIS to 
create predictive near repeat residential burglary maps, do 
you think the SAPS will be better informed to allocate 
resources such as crime prevention patrols in areas with 
increased risk for residential burglaries? 
 
Zinn (2017: np) supported the idea that if the NRC results (risk calculations) are used, 
in conjunction with the GIS to create predictive near repeat burglary maps, that the 
SAPS will be better informed to allocate resources such as crime prevention patrols 
in areas with increased risk for residential burglaries.  According to Zinn (2017: np), 
“The best type of crime intelligence, including proactive crime intelligence, should be 
based on a variety of tools and resources. The more analysis and tools the more 
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accurate the crime intelligence becomes.” 
 
5.4.18 At station level, do you think the SAPS has the ability, skills, 
and resources to run the NRC and the GIS software on a 
standalone computer, and create up-to-date month-to-month 
near repeat residential burglary risk maps? 
 
Professor Zinn (2017: np) was not in a position to answer this question and therefore 
did not provide an answer. 
 
5.4.19 Can the location of a neighbourhood or houses in relation to 
the environmental factors, like main roads, road nodes, end 
nodes (cul-de-sacs), railway lines and land use, play a role in 
the risk of residential burglaries? 
 
Zinn (2017: np) rejoined, “Yes, there is a definite correlation between the 
environmental factors and burglaries”. He added that the link between environmental 
factors and residential burglaries is supported by international literature, the analysis 
performed by the ISS (Institute of Security Studies) crime hub on SAPS statistics, 
and in his own experience as a police officer 
 
This statement by Zinn (2017:np) correlates with the CPT where offenders (burglars) 
seek out targets to victimise along the paths (roads) and nodes (home or place of 
work) during their routine activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham 
& Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995). 
 
 
A property may ‘flag’ the attention of such offenders and which supports the FBT. 
 
5.4.20 Under which circumstances could a residential burglary in 
progress escalate to become a house robbery? 
 
Circumstances, where a residential burglary may escalate to a residential robbery, 
would likely include if the burglars unexpectedly encountered someone inside the 
yard or house (Zinn, 2017: np). 
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5.5 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS WITH DETECTIVES 
 
 
This section discusses the feedback gathered from the one-on-one qualitative 
interviews with five detectives from Hillcrest police station. The detectives were 
asked open-ended structured questions to give the researcher insight into their 
experiences, expertise, knowledge, and opinions on residential burglaries that have 
taken place in the Hillcrest policing area. All five detectives participated voluntarily, 
and they consisted of a mixture of males and females holding various ranks. 
However, all five detectives had been involved in a number of investigations on 
residential burglaries, ranging from dozens to several hundred cases. The detectives 
are referred to as respondents, and each given a number between one and five in 
order to maintain their privacy, and to keep their identity anonymous which was a 
condition for their voluntary participation. 
 
5.5.1 Do you map the crimes that you investigate? 
 
 
Respondent 1 answered that she sometimes maps the crime that she is investigating 
on a (paper) map. Respondents 2, 3 and 4 stated that they did not map residential 
burglaries that they were investigating. Respondent 5 noted he used “Street Maps” 
(a map website) on a computer to map burglaries under investigation. Based on 
these responses, crime mapping, or the use of the GIS was absent and does not 
appear to be the norm for residential burglary investigations at Hillcrest. At the time 
of the interviews, this highlighted the importance and the benefits that the GIS tool 
could bring to residential burglary investigations (and crime investigations) if utilised 
at Hillcrest. 
 
According to the CPT, it is believed that offenders (burglars) seek out suitable targets 
to victimise along the paths (roads and pedestrian walkways) and nodes (home or 
place of work) during their routine activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995). Using the 
GIS to illustrate the Hillcrest policing area, related environmental factors such as 
roads; and to map the residential burglary points, may highlight patterns or routines 
that burglars (offenders) travel along between destinations. 
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5.5.2 How well planned are residential burglaries? 
 
 
Respondent 1 was unsure of the distinct types of burglary. Respondent 2 was of the 
opinion that some burglaries were well planned, and others were committed by drug 
addicts from nearby informal settlements. According to Respondent 3, burglaries 
were not planned. Burglars took chances with dogs and fences and had no idea 
whether anyone was at home or not. Respondent 4 and 5 stated that there were two 
types of residential burglary: planned and unplanned. Some residential burglaries 
were planned, using inside information from domestic staff, while unplanned 
residential burglaries were often motivated by drugs (like Whoonga). 
 
Whoonga is a street drug which was first reported in Durban (KZN) but has spread 
to other parts of South Africa (Africa Health Placements, 2015: np). It is an addictive 
combination of detergent powder, rat poison and (sometimes) crushed antiretroviral 
drugs (ARVs) (Shembe 2013:5). The ARVs are crushed in combination with other 
drugs like marijuana, and drug dealers also mix or cut the product with soap powder 
and rat poison to stretch their profits. Whoonga is a cream coloured powder which 
costs about R20 a smoke (Bryson, 2010: np). Another form of Whoonga is brown 
heroin mixed with rat poison, ammonia, and another street drug called ‘tik’ 
(Chapman, 2013: np). Tik is the street name for crystal methamphetamine (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015: np). 
 
The CPT (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 2013; Wang & Liu, 2017) and the 
FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) can 
explain planned and unplanned residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area. 
Burglars, or would be burglars, travel along paths and nodes (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995) during their routine activities to search for suitable targets to 
burgle. A suitable target or house catches the attention or flags the attention of the 
burglar. The burglar may take the opportunity immediately or plan to return later to 
carry out the burglary. 
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5.5.3 In general, how far away do the burglars live and work from the 
crime scene or burgled property? 
 
Respondent 1 suggested that burglars commit burglaries outside of their own area. 
Respondent 2, used the following example: burglars travel from Molweni (peri-urban 
settlement) to commit burglaries in Waterfall (formal urban settlement), from Embo 
(urban settlement informal and peri-urban settlement formal) to commit burglaries in 
Hillcrest (formal urban settlement), and from Kwanyuswa (kwasondela area, peri- 
urban settlement) to commit burglaries in Botha’s Hill (consisting of undeveloped and 
farming land, retail and urban settlement formal). According to Respondent 3, the 
estimated distance travelled by burglars was three to five kilometres. Respondent 4 
said the distance burglars travelled to residential burglary targets could vary. 
Burglars, however, tended to target nearby properties or areas close to where they 
lived. Respondent 5 answered, that unplanned burglars were usually local and that 
burglars stayed in the area of the target properties or houses. Planned burglaries 
were committed by burglars from outside the area of targeted properties or houses, 
and they often used motor vehicles to travel. Based on this feedback, burglars appear 
to travel from peri-urban settlements and informal urban settlements to burgle 
properties which are mostly formal urban settlements. 
 
The feedback from detectives strongly suggests that burglars travel along paths and 
nodes to carry out residential burglaries. This fits in with the CPT (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 2013; Wang & Liu, 2017) whereby until suitable 
property catches a burglar’s attention. The burglar either commits the residential 
burglary at short notice or returns later to carry out the burglary as promulgated in 
the FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; Wu et al, 2015). 
 
5.5.4 What attracts burglars to target a specific house or houses in 
an area? 
 
Respondent 1 did not have an opinion or suggestion as to what attracts burglars to 
target a specific property. According to Respondent 2, houses surrounded by trees 
and vegetation provided cover for burglars. Respondent 2’s comment is in line with 
the CPTED (Cozens & Love, 2017:2; Palmiotto, 2011:171) and the BWT (Kelling & 
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Wilson, 1982:np; Miller et al, 2014:64-65). Trees, vegetation, and overgrown gardens 
can hamper natural surveillance. CPTED, with regards to natural surveillance, 
highlights whether residents can notice strangers in the neighbourhood (Cozens & 
Love, 2017:2; Palmiotto, 2011:171). 
 
Furthermore, the BWT suggests that unmowed lawns and overgrown gardens can 
signal disorder and a ‘no one cares’ vibe, allowing incivilities and crime to manifest 
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982: np; Miller et al, 2014:64-65). Respondent 3 said burglars 
took chances and targeted all houses, not just “fancy” (affluent) houses. According 
to Respondent 4, high-class and affluent areas were targeted by organised burglars 
who usually travelled in vehicles. The use of motor vehicles by burglars can explain 
the risk calculations over large distances, identified by the NRC. These burglars were 
usually in and out of a house within two to three minutes, setting-off burglar alarm 
systems and fleeing before armed response security arrived. In the case of targets 
that appeared to be easier, with more relaxed security, the burglars would carry the 
items away on foot. Lastly, Respondent 5 claimed that burglars were attracted by 
wealth (affluent characteristics). The views of Respondents 4 and 5 (2015:np) are in 
line with the Flag Theory which states that the attractiveness or perceived wealth of 
a property draws the attention of would-be burglars (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; 
Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178). 
 
5.5.5  What  factors  do  burglars  take  into  consideration  before 
committing these crimes? 
 
According to Respondent 1, burglars considered whether the property has Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV). Respondent 2 noted that burglars considered the cover of 
trees and vegetation where they can hide. This is in line with CPTED (Cozens & 
Love, 2017:2; Palmiotto, 2011:171) as burglars are concerned with being seen and 
apprehended. Overgrown shrubbery and un-kept gardens provide hiding places by 
blocking natural surveillance of occupants, neighbours and people passing by. The 
BWT (Kelling & Wilson, 1982:np; Miller et al, 2014:64-65) also applies, for example, 
un-kept gardens and a littered street send a ‘don’t care’ attitude to burglars and 
convey a message that it is unlikely that anyone would be bothered to report anything 
suspicious to the police. 
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Respondent 3 posited that burglars often did not know whether someone was in the 
house when they burgled, which could lead to a confrontation escalating to a 
residential robbery (house robbery). Respondent 4 felt that burglars monitored the 
routines of the residents, considered the security of the premises - security gates, 
fences, walls, dogs - and then decided whether the house was an easy or hard target. 
Respondent 5 maintains that burglars assess the security of the property. The 
security of the property can encompass burglar alarms systems linked to an armed 
response security company, dogs, security gates, burglar bars, CCTV, walls, and 
fences. The RCT and the RAT form part of the CPT and can be applied to this 
feedback. Burglars weigh up the pros and cons (risk and rewards) of committing the 
burglary beforehand, suggesting rational thinking and rational choice by weighing up 
the security measures of the property (RCT) (Santos, 2017:43; Walklate, 2017:80- 
81). A motivated burglar, a suitable target, and lack of guardianship form the base of 
Cohen and Felson (1979) RAT. The RAT applies as Respondent 4 suggested, 
burglars will monitor the routine activities (coming and going) of the occupants before 
carrying out the burglary and assess the risks and rewards (target hardening 
measures versus property to steal) (Natarajan, 2016: xviii; Walklate, 2017:83). 
 
5.5.6  How many  burglars  are  usually  involved  in  residential 
burglaries? 
 
Respondent 1 expressed that it could be a single burglar or a group of burglars 
committing residential burglaries. She noted that it could vary, depending on the 
number of goods taken. Respondent 2 said that there were usually two to three 
burglars in a group, while Respondent 3 specified two to four burglars in a group. 
According to Respondent 4, the number of burglars could vary from two to four 
burglars in an organised group. Respondent 5 commented that drug-dependent 
burglars burgled alone and that planned burglaries usually consisted of two to four 
burglars in the group. 
 
5.5.7 What time of day and day of the week do the burglaries mostly 
occur? 
 
Respondent 1 said burglary times varied and Respondent 2 said burglary times were 
always changing. Respondent 3 believed most burglaries occurred over weekends 
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when residents went out and left the home unoccupied. Respondent 4 remarked that 
in the past operations were planned according to the CPA, and the CTA. The CPA 
and CTA are tools used at station level (Hillcrest police station) to identify hotspots; 
for operational planning, resource allocation and crime prevention strategies 
(Krause, 2007:3-4, 35; NRC, 2017:16-17). Respondent 5 cited that planned 
burglaries were generally between 11 am and 5 pm and unplanned burglaries 
occurred in the early hours of the morning between 2 am and 4 am. These responses 
suggested that the time of burglaries varied. Planned burglaries generally occurred 
between 11 am, and 5 pm and unplanned burglaries between 2 am, and 4 am. From 
analysing closed-cases in this research, most of the residential burglaries occurred 
during the day when houses were unoccupied. 
 
This feedback suggests, the RCT and RAT apply to planned and unplanned 
residential burglaries. The RCT refers to a burglar that weighs up the advantages or 
disadvantages of committing the burglary, and when to commit the burglary (Santos, 
2017:43; Walklate, 2017:80-81). The RAT applies as the feedback suggests that 
burglars carry out burglaries at certain times, for example during the day when most 
people are likely to be at work (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Natarajan, 2016: xviii; 
Walklate, 2017:83). Both the RCT and RAT form part of the CPT. 
 
5.5.8  Do  criminals  that  commit  residential  burglary  escalate  to 
commit robberies at residential premises? 
 
Respondents 1 and 2 believed residential burglars progress to become residential 
robbers. These respondents explained that when burglars burgle a house, they do 
not know if anyone is home and the burglary can escalate to residential robbery when 
the burglar is confronted by a resident (or an occupant). Respondents 1 and 2’s 
statement correlates with Zinn (2017: np), where he noted that burglars are startled 
by occupants which increases the risk of confrontation, and escalation to residential 
robbery. Respondents 1 and 2, further added that burglars become more confident 
and gain experience whenever they burgle a house, which encourages progression 
from residential burglary to residential robbery. Respondent 3 was unsure whether 
residential burglars progressed to become residential robbers. According to 
Respondent 4, drugs could make burglars more confident, leading to escalation from 
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residential burglary to residential robbery, and drugs could also increase the level of 
violence used by burglars in a confrontation. Respondent 5 answered that criminals 
can progress their criminal career from residential burglary to residential robbery. 
Respondent 5 gave an example when the burglars burgle a house, the residents 
might be out or believed to be out, leaving the house unoccupied. The burglars 
gained entry only to be startled or surprised by a resident that is home (or a domestic 
worker); the burglars’ panic and either flee the house or retaliate by threatening or 
attacking the occupant. It is then no longer a residential burglary but has progressed 
into a residential robbery. Respondent 5 further claimed that the burglars may tie up 
the occupants and make off with the desired goods. 
 
Based on these answers, residential burglary can progress to residential robbery, 
and residential burglars can advance their criminal careers by becoming residential 
robbers. Whoonga and other drugs contribute to this progression which can involve 
assault, rape, or murder. The RCT (Santos, 2017:43; Walklate, 2017:80-81) applies 
to these circumstances in that burglars can choose to flee the property when 
confronted, or to rise to the confrontation and carry out the burglary or robbery. 
However, if burglars are under the influence, they may not be thinking rationally. 
 
5.5.9 In your investigations, can you identify patterns for a series of 
crimes? 
 
According to Respondents 1 and 2, when the same burglar, or group of burglars, 
were operating in an area, it was possible for burglary patterns to be identified. 
Respondent 3 was unsure whether burglary patterns could be identified. Respondent 
4 replied that if a residential burglary took place in a specific area, he checked 
whether a certain burglar was still in prison. For example, one burglar operating in 
the Hillcrest policing area was responsible for eight residential burglaries. 
Respondent 4, believed burglars that have previously been arrested and have served 
their prison sentence, often return to the same area to continue to commit burglaries. 
Respondent 5 responded that a burglary pattern could be identified where doors and 
gates were left open at houses, resulting in burglary opportunities and unplanned 
burglaries, in the case where wealthy houses were targeted. 
 
The CPT states that offenders (burglars) travel along paths (roads) and nodes 
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(destinations like home or work) during their everyday activities looking for suitable 
properties to burgle (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 2013; Wang & 
Liu, 2017). The FBT can explain when a property catches the attention of a burglar 
(Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; Wu et al, 2015). The 
NRBT (Bernasco, 2008:414; Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178) suggests that 
nearby properties are at elevated risk for residential burglary following an initial 
burglary in the area. 
 
5.5.10 Can you predict, based on previous cases, where the next 
residential burglary is most likely to occur? 
 
Respondents 1 and 3 felt that residential burglary could not be predicted. 
Respondent 2 reported that when an area is burgled, nearby areas are also at risk 
of being burgled. Respondent 4 pronounced that it was possible to predict residential 
burglary by working according to the CPA and CTA. Respondent 5 postulated that it 
was possible to predict where residential burglary could occur next, for example, 
when houses in two streets were burgled, and there were access routes to the same 
roads. Respondent 5 added that burglars target houses with escape routes. 
 
Respondent 2 and 5’s comments correspond with the NRBT that an initial burglary 
transmits a risk of burglary to nearby properties (Bernasco, 2008:414; Wang & Liu, 
2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). Respondent 5’s comment can be ascribed in the CPT 
where burglars travel along paths and nodes seeking suitable properties to target. 
The FBT describes the risk that is ‘boosted’ to surrounding properties following an 
initial residential burglary (Bowers & Johnson, 2004; Pease, 1998; Wang & Lui, 2017; 
Wu et al, 2015). 
 
Respondent 4 appears to be confident in predictive tools like the CPA and CTA. 
Respondent 5’s comment concurs with the NRBT and the CPT with regards to 
access routes (paths) that burglars travel along. 
 
An understanding of the NRBT and the application of the NRC could empower the 
Hillcrest police to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns which could assist 
in the allocation of resources to specific areas, for a certain period, to prevent further 
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burglaries from occurring. Based on this research, the NRC can be applied to identify 
near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. 
 
5.5.11 Would you use the NRC? 
 
 
Respondents 1, 2 and 3, were unfamiliar with the NRBT or the NRC. Respondent 4 
had not heard of the theory or the NRC but had a sound understanding of the CTA 
and the CPA. Respondent 5 was familiar with the NRBT. The respondents were 
informed about the NRBT and the NRC, and thereafter all five respondents said they 
would be willing to use the NRC if it assisted in and added value to their 
investigations. 
 
From the feedback received from the respondents, it is evident that they are valuable 
sources with a wealth of experience in the investigation of residential burglaries. 
Feedback suggests that the GIS was not used by detectives (or at station level) to 
map the location of residential burglaries or to represent the area they police. It was 
stated, that affluence or perceived affluence is believed to attract burglars which 
draws parallels with the FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang 
& Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178). According to the Flag Theory, the attractiveness 
or perceived wealth of a property draws the attention of would-be burglars (Bowers 
& Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178). 
Two types of residential burglaries were identified, namely planned and unplanned. 
In the case of planned burglaries, offenders may have used motor vehicles, and they 
travelled further distances to carry out their crimes that occurred mostly during the 
day. 
 
In contrast, unplanned burglaries took place mostly at night, and the burglars most 
likely travelled shorter distances on foot. The CTA and the CPA are tools that are 
currently used at station level to forecast/predict future residential burglary risk and 
for the planning of operations. Residential burglars generally work in groups but can 
also work in isolation. Certain circumstances can progress the criminal career from 
residential burglary to residential robbery:  as a burglar’s confidence grows with 
experience and/or drug use, they can progress their criminal careers from residential 
burglary to residential robbery; encountering a resident or occupant at home when 
the home was believed to be unoccupied, causing the confrontation to escalate into 
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a robbery. The CPA and CPT were used to forecast or predict residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. When a burglary occurred in a neighbourhood, 
detectives could gauge that nearby houses may also be at risk of burglary, as the 
same access routes into the street or neighbourhood, could be used by burglars 
operating in the area. The statements by the Respondents 2, “…when an area is 
burgled, nearby areas are also at risk of being burgled” and 5 “…it was possible to 
predict where residential burglary could occur next, for example, when houses in two 
streets were burgled, and there were access routes to the same road” on the 
prediction of residential burglaries support the Flag Theory (Bowers & Johnson, 
2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178), and the Boost 
Theory (Pease, 1998:8-9; Wu et al, 2015:178) and the NRBT (Bernasco, 2008:414; 
Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). The Flag Theory refers to the 
attractiveness, or perceived wealth, of a property which draws the attention of would- 
be burglars (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu 
et al, 2015:178). The Boost Theory comes into play when a house is burgled for the 
first time, the risk of another burglary occurring at the same place is boosted, as a 
result of previous burglary victimisation (Pease, 1998:8-9; Wu et al, 2015:178). All 
five respondents (detectives) highlighted that they would be willing to apply the NRC 
if it brought value to and enhanced their residential burglary investigations. 
 
5. 6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The NRC identified near repeat residential burglary patterns by using 12 months of 
residential burglary data (April 2012 to March 2013) from the Hillcrest (KZN) police 
station. A total of 411 (83.9%) residential burglaries ensued at stand-alone houses 
or properties, and 79 (16.1%) happened within gated communities. 
 
The majority (45.7%) of these residential burglaries occurred during the day, while 
 
33.1% happened at night, and 21.2% took place over a period of longer than 12 
hours. 
 
For each month, the burglary data was entered into the NRC, which identified any 
patterns of risk. The NRC was able to project the location of near repeat residential 
burglaries from 29.7% to 97.3% accuracy. The purpose of the NRC is not to replace 
194  
any other tools, but to work in conjunction with the CPT and CPA. As highlighted by 
Zinn (2017: np), the best type of crime intelligence should include a variety of tools 
and resources. In addition, Fielding and Jones (2012), noted that tools used for near 
repeat calculations of risk, and for creating predictive maps should be added to the 
tools used by police agencies, and not as a sole replacement for current crime 
analysis tools. 
 
The precision of the NRC over the 12 month period demonstrated predictive value, 
and it was accurate to 70% in May (2012), 87.9% in June (2012), 45.5% to 72.7% in 
July (2012), 29.7% to 59.5% in August (2012), 75.7% in September (2012), 46% to 
75% in October (2012), 75.6% to 97.3% in November (2012), 86.1% in December 
(2012), 78% in January (2013), 72.2% to 86.1% in February (2013) and 69% to 81% 
in March (2013). 
 
Month-to-month spatial analysis of residential burglaries in relation to the previous 
month’s burglary locations suggested a crime prevention value in focusing crime 
prevention resources to risk areas. Based on this, the allocation of crime prevention 
strategies may have prevented a significant amount of residential burglaries from as 
high as 69.4% in February 2013, and as low as 33.3% in March 2013. However, the 
analysis concluded that had crime prevention resources been allocated, based on 
the near repeat calculations of risk, that potentially more residential burglaries would 
have been prevented due to the predictive accuracy of the time-space clustering of 
near repeat residential burglaries, using the NRC. These findings can be supported 
by the CPT where burglars, and potential burglars, travel along paths (roads) and 
nodes (from work or home) until a suitable target flag their attention. The FBT is 
event-dependent, which means that property flags, or catches the attention of a 
burglar, who carries out a residential burglary at the property. The initial residential 
burglary ‘boosts’ the risk of future burglary victimisation at the same location or 
nearby properties. The NRBT explains these NRC findings and postulates that an 
initial burglary elevates the risk of burglary to the surrounding properties (Bernasco, 
2008:414; Wang & Liu, 2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). 
 
 
It was established that the CPT and the CPA are tools that are used to predict or 
forecast the space and time of residential burglaries (Krause, 2007:3,34-35; NRC, 
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2017:20; National Instruction 3/2011, 2011:5). Respondents 4 and 5 stated that the 
CPT and CPA are analysis tools used by Hillcrest police station to forecast or gauge 
the areas at increased risk of residential burglaries. The NRC differs to the CPT and 
the CPA because the NRC is a tool that focuses specifically on identifying near repeat 
residential burglary patterns (Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Piza & 
Carter, 2018; Schmitz, 2016: np; Wu et al, 2015). 
 
This research consisted of 490 closed-case residential burglaries, out of a total 1013 
residential burglary cases reported to Hillcrest Police Station between April 2012 and 
March 2013. Schmitz (2016: np) and Breetzke (2016: np) agreed that the sample 
should be adequate to test the application of the NRC in this exploratory research. 
The SMEs (Breetzke, 2016: np; Kruger, 2017: np; Landman, 2017: np; Schmitz, 
2016: np; Zinn, 2017: np) provided valuable feedback and supported the research 
on the NRC in a South African context. However, Kruger (2017: np) was cautious of 
models or tools developed for Western countries being applied in South Africa. 
Schmitz (2016: np) cautioned that this research would only apply to the Hillcrest 
policing area, and not South Africa as a whole. Breetzke (2016: np) suggested that 
a lack of essential data from the SAPS hampers spatial-temporal research in South 
Africa. Zinn (2017: np) stated that predictive tools need to be monitored, as a tool 
may be accurate at present but may quickly change overnight. Zinn (2017: np) was 
furthermore in support of using the NRC, in conjunction with the GIS, to create 
predictive visual maps, which can be used for resource allocation to areas at elevated 
risk. Schmitz (2016: np) was uncertain if station level staff had the skills to carry out 
NRC analysis, which would be required on an on-going basis if it was to be effective. 
 
Feedback from the SMEs (Breetzke, 2016:np; Schmitz, 2016:np; Zinn, 2017:np) 
correlates with research by Clark, (2014:24,27); Moreto et al (2014:1120-1121); 
Morgan (2000:87, 94); Mundell and  Ayres, (2015:7); Olckers (2007:137-138, 140, 
142, 222); Snyders, (2016:75); van Zyl (2002:70-71, 125); Winchester and Jackson, 
(1982: 9,14-15, 39), that proved that environmental factors contribute to the level of 
risk. Moreto et al (2014:1120-1121) argued that this risk is present before an initial 
residential burglary is committed, which in turn elevates the near repeat risk of 
burglary to nearby houses. 
196  
The Q-GIS was used to a conduct spatial analysis of residential burglary locations, 
in relation to environmental factors and found that houses within 500m of 
undeveloped land experienced most of the residential burglaries (86.7%). 
Undeveloped land posed the highest risk of burglary to houses in its vicinity. This 
was followed by 27.4% of residential burglaries occurring within 500m of other 
farming land and, 9.4% within 500m of urban settlement informal, 2.3% within 500m 
of peri-urban settlements, and 4.7% within 500m of sugarcane. A considerable 
number of residential burglaries (37.9%) took place within 500m of railway lines. 
Many residential burglaries took place along main arterial routes, like Inanda Road 
and Old Main Road. A total of 32% of residential burglaries occurred within 500m of 
Old Main Road, and 23.6% within 500m of Inanda Road. A staggering 80.2% of the 
residential burglaries happened within 200m of a road node, or road intersection and 
35.9% within 200m of a cul-de-sac or end node. 
 
 
From the feedback received from the respondents (detectives) on residential 
burglaries, it is evident that the GIS is not widely used (if at all) at the station level, 
for the mapping and investigation of residential burglaries. Burglars are attracted to 
target houses which are affluent (or perceived to be affluent), which is in line with the 
Flag Theory (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; 
Wu et al, 2015:178), because a suitable target property ‘flags’ or attracts the attention 
of the burglars. 
 
Two types of residential burglaries were identified, namely, planned, and unplanned. 
Planned burglaries were believed to be committed by burglars from out of the area, 
while unplanned burglaries were carried out by local offenders who stay or live in the 
area. It was estimated that burglars travel up to three to five kilometres to burgle a 
house. Burglars considered the security at the property before carrying out a 
burglary. Planned burglaries were usually committed between 11:00 and 17:00, while 
unplanned burglaries were said to be committed between 02:00 and 04:00. Snyders 
(2016: np) had similar findings in Villieria, Pretoria where most of the residential 
burglaries took place during the day (06:00-18:00). Van Zyl (2002:129) found that 
66.6% of burglaries in his study area, occurred when no one was home, meaning 
that 33.3% occurred while the residents were home. In such circumstances, as 
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highlighted by Zinn (2017: np) and Respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 (2015: np), if burglars 
are confronted, the burglary may progress into a residential robbery. According to 
the RAT burglars carry out burglaries at certain times, for example during the day 
when the property is unoccupied (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Natarajan, 2016: xviii; 
Walklate, 2017:83). The RCT suggests that burglars weigh-up the risks and rewards 
of committing the burglary, and when to commit the burglary (Santos, 2017:43; 
Walklate, 2017:80-81). Both the RCT and RAT form part of the CPT. 
 
Target hardening devices, such as burglar alarms, do not deter burglars, as planned 
burglaries are carried out within two to three minutes, and the burglars flee (by motor 
vehicle) before security can respond. Burglars may progress their criminal career to 
residential robbery as their confidence grows, with the use of drugs, and/or when the 
burglars are startled or confronted by an occupant when the house was believed to 
be empty. The CPA and the CPT are analytical and predictive tools used at station 
level by the SAPS, to predict the time and location of future burglaries. The NRBT 
was not widely known by the detectives (respondents), but all five detectives were 
willing to apply the NRC to their investigations if it added value. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter commences with the findings and adherence to the research design. 
The second part of this chapter provides recommendations for future research on the 
application of the NRC. The recommendations support the inclusion of SMEs views 
in research, the capturing of the x and y coordinates of residential burglaries by the 
police, and the essential training of police members to conduct routine near repeat 
calculations and generate predictive risk maps. Residential burglary statistics, from 
non-police sources like security companies and neighbourhood watch groups, 
should ideally be included in near repeat calculations. The police can enhance 
community participation through local neighbourhood watches or street watches and 
practice the concepts of the CPTED and the BWT, as the success of these crime 
prevention strategies relies on community participation. Further research on the role 
that environmental factors play in residential burglaries is suggested. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes with an outline of the chapters. 
 
 
 
 
6.2 FINDINGS AND ADHERENCE TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
The researcher followed the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design 
for this exploratory research, which made use of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. The quantitative data, followed by qualitative data was collected during the 
research and merged together to provide an in-depth understanding of the research 
problem (Bryman, 2016:692; Creswell, 2014:4, 215; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 
2013: 207; dos Santo et al, 2017:3; Porche & Spencer, 2017:3). This research is 
based largely on a quantitative orientation, which made the explanatory sequential 
mixed methods ideal for this exploratory research (Creswell, 2014:14). 
 
This research focused on the application of the NRC using 490 geocoded residential 
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burglary cases over a 12-month period (April 2012 – March 2013). The NRC was set 
for the Manhattan Distance Measure with temporal bandwidths of seven days with 
30 bands, and 400m spatial bands with 13 spatial bands using p=0.01. The 
Manhattan Measure was used as the majority of the residential burglaries occurred 
in urban settlements (91.6%) within the Hillcrest policing area. All 12-months were 
calculated to these settings. Schmitz (2016: np) agreed with testing the NRC by using 
bandwidths up to 500m; as 500m is equal to two street blocks. The month-to-month 
near repeat calculations were performed, and the calculations for each month 
visualised using the Q-GIS. The quantitative aspect of the research, in the form of 
secondary data analysis, and risk calculations were conducted and followed by one- 
on-one qualitative interviews with detectives of Hillcrest police station, and electronic 
communications with SMEs. All ethical considerations and CRIMSA (2012: np) code 
of conduct, as well as the principles of the Belmont Report 1979, were adhered to 
during the research. 
 
The secondary data collection and analysis of all closed-case residential burglaries 
between April 2012 and March 2013 provided a sample of 490 residential burglary 
cases. All the residential burglaries in the sample had known street addresses which 
could be identified using eThekwini Municipal GIS data (cadastral). Breetzke (2016: 
np) advised that Hillcrest (KZN) has a well-constructed road network and will have 
accurate cadastral boundaries but cautioned this may not be the case for informal 
areas (which fall within the Hillcrest policing area). All the residential burglaries were 
geocoded providing a visual representation of the location of the residential 
burglaries and x and y coordinates (and dates) necessary for near repeat 
calculations. Qualitative interviews were conducted with detectives who volunteered 
to participate, providing that anonymity was ensured. These interviews were 
conducted at the convenience of the detectives in the privacy of their offices, at 
Hillcrest police station. All participants were provided with a letter of introduction 
outlining the purpose of the research, and consent forms which were signed before 
the start of the interview. The secondary data collection, qualitative data collection 
(in form of one-on-one interviews with detectives from Hillcrest police station), and 
electronic communications with SMEs were successful (and valuable to the 
research) as far as the NRC was recognised as a valuable tool in predicting near 
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repeat residential burglaries. 
 
 
Reliability was achieved as the application of the NRC identified that near repeat 
residential burglary patterns were consistent, in terms of the NRCs ability to identify 
them, in the same way as international research on near repeat residential burglary 
prediction (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; 
Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 
2014; Piza & Carter, 2018; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; 
Wu et al, 2015). As highlighted by Bachman and Schutt, (2016:85); Creswell (2014: 
np) and Schutt (2017:244), reliability can be confirmed if the consistency and stability 
of a measure of a concept can be repeated by a different researcher and in different 
research projects. Furthermore, this research met the criteria of internal reliability as 
the indicators of measurement (near repeat residential burglary patterns identified in 
Hillcrest) are consistent (Bryman, 2016:692). Breetzke (2016: np) held the opinion 
that there was no reason the NRC would not be accurate in a South African context 
but warned that this may vary depending on the urban area. 
 
As highlighted by Dr Schmitz (2016: np), these research findings only represent the 
Hillcrest policing area and not South Africa as a whole. However, the NRC identified 
the existence of near repeat residential patterns in the Hillcrest policing area within a 
South African context for the first time. Even though these near repeat residential 
burglary patterns may differ in space and time, to previous international research 
(Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Fielding & 
Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Piza 
& Carter, 2018; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 
 
2015), the underlying point is that near repeat patterns exist in the study area, and 
according to these research findings, the NRC holds a crime prevention value for the 
Hillcrest police. 
 
The NRC can identify near repeat residential burglary patterns, (as is the case with 
international research), but the near repeat patterns identified in Hillcrest cannot hold 
true for South Africa as a whole. The near repeat residential burglary patterns 
identified in the Hillcrest policing area are similar in nature to international research 
findings, but cannot be generalised beyond the study area (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; 
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Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen, Yuan & Li, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson 
et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Moreto et al, 2014; Morgan, 2000; Piza & 
Carter, 2018;Townsley et al, 2003; Wang & Liu, 2017; W u, Xu et al, 2015). 
 
Predictive validity was achieved through the NRC's ability to accurately identify near 
repeat residential burglary patterns for the following month over a 12-month period 
(Bryman, 2016:694; Gray, 2014:153). These near repeat calculations of risk were 
used to create month-to-month predictive risk maps over a 12-month period. For 
each month, these calculations were compared to the actual location of residential 
burglaries, to determine the predictive accuracy of the NRC. The NRC was found to 
be accurate in predicting the space and time locations of near repeat residential 
burglaries ranging from as low as 29.7% for August 2012, and up to 97.3% in 
November 2012. Construct validity was met, as the NRC identified near repeat 
residential burglary patterns which were found to be accurate through month-to- 
month analysis, confirming its crime prevention value for the Hillcrest police 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2016:85; Bryman, 2016:69; Gray, 2014:279; Schutt; 2017:240). 
The geocoded residential burglary points (x and y coordinates) and date were 
entered in the required format for the NRC and systematically calculated for each 
month other a 12-month period. The near repeat residential burglary patterns and 
risk calculations were visualised using the Q-GIS. The statistical validity was met by 
following this design and a statistical method (Gray, 2014:153). The NRC itself is 
externally valid, and external validity was achieved in this research as the research 
findings in terms of identifying the existence of near repeat residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest policing area, have been identified worldwide by international 
research (Bryman, 2016:691; Crowther-Dowey & Fussey, 2013: 109; Gray, 2014:280 
 
The existence of near repeat residential burglary patterns has been proven by 
international research (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et 
al, 2013; Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson et al, 2007; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; 
Moreto et al, 2014; Piza & Carter, 2018; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003; Wang 
& Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015) using the NRC and related different measures. 
However, the research findings presented here are only applicable to the Hillcrest 
policing area and not South Africa as a whole (Schmitz (2016: np), making these 
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findings internally valid. As stated by Bryman (2016:692), internal validity refers to 
the extent to which findings integrate a relationship or link between two or more 
variables. The geocoded and dated month-to-month residential burglary points 
entered into the NRC, identified near repeat residential burglary patterns in the 
Hillcrest policing area. 
 
The NRC calculations over the 12-month period were visualised using the Q-GIS and 
analysed month-to-month. The month-to-month near repeat residential burglary 
pattern and risk calculations were analysed against actual reported residential 
burglaries reported to the Hillcrest police station (April 2012 - March 2013), to give 
an insight into the predictive accuracy of the NRC. The data that was gathered 
through one-on-one qualitative interviews with five detectives of Hillcrest police, and 
the feedback and opinions of SMEs, was combined with the analysis of near repeat 
calculations of risk to supply a deeper understanding of near repeat residential 
burglary patterns in the Hillcrest policing area. This exploratory research succeeded 
in following an explanatory sequential mixed method approach and therein merging 
the quantitative and qualitative data, to provide a detailed account of the research 
findings. 
 
The research aimed to apply the NRC to identify near repeat residential burglary 
patterns in the Hillcrest policing area using 12-months of residential burglary cases 
reported at the Hillcrest police station. To test the NRCs predictive ability, the near 
repeat calculations were illustrated using the GIS for each of the 12 months, creating 
a predictive near repeat risk map for the following month. The findings were analysed 
and discussed. 
 
The interpretation of the findings suggests that the NRC can be a valuable tool to the 
Hillcrest police station. The NRC identified near repeat residential burglary patterns 
in the Hillcrest policing area, which were found to be accurate through comparison 
with actual reported residential burglaries. The identification of near repeat residential 
burglary patterns holds a crime prevention value for the Hillcrest police. 
 
The researcher thus successfully answered the research questions namely: 
203  
6.2.1 Can the NRC identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in 
the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area? 
 
The NRC was able to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest 
policing area over a 12-month period. 
 
6.2.2 Can the NRC predict near repeat risk of residential burglaries in the 
 
Hillcrest policing area? 
 
 
It is evident from the findings as discussed above that the NRC can accurately predict 
near repeat residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area. NRC accuracy ranged 
from 29.7%% to 97.3%, when month-to-month near repeat calculations were 
compared to actual reported residential burglaries, between April 2012 and March 
2013. 
 
6.2.3 Can the NRC be of any value or use to the Hillcrest police for 
resource allocation, crime prevention strategies and 
investigations in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area? 
 
The NRC identified near repeat residential burglaries in the Hillcrest policing area. 
The NRC can predict or forecast the spatial-temporal locations of near repeat 
residential burglaries. This holds a crime prevention value for Hillcrest police. With 
this insight, valuable resources in the form of patrols and workforce deployment can 
be assigned to certain areas of elevated risk for a certain period. 
 
Schmitz (2016: np) highlighted that the aim of the NRC was to identify repeat and 
near repeat residential burglary patterns, close to where the first burglary occurred 
and within a certain period so that the police can prevent further residential burglaries 
from occurring. 
 
6.2.4 Can the GIS be a valuable visualisation and  analytical tool at 
 
Hillcrest (KZN) police station? 
 
 
The research findings strongly support that the GIS as visualisation and analytical 
tool should be utilised at the Hillcrest police station. The GIS (Q-GIS) was used to 
map the Hillcrest policing area, and the sample of 490 residential burglaries was 
pinpointed or geocoded for each month over 12 months. The NRC results were 
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visualised using the GIS, and spatial analysis was conducted to determine the 
month-to-month risk calculations, against actual reported residential burglaries, to 
determine the accuracy of the predictive risk maps. 
 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
SMEs should be included at the early stages of future research endeavours.  In this 
research, SMEs like Dr Schmitz, Professor Kruger, Professor Breetzke, Dr Landman 
and Professor Zinn, brought value to this research by confirming the value and need 
of the NRC, to identify near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) 
policing area for the first time. 
 
This research consisted of 490 closed-case residential burglaries out of a total of 
 
1013 reported Hillcrest Police station between April 2012 and March 2013. The cases 
displayed street addresses that could be identified using eThekwini Municipal GIS 
data (cadastral). It is recommended that future studies of the NRC should make use 
of current residential burglary statistics and include all the reported cases of 
residential burglary; not only closed cases. Access to closed-cases of residential 
burglaries was permitted for this exploratory research. As highlighted by Schmitz 
(2016:np), future research on near repeat residential burglaries, and the application 
of the NRC, should include a broader sample of police stations, such as a police 
station in a dense rural populated area in KZN, a police station in sparse rural areas 
with small towns in the Free State or Northern Cape, and downtown Durban Central 
police station (urban area). 
 
For future research purposes, all residential burglaries reported to the SAPS should 
include the x and y coordinates for the address or location of the burgled home. The 
reason for this is to ensure that all residential burglary occurrences, even if there is 
no known or fixed street address, can be geocoded or mapped using the GIS. The 
same applies to units within complexes or gated communities. The detective who 
visits the crime scene and investigates the burglary can do this using a GPS. The 
same can apply for all residential burglaries reported to other establishments, like the 
neighbourhood and street watches, and armed response security companies. 
Recording of the x and y coordinates is essential for the NRC. 
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Additional research in the application of the NRC would result in more detailed near 
repeat calculations of risk for residential burglaries. Thus, further research should be 
carried out. Once the application of the NRC in the Hillcrest policing area has been 
streamlined, then the near repeat calculations of risk can be included in support 
systems, or decision-making regarding the CPA and CTA, for resource allocation to 
specific areas at specific times. Zinn (2017: np) emphasised that the best type of 
intelligence consists of proactive crime intelligence based on a variety of tools and 
resources. He further proclaimed that the more analyses and tools applied, the more 
accurate the crime intelligence will be (Zinn, 2017: np). In addition, Kruger (2017: 
np), suggested that the lack of research in this area could be attributed to a lack of 
accurate (geocoded) data for some locations. Regarding this matter, Breetzke (2016: 
np), believed there is no reason the application of the NRC in a South African context 
would be inaccurate, but he noted that accuracy may depend on the urban area. 
Kruger (2017: np) expressed his reservations about predictive tools from developed 
countries being applied in the South African context. However, future research on 
the NRC can either prove or discredit it as a tool applied in the South African context. 
 
Likewise, the GIS and NRC tools should be implemented at the station level, and 
members should be trained to conduct near repeat calculations and visualise data 
using the GIS to create predictive risk maps, based on near repeat calculations of 
risk. These maps should be updated on a weekly or monthly basis. However, Schmitz 
(2016: np) cautioned that even though the Q-GIS and the NRC are freely available, 
the skills necessary to carry out this analysis may be lacking in SAPS staff. The 
effective training of SAPS members at station level in the use and application of the 
GIS (Q-GS) and the NRC, would be an advantage. 
 
Zinn (2017: np), supported the idea of the application of the NRC and the GIS to 
create predictive risks maps and confirmed that the application of these tools would 
be of advantage to the SAPS for resource allocation, for the prevention of residential 
burglaries. Zinn (2017: np) however cautioned that if tools such the NRC, the CPA 
and CPT are currently accurate in predictions (or forecasting), they may change, and 
should thus be subject to on-going reviews. 
 
The lack of crime statistics from the SAPS remains a challenge and this could be the 
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reason for the dearth in research of this nature (Breetzke, 2016: np). Since only half 
of the residential burglaries are reported to the police (Statistics South Africa, 2012:3; 
Lehohla, 2014:59, Lehohla, 2017a:1; Lehohla, 2017b:65), residents may report 
residential burglaries to other establishments like armed response security 
companies, and neighbourhood and street watches, instead of reporting it to a police 
station. Concerning this research, if the Hillcrest police included the aforementioned 
sources of crime statistics and if they allowed for and included the residential burglary 
incidents, then the data could have been captured by the CPA and the CTA, which 
are currently used by the SAPS for resource allocation. The residential burglary 
statistics provided by armed response security companies, and neighbourhood and 
street watch groups, will enhance the application of the NRC to identify near repeat 
residential burglary patterns, in the Hillcrest policing area. The NRC differs to the 
CPT and the CPA because the NRC is a tool that focuses specifically on identifying 
near repeat residential burglary patterns (Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; 
Piza & Carter, 2018; Schmitz, 2016: np; Wu et al, 2015). 
 
The Hillcrest police should promote community participation and educate the public 
on the importance of reporting crimes like residential burglaries. The public should 
be encouraged to establish, or join existing neighbourhood or street watch groups, 
and should be educated on community-minded crime prevention theories like the 
CPTED (Safer Spaces, [Sa]: np) and the BWT (Snyders, 2016:28) which rely on 
community participation. The HPNW is a good example of a community that 
empowered themselves and took ownership of their neighbourhood through 
community participation, and the application of crime prevention theories like the 
BWT and the CPTED. 
 
With regards to environmental factors, such as location of the residence to main 
roads, end nodes (cul-de-sacs); various land usages; and railway lines as factors 
relating to the risk of residential burglary victimisation, Schmitz (2016:np), stated, 
“Literature and experience indicate that certain areas are crime attractors and these 
can be addressed through Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) principles.” Schmitz’s (2016: np) statement corresponds with the research 
of Moreto et al (2014:1120) who highlighted, using the RTM and NRC, that specific 
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environments or locations are at higher risk for initial residential burglaries than 
others. 
 
Breetzke (2016:np) confirmed that environmental factors are one of the most 
important  theoretical  underpinnings  of  environmental  criminology  and  that  the 
'environmental backcloth' of an area creates or reduces opportunities for crime. Zinn 
(2017: np), also confirmed that there is a definite correlation between environmental 
factors and burglaries. Statements on environmental factors by Schmitz (2016:np) 
and Breetzke (2016:np) concur with the CPT in terms of the backcloth or the 
environment in which offenders travel along paths (roads) and nodes (work or home) 
during their routine activities, where a suitable target property ‘flags’ their attention 
(FBT). In contrast to the CPT and FBT; the CPTED theory aims to reduce 
opportunities for crime by enhancing surveillance, increasing visibility, encouraging 
territoriality, managing access and escape routes, improving image and aesthetics 
and target hardening. The BWT concurs with the CPTED, which promotes ownership 
of the environment. 
 
More research into the role that environmental risk may play in residential burglary 
victimisation in the Hillcrest policing area, will be beneficial as it will help to prevent 
the initial residential burglary from occurring, which elevates the residential burglary 
risk to surrounding properties. This statement is supported by Moreto et al 
(2014:1120-1121) who stated that risk is present before an initial residential burglary 
has taken place, which escalates the (near repeat) risk of burglary to nearby houses. 
Prior research by Clark, (2014:24,27), Moreto et al (2014:1120-1121), Morgan 
(2000:87, 94), Mundell and Ayres, (2015:7), Olckers (2007:137-138, 140, 142, 222), 
Snyders, (2016:75), van Zyl (2002:70-71, 125), and Winchester and Jackson, (1982: 
9,14-15, 39) identified environmental factors that contribute to the risk of residential 
burglary victimisation. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Chapter 1 commenced by recognising international research on near repeat 
residential burglary patterns. The NRC was introduced, as well as the CPA and CPT 
analysis tools currently used by the SAPS. 
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The aims and objectives of the research were presented, and the research questions 
were highlighted. The following basic key concepts were defined for the reader: 
environmental criminology, the GIS, crime mapping, the Q-GIS, crime analysis, near 
repeat burglary, the NRC, DSS, residential burglary, and robbery at residential 
premises. Furthermore, the research methodology was outlined, namely the mixed- 
methods approach, unit of analysis, data collection methods, reliability and validity 
and ethics followed, which were discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the work of Morgan in Australia, who was the first to identify 
near repeat residential burglary patterns which opened the doorway to international 
research on the near repeat residential burglary patterns in Australia (Johnson et al, 
2007; Morgan, 2000; Townsley et al, 2003), Brazil (Chainey & da Silva, 2016), China 
 
(Chen et al, 2013; Wang & Liu, 2017; Wu et al, 2015), New Zealand (Johnson et al, 
 
2007), the Netherlands (Johnson et al, 2007), the UK (Bowers & Johnson, 2005; 
Fielding & Jones, 2012; Johnson & Bowers, 2004; Johnson et al, 2007) and the USA 
(Johnson et al, 2007; Moreto et al, 2014; Piza and Carter, 2018). 
 
Early developments of the GIS was outlined by Tomlinson in Canada in the 1960s 
and the research highlighted the international development and popularity of the GIS 
as a spatial analysis tool. The GIS provided a platform for the development of crime 
mapping and crime analyses by law enforcement agencies around the world. The 
application of the GIS in an African context was considered. In South Africa, the 
development of the GIS by the SAPS began in the 1990s, but the extent to which it 
is currently used by the SAPS is unclear. Environmental factors and the link to 
residential burglaries were highlighted by international research findings. Different 
housing types had been identified that could spread the near repeat risk (or 
contagion) to surrounding properties, following an initial residential burglary. 
However, it was reported that environmental factors can increase the risk of the first 
initially residential burglary in an area. 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted criminological theories to wit CPT and the FBT to explain initial 
residential burglaries, and near repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest 
(KZN) policing area.  The CPT borrows from the RCT and the RAT, which state that 
burglars’ awareness space is along the nodes and paths of the environment in which 
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they go about their routine activities until a suitable target catches or flags their 
attention. The FBT states that certain properties catch or flag the attention of burglars 
and potential burglars, which might result in a burglary in the area. The FBT suggests 
that risk is elevated or ‘boosted’ following the initial burglary, where burglars may 
return for goods not taken during the initial burglary or share information about the 
property within their criminal network. The heightened risk is short-lived and 
diminishes quickly following target hardening measures taken by the residents or 
burglary victims. 
 
The HPNW applies the CPTED and the BWT to assist in the prevention of residential 
burglaries (initial and near repeat) in the Hillcrest policing area. Both the CPTED and 
BWT require community participation and working with local law enforcement to 
successfully prevent residential burglaries (and other crimes) in their area. The 
CPTED consists of five principles namely: surveillance and visibility, territoriality, 
access and escape routes, image and aesthetics and target hardening. The BWT is 
largely based on order maintenance of the environment or neighbourhood, which 
sends a clear message of ownership by ensuring the neighbourhood is well 
maintained and litter and graffiti free. 
 
In Chapter 4, the methodological outlay of this exploratory research was outlined in 
detail. The value of this research regarding the application of the NRC to identify near 
repeat residential burglary patterns in the Hillcrest (KZN) policing area; and to assist 
with the deployment of valuable police resources to specific areas, or for a specific 
period to prevent further residential burglaries, was discussed. The GIS (Q-GIS) was 
used to visualise the Hillcrest policing area, residential burglary locations and the 
near repeat calculations of residential burglary risk. The objective of the research 
was to test the predictive accuracy of the NRC on month-to-month near repeat 
calculations of risk over 12 months. The GIS was used to conduct spatial analysis of 
the residential burglary locations, and environmental factors such as neighbouring 
land usage, railway lines, main roads, road nodes or intersections and cul-de-sacs 
or end nodes. Month-to-month spatial analysis of residential burglaries, in relation to 
the previous month’s burglaries, was analysed to prove whether the NRC has a crime 
prevention value. Both the NRC and the Q-GIS are free downloads. 
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An exploratory research design was followed because of limited research on this 
topic in South Africa. The unit of analysis consisted of docket analysis (secondary 
data collection) of 490 residential burglary cases reported to the Hillcrest (KZN) 
police station between April 2012 and March 2013. The researcher was only granted 
permission to access closed-cases. A sequential mixed methods approach was 
found to be the most appropriate data collection method for this exploratory research, 
as it allowed the merging of quantitative and qualitative data for a deeper 
understanding of the research topic. The quantitative aspect of this research 
consisted of secondary data collected through docket analysis, the geocoding of 
residential burglary points, and the near repeat calculations of risk. The qualitative 
aspect of this research entailed confidential qualitative interviews with five detectives 
from the Hillcrest (KZN) police station. The qualitative aspects also consisted of 
electronic communications with SMEs - Dr Schmitz, a Principal Researcher at the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Built Environment (South 
Africa); Professor Breetzke of the Department of Geography, Geoinformatics and 
Meteorology at the University of Pretoria (South Africa); Dr Landman (previously a 
Principal researcher at CSIR, Built Environment, South Africa), and currently a 
lecturer at the University of Pretoria; Professor Kruger, a Principal Researcher at 
CSIR, Built Environment, South Africa; and Professor Zinn of the UNISA, College of 
Law, School of Criminal Justice, Department of Police Practice. 
 
The researcher described how validity (predictive, statistical, construct and external) 
and reliability was met through the research methodology followed. Permission for 
this research was demonstrated by following the ethics outlined by UNISA, College 
of Law Research and Ethics Committee (Ref: CLAW 2015 ST 11, see Annexure 3), 
and the permission and guidelines from the SAPS’s Head of Strategic Management; 
the Division Commissioner of the Detective Service; and the Provincial 
Commissioner. The researcher respected the CRIMSA code of conduct, and the 
ethical principles and guidelines described in the Belmont Report,1979. 
 
In Chapter 5, the near repeat calculations of risk were applied to 12 months of 
Hillcrest police residential burglary data (April 2012 – March 2013). The NRC 
identified a significant amount of near repeat residential burglary patterns. Through 
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docket analysis, the researcher established that a total of 411 (83.9%) residential 
burglaries happened at stand-alone houses or properties, and 79 (16.1%) occurred 
within gated communities. 
 
For each month, other the 12-month period, the burglary data was calculated using 
the NRC, with the aim of identifying any near repeat residential burglary patterns in 
the Hillcrest policing area. It was established that the NRC was able to forecast the 
locations of near repeat residential burglaries with accuracy ranging from 29.7% to 
97.3%.  The researcher stated that the purpose of the NRC was not to replace any 
current analysis tools used by the SAPS such as the CPA and CTA, but rather 
presented a valuable tool to specifically identify near repeat residential burglary 
patterns. As emphasised by Zinn (2017: np), the best type of crime intelligence 
should include a variety of tools and resources. In addition, Fielding and Jones (2012) 
promoted the application of the NRC, and the creation of predictive risks maps using 
the GIS, as additional tools to be utilised by police agencies to prevent near repeat 
residential burglaries, and not as a replacement for any crime analysis tools currently 
used. 
 
The NRC proved its ability to accurately predict near repeat residential burglary 
locations over a 12-month period. This precision was highlighted by the accurate 
prediction of 97.3% of the residential burglary locations in November (2012). The 
month-to-month spatial analysis of residential burglaries that occurred within 500m 
of the previous months’ burglaries topped off at 69.4% in February 2013. However, 
the analysis concluded, that had crime prevention resources been allocated based 
on the near repeat calculations of risk; potentially more residential burglaries would 
have been prevented based on the NRCs accuracy for predicting the locations of 
near repeat residential burglaries in the study area. 
 
The CPT was confirmed in this study’s findings and further explained that burglars 
and potential burglars travel along paths (roads) and nodes (work or home) until a 
suitable target ‘flags’ their attention (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Brantingham 
& Brantingham, 1993; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Chen et al, 2013; Wang & 
Liu, 2017). The FBT promulgates that a suitable target catches the attention of the 
burglars and that ‘boost is event dependent’, which means that property flags or 
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catches the attention of a burglar who carries out a residential burglary at the 
property. The initial residential burglaries ‘boost’ the risk of repeat residential burglary 
victimisation at the same location, or nearby properties. The NRBT, which elaborates 
that an initial burglary heightens and transmits the risk of burglary to surrounding 
properties, which boosts the risk of future burglary victimisation either at the same 
location or nearby properties; was also applicable to the research (Bowers & 
Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178). The 
NRBT explains these NRC findings and proves that an initial burglary elevates the 
risk of burglary to the surrounding properties (Bernasco, 2008:414; Wang & Liu, 
2017:1; Wu et al, 2015:178). 
 
 
It was established that the CPT and CPA are analysis tools used by the SAPS to 
predict or forecast the space-time clustering of crimes, like residential burglary 
(Krause, 2007:3,34-35; NRC, 2017:20; National Instruction 3/2011, 2011:5). In 
addition, Respondents 4 and 5 stated that the CPT and the CPA are analysis tools 
used by Hillcrest police station to forecast, or gauge, the areas that are at higher risk 
of residential burglaries.  It must be emphasised that NRC is different from the CPT 
and the CPA, because the NRC is designed specifically to identify near repeat 
residential burglary patterns (Chainey & da Silva, 2016; Chen et al, 2013; Piza & 
Carter, 2018; Schmitz, 2016:np; Wu et al, 2015). 
 
Regarding the sample, Schmitz (2016: np) and Breetzke (2016: np) agreed that the 
sample should be adequate to test the application of the NRC in this exploratory 
research. The SMEs (Breetzke, 2016: np; Kruger, 2017: np; Landman, 2017: np; 
Schmitz, 2016: np; Zinn, 2017: np) supported the research on the NRC in a South 
African context and provided valuable feedback, which was discussed in detail. 
 
Feedback from the SMEs (Breetzke, 2016:np; Schmitz, 2016:np; Zinn, 2017:np) 
 
correlates with research conducted by Clark (2014:24,27); Moreto et al (2014:1120- 
 
1121); Morgan (2000:87, 94); Mundell and  Ayres (2015:7); Olckers (2007:137-138, 
 
140, 142, 222); Snyders (2016:75); van Zyl (2002:70-71, 125); and Winchester and 
Jackson (1982: 9,14-15, 39), that environmental factors contribute to the level of risk. 
In this regard, Moreto et al (2014:1120-1121) argued that the risk is present before 
an initial residential burglary is committed, which in turn elevates the (near repeat) 
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risk of burglary to nearby houses. 
 
 
The Q-GIS was used to conduct spatial analysis of residential burglary locations in 
relation to environmental factors. Houses within 500m of undeveloped land 
experienced the majority of the residential burglaries (86.7%), followed by other 
farming lands at 27.4%. Undeveloped land posed the highest risk of burglary to 
houses in its vicinity. Other neighbouring land uses (urban settlement formal, peri- 
urban settlement, and sugarcane fields) were found to pose significantly less risk in 
comparison to undeveloped land. Many residential burglaries (37.9%) took place 
within 500m of railway lines. A large number of residential burglaries took place along 
main arterial routes, like Inanda Road and Old Main Road. A total of 32% of 
residential burglaries occurred within 500m of Old Main Road and 23.6% within 500m 
of Inanda Road. A staggering 80.2% of the residential burglaries happened within 
200m of a road node or road intersection, and 35.9% ensued within 200m of a cul- 
de-sac or end node. 
 
Through interviews with the respondents (detectives), it was concluded that the GIS 
is not widely utilised at station level for the mapping and investigating residential 
burglaries. Burglars are attracted to target houses which are affluent (or perceived to 
be affluent), which is in line with the FBT (Bowers & Johnson, 2004:12; Pease, 
1998:8-9; Wang & Liu, 2017:2; Wu et al, 2015:178), because a suitable target ‘flags’ 
 
or attracts the attention of the burglars. 
 
 
From the feedback, it was established that residential burglaries in the study area 
could be one of two types of burglaries: planned and unplanned. It was proposed 
that planned burglaries were the work of burglars from other areas, and unplanned 
residential burglaries were normally the work of burglars living in the area. It was 
established that burglars travel up to three to five kilometres to carry out a residential 
burglary. Burglars consider the security of the property, and the routine of the 
residents when deciding wherever to burglarise a property or not. Target hardening 
in the form of burglar alarms linked to a security company did not deter burglars, 
because often the burglars had fled, with the desired goods, within two to three 
minutes before anyone could respond. If burglars are on drugs (like Whoonga) while 
carrying out a burglary and were confronted by a resident at home, the incident may 
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escalate from burglary to a robbery at residential premises. Both the RCT and the 
RAT form part of the CPT. The CPA and the CPT are crime analysis tools used by 
Hillcrest police station and the SAPS. The NRBT was not widely known by the 
detectives (respondents), but all five detectives were willing to apply the NRC to their 
investigations if it added value. Finally, recommendations were made about future 
research on the application of the NRC. 
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To whom it may concern 
 
This is to certify that the thesis witthe title "THE NEAR REPEAT RISK CALCULATION OF 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES IN HILLCREST,KWAZULU.NATAL,SOUTH AFRICA: A 
CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS",to be submitted for examinationby JAMES ANDREW 
GEORGE ROY CLARK,has been edited forlanguage under my hand.Neither the 
researchcontent nor the researcher's intentions were alteredinanyway during 
the 
editing process. 
 
I applied standard United Kingdo11English language conventions during the editing 
process.I stand by the quality of the Englishlanguage in this document, provided my 
amendments hove been accepted and further changes mode to the document 
hove been submitted to me for review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Or MG Karels 
 
karel smg@outlook.eom 
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Subject:HD meeting feedback 
 
 
Dear Colleagues, 
 
 
Herewith feedback from the HD committee: 
 
 
(a) Clark, J-MAin Criminology (4346-739-3) Approved 
 
 
Amendment of title and change of supervisor: 
 
 
Amended title:                              The near repeat risk 
calculation of residential burglaries in Hillcrest, Kwazulu Natal, 
South Africa: a criminological analysis 
 
 
Previous title: The application of the 
near repeat calculator as an investigative tool in the prevention of 
burglary in Kwazulu Natal, South Africa:a criminologicalanalysis 
 
 
Supervisor:   Prof AE Hesselink 
Co-supervisor:  Prof NP Dastile 
Previous supervisor: Prof BW Haefele 
Kind regards, 
Marelize 
 
Prof M Schoeman 
 
Department of Criminology and Security Science 
 
College of law 
 
Tel: 012 433 9491 
 
Email:schoemi@unisa.ac.za 
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Please use this letter as permsi si on to use the Near Repeat calculator software for your project 
and dissertat on.Please also advise the University of South Africa powers-that-be that the 
softwareis in the public domain and the freeware license agreementis availabl e online for 
their perusal. Perhaps this mgi ht helP' them avoid forcing their students to indugl e in such 
irrelevant and unnecessary requests in the future. 
Regards 
 
 
 
Jerry Ratclfife 
Professor 
Department of CriminalJust ce 
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COLLEGE OF lAW RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE 
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Dear J Clark 
 
ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPLICATION: THE APPLICATION OF THE NEAR REPEAT CALCULATOR AS 
AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL IN THE PREVENTION OF BURGLARY IN HILLCREST,KWAZULU-NATAL, 
SOUTH AFRICA.A CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the College of law Research Ethics Review 
Committee for the above mentioned research project. The ethicalclearance application for the above 
mentioned research project has been approved. 
 
The proposed research may now commence with the proviso that: 
1)   The  reseorcher/s  will ensure  that  the  research  project adheres  to the  values and  principles 
expressed in the UN/SA  Poliey on Research Ethics, which con be found at the following website: 
http://www.uniso.oc.za/cmsys/stoff/contents/deportments/res_ policiesjdocs/Poliey_ 
Reseorch%20Ethics_rev%20app!i620Counci/_22.06.2012.pdf 
2)   Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to 
the ethicality of the study, as well as changes  in the methodology, should be communicated in 
writing to the Chair of the College of Law's Research  Ethics Review Committee.  An amended 
application could be requested  if there  ore  substantial  changes  from the  elCisting proposal, 
especially if those changes affect any of the study-related risks for the research participants. 
3)   The  researcher  will ensure  that   the  research   project  adheres  to  any  applicable  notional 
legislation,  professional  codes  of  conduct,  institutional   guidelines  and  scientific  standards 
relevant to the specific field of study. 
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Mr James Clark 
P.O. Box 1995 
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3652 
 
 
RE: RESEARCH STUDY: THE APPLICAnoN OF NEAR RISK CALCULAnoN AS AN 
INVESTIGATIVE TOOL IN THE PREVENTION OF BURGLARY IN HILLCREST,KWAZULU-NATAL: 
RESEARCHER: MRJAMESCLARK 
 
 
 
Attached,please find Head Office minute 313412 dated 2014-06-06 from the office of Major 
GeneralMenziwa regarding permission to conduct the above-mentioned research. 
 
 
Recommendation to conduct the said researchhas been granted in terms of SAPS Research Policy 
(National Instruction 112006). 
 
 
Approvalfrom the office of the Divisional Commissioner:  Detective Service as 'N911 as the Provincial 
Commissioner Is hereby granted to oonduct the research on oondltlon  that the contents stipulated in 
paragraphs 4,5 and 6 af Head Office minute 3134/2 dated 2014-06-<>6 are adhered to prior to the 
commencement of the research study. 
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ANNEXURE 6: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Hello, I am James Clark. I am currently studying towards my Master’s in Criminology 
 
through University of South Africa (UNISA). My research topic is, 
 
 
“The application of the Near Risk Calculator as an investigative tool in the prevention 
of burglary in Hillcrest, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. A criminological analysis”. 
 
My research has been approved by Major General Menziwa of Head Strategic 
Management, The Divisional Commissioner: Detective Services and the KZN 
Provincial Commissioner. 
 
I have analysed crime data for closed cases of house breaking and robberies at 
residential premises reported to Hillcrest Police, KZN between April 2012 to March 
2013. All crimes have been mapped using Arc GIS (Geographic Information System). 
The Near repeat (NRC) results have been calculated, and the results have been 
mapped on the same maps, creating ‘risk maps’. 
 
I would like to ask you some questions which relate to closed cases of house 
breaking and robberies at residential premises. There are no right or wrong answers 
to these questions. Please understand your participation is voluntary and you are not 
being forced to participate in this research. The choice to participate is your choice 
alone. However, I would really like you to share your knowledge and experiences 
with me. If you choose not to participate in this research, you will not be affected in 
any way. If you agree to participate, you may stop the interview at any time, and 
refuse to answer any question you are uncomfortable with. I will not be recording 
your name anywhere on the questionnaire, and no one, apart from myself will be able 
to link you to the answers you give. All individual information will remain confidential. 
 
The interview will last about 40 minutes. I will be asking you a few questions, and I 
request that you be open and honest in answering these questions. Some questions 
may be of a personal or sensitive nature, which you may refuse to answer these 
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questions. I may be asking questions that you have not thought of before, and which 
may involve you thinking about the past or future. 
 
Your participation and input would be greatly appreciated. 
 
 
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact my supervisor Dr 
 
Häefele , at UNISA, School of Law, Criminology Department on email: 
 
haefebw@unisa.ac.za . 
 
 
My contact details are:        0768715137,           and           my           email           is, 
jamesclark137@gmail.com , if you have any queries at a later date relating to this 
research. 
 
Thank you for your time. 
James Clark 
Master’s in Criminology student at UNISA 
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ANNEXURE 7: CONSENT FORM 1 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 1 
 
 
Consent form for participation in research questionnaire 
 
 
I,                                                         _                                        _      hereby   agree 
 
to participate in James Clark’s research on: 
 
 
“The application of the Near Repeat Calculator as an investigative tool in the 
prevention of burglary in Hillcrest, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. A criminological 
analysis.” 
 
I understand that I am participating freely of my own will. I also understand that I can 
terminate the interview at any point should I not want to continue and that my decision 
will not prejudice me in any way. 
 
The purpose of the study has been explained to me and I understand what is 
expected of me. I understand that this research project may not benefit me 
personally. 
 
I have received the details of a person to contact should I wish to speak about any 
issues regarding the research or interview. I understand that my name and details 
will not be written anywhere on the questionnaire, and no one will be able to link me 
to the answers I give. I understand that all my personal information will remain 
confidential and only James Clark will have access to it. I understand that, if James 
Clark is permitted to, I shall receive feedback of the research findings. 
 
 
 
 
Name and signature of participant:                                                    
 
 
Date:   _ 
Place:     
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ANNEXURE 8: CONSENT FORM 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 2 
 
 
Permission to contact participant at a later date 
 
 
I hereby consent to James Clark contacting me at a later date about his on-going (or 
future) research on the topic: 
 
“The application of the Near Repeat Calculator as an investigative tool in the 
prevention of burglary in Hillcrest, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. A criminological 
analysis.” 
 
 
 
 
Name and signature of participant:                                                    
 
 
Date:   _ 
Place:     
  
 
 
 
ANNEXURE 9: RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (APRIL 2012 TO MARCH 2013) 
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ANNEXURE 10: APRIL 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 11: APRIL 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 12: APRIL 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 13: MAY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 14: MAY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 15: MAY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 16: JUNE 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 17: JUNE 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 18: JUNE 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 19: JULY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 20: JULY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 21: JULY 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 22: AUGUST 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• August 2012 Residential Burglary 
•••• raliway_lines 
QHillcrest Station boundaries 
DSuburbs 
242  
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE 23: AUGUST 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 24: AUGUST 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 25: SEPTEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 26: SEPTEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 27: SEPTEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 28: OCTOBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 29: OCTOBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• October 2012 Residential Burglary 
DOctober 2012 Risk 50%>   801m to 1200m 22-28 days 
DOctober 2012 Risk 191%> 2001m to 2400m for 29-35 days 
0 October 2012 NEAR REPEAT RISK 28%> 401m to 800 for 0-7 days 
DOct 2012 Risk 65%>  1201m to 1600m for 22-28 days 
•••• railway_lines 
QHillcrest Station boundaries 
DSuburbs 
  
 
.. 
 
ANNEXURE 30: OCTOBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 31: NOVEMBER 2012- RESIDENllAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 32: NOVEMBER  2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 33: NOVEMBER  2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 34: DECEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 35: DECEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 36: DECEMBER 2012- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 37: JANUARY  2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 38: JANUARY  2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 39: JANUARY  2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 40: FEBRUARY 2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 41: FEBRUARY 2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 42: FEBRUARY 2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 3 OF 3) 
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ANNEXURE 43: MARCH 2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 1 OF 2) 
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ANNEXURE 44: MARCH 2013- RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES (MAP 2 OF 2) 
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